



GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN GROWTH


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GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN GROWTH

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


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
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To David V. Tiedeman



PREFACE

In undertaking to write this brief volume about guidance and human growth, I have chosen to steer a course somewhat different from directions followed by most other books addressed to our profession. This is not because I disagree with the several competent works that have been written to instruct the graduate student of guidance and the school practitioner, but because it has seemed to me that recent events in the schools and colleges, and in our profession itself, bespeak rather unequivocally the need for an expanded dimension in our view of guidance and in our practice.

What I would like to do through this book is to contribute toward opening up a new inquiry into the directing constructs, the psychological and educational assumptions, and the overarching framework from which school guidance practice can be derived. Further, it is my aim to bring within the scope of this discussion the concept of optimum human development as the primary objective of guidance and of all education. In doing so, I should like to address my remarks not only to students and practitioners of guidance but to those who study and observe education from other perspectives—administrative, sociological, philosophic, psychological—to anyone, in short, who views education as a context for intervention to promote growth and who is concerned with questions of personal competence in school and college.

Although interest in the broad objectives of guidance has grown in recent years, much of the discussion has tended, in my view, to offer us only the horns

of a dilemma. Either we have been referred, in global terms, to a "guidance point of view" equating guidance with individual counseling, or we have been asked to consider guidance as essentially an ancillary administrative service.

There is nothing wrong with the equation, guidance equals individual counseling, except that counseling then becomes an educational extra, a supplement tacked on to "individualize" the regular program. This view also ignores the weighty question of the educational objectives of counseling, assuming as it does that interpersonal relationships are both necessary and sufficient conditions for educational as well as personal growth.

The common alternative view, while avoiding the problems inherent in equating all of guidance with the individual counseling function, introduces more serious problems, to my mind, by denying guidance no more significant educational function than scheduling, record-keeping, charting, and the like.

Seeking a *tertium quid* that would keep the student in the spotlight yet give guidance a major institutional function paralleling and complementing the teaching function, I evolved the seven chapters that follow. They explore the major stumbling blocks I see presently confronting our growing field, and why continued random expansion without systematic theory is to be avoided. They suggest the desirability of an integrated view of human development as a basis for guidance, and they attempt to demonstrate that personal competence, in a framework of developmental stages and tasks, offers such a view. The applied science of human behavior that results is shown to have as its major focus autonomy and self-esteem in the educational environment, and this is ultimately defended as a more appropriate goal for guidance than applied behavioral technology per se. Finally, in light of the above, three practical aspects of guidance are examined: counseling, testing, and an as-yet underdeveloped aspect, consultation.

My task proved difficult, for it was necessary to avoid suggesting a single super-theory on the one hand while not falling into an atheoretical eclecticism on the other hand. I also strove to avoid the danger of theorizing about theorizing. There is always a temptation when building theories to continually escalate the levels of abstraction, both to bewilder the reader and to avoid clarifying what one really means, but I have tried in this regard to heed William James' admonition concerning thought and metathought—that all such "thinking" must feed back to the reality of function. It is, at least, my hope that the ideas and illustrations presented here do feed back to the real world of schools and most especially to the realities of personal educational development.

Many people have helped me with this work, but one stands out as a major resource, as someone who has deeply affected my thinking about guidance and human development. I consider it a privilege to dedicate this work to him.

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GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN GROWTH: THE NEED AND THE OPPORTUNITY

INTRODUCTION

The field of guidance presently confronts a paradox. The practice of guidance has expanded tremendously in the last decade. The number of school counselors has increased geometrically at practically every level from elementary to college and graduate school. In less than five years, according to recent estimates, counseling staffs in schools have doubled (Sprinthall and Tiedeman, 1966, p. 59). However, in spite of this numerical growth, or perhaps in part because these increases have been so rapid, a systematic theory for the practice of guidance is lacking. This major omission lies at the root of the problems confronting school guidance programs. Without theory, the practice of guidance grows randomly, first in one direction, then in another, and a few years later in yet another. Services and duties are added to the organizational charts of guidance offices in one era and just as quickly removed in the next, leaving, as one cynic remarked, only the ivy growing in the counselor's office as the constant in guidance.

Guidance is simultaneously looked upon as the solution to all major problems of education and as the answer to none of those problems. Guidance as

theory (or non-theory) and practice seems to suffer the disease of extremism, of promising everything and delivering nothing. Counselors, perhaps unwittingly, have encouraged the public to see their role and functions as more important than teaching and then immediately disavow the consequences. Thus all during the sixties, the visibility of counselors had increased. The pressure for post high school education had created a new platform for counselors, along with the "college night," the "career day," the extensive school visitation from admissions officers and local alumni, the intricacies of financial aid and applications, etc. However, this obviously placed the counselor in a very delicate and extraordinarily vulnerable position. It appeared to the public that the counselor could provide the service of a gate keeper to the next phases of education, that the counselor did "get kids into college," or placed students in desirable apprentice training programs. It came as a shock and with considerable dismay when the public discovered the truth. While to some extent this may have been a special problem of suburban high schools, the counselors in such schools did experience what amounted to a major trauma each spring, during what was called "thin envelope time."^{*} The parents of each succeeding graduating class learned all too late that their sons and daughters could be admitted or rejected for what may have appeared as esoteric reasons well beyond the control and direction of the counselor. While many counselors were being blasted out of the water by parents of rejected applicants, other counselors were often broadcasting their successes. In a nearby system one counselor was heard to announce in loud tones that in spite of many difficulties, he had succeeded in getting all of his counselees into college, with three exceptions. Three kids had been hospitalized for mental breakdowns, but as soon as they were released, the counselor noted, "I'll get them admitted too!"^{**}

Under such conditions the public becomes too easily confused as to what guidance is really all about. The confusion, however, is probably not within the public but is more directly within the guidance field itself. Under the general rubric of meeting the "needs" of students, it is all too easy to find a laundry list of functions which suggests that, in addition to performing specific services in post high school placement, a counselor should also handle a bewildering variety of other functions. There is no rationale for inclusion or exclusion other than, in the words of one counselor, "But if we don't do it, who will?" Thus one finds counselors taking attendance, maintaining library information, scheduling interviews, changing course programs for students, handling discipline but rarely seeing students on a regular basis, and almost

* College acceptances usually come in "thick" envelopes with instructions, freshman guides, outlines of orientations, housing information, etc. The rejection letters are usually one page.

** Other examples are the lists published in local papers of college acceptances and scholarship thermometers showing the dollar value of awards to the senior class. Apparently, counselors have been slow to recognize that they themselves are partly responsible for creating a set of expectations concerning guidance as a "look what I can do for you" function.

never having direct involvement in the instructional program or curriculum of the school. As curriculum materials and procedures are changed over time, the guidance counselor apparently has almost no voice in such decisions, nor does he have the time (or perhaps the interest) to work with students on a regular basis. Thus the paradox of guidance as a function, lost somewhere between the cosmic and the trivial, its lack of rationale inviting an eclectic solution which in turn only promotes more undirected growth.

An alternate view for guidance is both needed and essential if we hope to create a viable basis for practice. From an educational standpoint it makes little sense to have a counselor with a college and graduate education performing housekeeping tasks. Yet such under-utilization is surely one of the most severe problems confronting the field and results from the eclectic nature of guidance practice. When a definition is as broad as meeting students' needs, anything will fit as a function. Priorities disappear and guidance as an educative function paralleling teaching as an educative function becomes impossible to maintain, let alone establish. The problem now, of course, is that it is far easier to be critical of the present "mess" in guidance than to be creative in pointing toward solutions. However, it is toward this latter direction that we now turn.

DIMENSIONS OF GUIDANCE

To create a framework for understanding a nature and purpose for guidance different from eclectic service, we will start by presenting some comments from students at different educational levels. It is too easy to simply state a goal for guidance, i.e., to promote individual freedom, and then move on to other problems. It is our purpose at this point to examine, from the students' perspective, how they experience the process of education, what they learn and more importantly, what they may have missed. From this perspective, we hope to convey in an elaborated way both the complexities of the process of human growth and the opportunities for an educational function that does not now occur. In the last chapter, we will discuss some of the future programs necessary to provide an education for students.

At this point we need to illuminate our meaning of guidance for human growth through some examples. These examples have been selected from different points along the educational sequence—college, secondary school, elementary school—in order to illustrate the developmental dimension of guidance. Some of the personal and psychological issues that students confront will be apparent from the illustrations.

However, as will be made clear in the discussion following each excerpt, a broader context than simply personal adjustment is necessary if we are to understand guidance as both theory and practice.

A College Student Speaks

In the first example, a college student is discussing some of his thoughts and emotions concerning his present motivation and the demands he faces from the college environment:

It seems to me there are a lot of different reasons one can pick for being in a course . . . someone picks a course to get a certain grade [a "gut" course] . . . and then there's the reason one wants, an idealistic one . . . you know, I want to get all I can out of this course—the learning is for me . . . but there aren't courses that cover exactly what you want. It seems to me there are a lot of reasons like this for any one course . . . several of these reasons can apply at once.

In my case, getting a good grade always applies in order to keep my scholarship . . . and also I feel pretty idealistic about things, I'd like to get, to really want to get, all of the material out of a course.

I see a few students who really follow their own lines—you know really hard-headed about what you want . . . I wish I didn't have to care about good grades. This would be great, I hate grades, you know you have to grub for them—and so I do it. It seems to me that it would be a lot more enjoyable doing this if you got what you really wanted out of something.

There's so much energy chasing a grade, that anything that's left over for the kind of education as I've defined it, it's pretty hard to come by. It's just about drained off.

In the excerpt, a student outlines a specific instance for the possibilities of a guidance process. At the general level, guidance as education subsumes the concept that an individual can creatively develop the assumption of responsibility for the direction of his own life. The student, in this case a college sophomore who has always achieved academically at the top of his class in both secondary school and college, confronts a discontinuity. The discontinuity he is now experiencing is not really abnormal or unusual, but it is new to him. The dissatisfaction which emerges within him parallels the incongruity between what he wants and what he feels he is being forced to acknowledge. The press to chase

grades, he begins to see, interferes with his so-called "idealistic" feelings—learning as intrinsic rather than extrinsic, primarily for him as a learner rather than for the system, for his own interest and curiosity rather than to please others. This all too familiar bind is classic in the sense that to a greater or lesser degree almost all students meet this issue—equating the demands of a task in a way that one is victimized by that task. In fact, in a democratic society we all too often hold as ideal the notion of maximizing self-direction, but at a practical level represent quite a different perspective. The ready tendency for adults to "guide" through an emphasis on extrinsic rewards and reasons is all too prevalent. It is small wonder then that students confronted by educational tasks become confused as to their own purpose in the enterprise. However, to simply note the incongruity is not sufficient to overcome it. As a necessary first step, it is certainly essential to see the problem. To derive a satisfactory solution, however, represents complexity of the first order. An appropriate solution would involve a rearrangement within the person of his perceptions of the task in relation to himself. The possibility of this kind of rearrangement, or synthesis on a new level of self-understanding and action, by no means automatically connotes a successful resolution. Our main point is that, as represented in this case, the opportunity is now present. At this particular stage for this specific student, the opportunity exists for him to confront the meaning of the implied confrontation. This is where the "learner" is now. This is where a process of guidance in that context may be enjoined.

From this first step, the recognition of discontinuity, the student has the opportunity to catch on to the process of change, to recognize that the external demands are indeed shifting—that the teachers themselves are not myopic concerning the goals of a liberal education. In the student's words:

I can't help but feel a little less than integral, if I let these other values take over [studying just for grades]. Some of the guys I really have the least respect for are the guys who are, you know, . . . always worrying about the grade, always worrying. I can tell it really ticks the teacher off too, you know, they're always coming up after class—"Gee, how much do you think this will count on the exam?" "What's the curve like?" It begins to seem just petty.

The ability to stand up for oneself, to take charge, to be selective, to exercise one's own critical judgment, does not come in one surge, as one task that is resolved once and for all. The growing emergence and

the potential development of such a stance, however, can be seen. The signs are unmistakable. The student continues after relating a recent experience in which a friend had apparently collapsed emotionally under the pressure of grades:

I saw him on the street being loaded into the police paddy wagon—screaming something about God and physics. . . . It's just that I'm beginning to get a little different perspective. If I miss [referring to academic performance at the highest level], it's not having this emotional tantrum that, you know, triggers off a depression. It's just, O.K., I missed, gee, I missed. I pulled the trigger on the gun and I missed the target. One bullet gone, that's all, but I still have a sense of retaining what I learn. . . . Before I thought this way: if I missed I didn't remember anything that I learned the previous term. Just recall the catastrophe of getting one grade lower than I wanted.

I mean really, I was trying to type the other day. I had a fever of 102° and I was trying to type out a paper that had to be in on Thursday. I was just about three times slower than I usually am; I was making all kinds of errors. I only got three pages done out of six or seven and I just said, "This won't do. I just don't care. If the instructor wants it now he'll have to get along without it because it's not going to get done now." You know, if the college doesn't like it that way then I don't need the college. It's really a sense of freedom. I couldn't have said that, I wouldn't have, I couldn't have said that when I was a freshman. I would have said, "If the college wants it then it must be right, it's got to be done."

Yet, freedom with responsibility, he closes by noting:

Yeah, if the college wants it, it certainly is important. That means that it ought to be considered, and considered with care.

If we conceptualize the development of personal independence that includes responsibility as an emerging process, we can view the excerpt in the context of a time sequence. By a process focus, we connote a dynamic within the person, a reference to a developing self, a process that is never totally completed. The framework includes the view of a series of successive approximations, or proximate criteria judged in the context of the person's stage of psychological and social development, the demands or tasks imposed by those sequential stages, and his emerging pattern of responses. It is the emerging pattern that represents

the crucial element, for in that pattern the process the individual actually uses, illustrates his command and control of the demands, or the reverse.

In the excerpt, the specific change that the student experiences is obvious—he changes his view of himself in relation to tasks. To establish himself more fully as an individual in his own right, *and* to master the specific learning tasks of the college at the same time, however, is no mean accomplishment. A success here is critical—redounding to self-mastery and indeed to authenticity as a person. The lack of success would point to a continuation of fear and estrangement. A person to whom “things happen,” connotes a passivity that unfortunately includes the seeds of self-destruction. The student might be continually haunted by the pressure of grades, or as it’s termed, “running scared all my life.” The ground on which he may stand at any point in his future life might continue to be shaky and volatile. Without an inner core to adapt successfully to new situations and challenges, life would be continually driven by the illusion that solutions reside in pleasing others—a search in the darkness for the right answers, a vain attempt to find “How much do you think this will count on the next exam?”

The relevant concern of the student in the case, prior to the emergence of a changing set of self-perceptions, was that the task (succeeding in college) was so important that it precluded the possibility of risk. It could be argued that the student should be shielded from such a distressing experience, that a confrontation should be avoided at all costs, that the demands be altered and the new experience be so shifted that he could continue to use his “old” definition of himself. However, it could also be argued that since this is a new task he should handle it as best he can. Any kind of intervention, in this view, would be detrimental to his own growth. In our view the process of learning confidence in self and mastery of new tasks is too precious to be left to chance, yet that is not sufficient justification for intervention that would substantially alter the nature of the new task. To create the conditions that foster autonomy and responsibility, avoiding either extreme, sets the guidance process in a context. To alter the task would also remove the possibility for a successful confrontation and the resulting advancement to a positively developing self. To provide no opportunity for reflection and understanding by the student would enhance the possibility of a resounding failure. In fact we have often been struck by the extent to which a liberal education assumes that an autonomous self will develop automatically. Too often, we would suggest, there is an ironic incongruity between the notion of “survival of the fittest” for the self, in contrast to the careful nurturance of scholarly

inquiry in subject matter. While we would rarely question the necessity of providing careful tutelage in the mastery of subject matter, and not leave this process to the vicissitudes of chance, we are still struck by the general lack of similar investment in the psychological development of the very same student.

A View from the Secondary Schools

We will now turn to an example selected from the secondary school. In this instance a group of students are discussing their experiences in an attempt to develop some perspective and clarification.

Boy 1 Ah—people go to school not to help others or to become cultured or anything. They just go because it's a necessity—to earn more money, to help themselves after college. I mean it's just one big process we're in, the . . . it's the whole school. . . . I think the whole school system is designed for that purpose. I mean, it's just one big race to get a diploma and people don't really study. They just memorize and take a test and they have to do some more studying. . . . You just race through a subject and you know something at the end, but it's not . . . it's not for the same purpose. It's just to get the diploma at the end.

Girl 1 We just want to do well so we could go on to college; and then maybe in college, that's when you start to learn things. . . ."

Girl 2 I think that the way the school system today is geared the student doesn't have time to inquire. . . . This doesn't mean he doesn't want to. . . . There's just so much that he has to learn and then take the college board exams. . . .

Boy 2 Like around here at report card time, everybody will go up to the teacher, "What did I get?". . . . They're so unbelievably mark-conscious . . . and I'm as mark-conscious as anybody else so . . . anyway. . . . And the teachers . . . the teachers always complain like . . . one teacher, yesterday . . . he yelled at a class. . . . He said, "All you want is A's and B's and you don't want to really learn." . . . But in the meantime there's the teachers and educators; they're the ones that are putting the pressure on you. . . . College applications will double by 1970. . . . You've got to get into college. . . . The high school drop outs, what are they doing now, they're cleaning streets. I mean they make it, they make it so hard. They say you've got to get into college, and your parents are constantly saying you've got to go to college if you want to make a lot of money, and then

they turn around and say, "Well don't be mark conscious." They're pushing you, and they're pushing in the other direction at the same time . . . so . . . it's a little . . . a little difficult.*

In secondary schools, the adolescent confronts a multitude of tasks, which Erikson classifies as the formation of a sense of identity. The students in the excerpt were all in the last half of their senior year. They were expressing some of their own views after experiencing the process of education in one particular school system. The extent to which the theme of extrinsic motivation appears again is certainly striking. The importance of the educational stepladder, going to college in order to get ahead, to get a good job in the future: these ideas seem a common currency to these students. Yet witness their reactions as high school life concludes. There is still hope for the future—"and then maybe in college, that's when you start to learn." The hope, however, may be forlorn in the face of an infinite succession of future hurdles. In the context of the discussion, though, it may be sufficient just to examine the present situation. The discontinuity is stark—"to get good grades to get to college." The fact that this press impinges upon inquiry and intrinsic interest in learning seems to be the unfortunate by-product. The educative focus on outcome rather than on the process itself again carries with it such inevitable discontent. It doesn't take long to figure out the cross-purposes involved, yet here again recognition is not solution.

Probably one of the most salient aspects of the difficulties which lie behind such a dialogue as has been presented, is the basic question of how much or to what extent have these students become involved in the decision about attending college. It seems that they have accepted at face value the idea that they should attend. That's what they have been told by the adults—teachers and parents. Seemingly, they have accepted this as a *fait accompli* without exploring their own reasons. For example, the following excerpt was taken from another group of high school students. The counselor asked them how they made the decision to go to college:

Girl 1 I've always wanted to go.

Girl 2 I've sort of had this idea all through elementary school and junior high school. It's the accepted thing to do especially in this kind of community. . . . Now I've started to think that I'd better make up reasons why I was going to college.

* This excerpt was from "Short-Term Group Counseling," Somers, L.; Thesis, H.G.S.E., 1967.

- Girl 3* I would like to think of it as a place that has a great intellectual atmosphere, but you know. . . .
- Girl 4* I have only one view of going to college. It's not going to college for college's sake. I'm going for what I can do when I get out.

We would suggest that an important educational experience, in both groups, had been effectively bypassed—that of each student examining and questioning his own purposes. Autonomy and responsibility might well be fostered if decisions were indeed vested in those who will be asked to implement them. This is not to suggest that we adopt a laissez-faire attitude or seek to promote either personal anarchy or educational nihilism. We obviously reject both the extremes of over-management or of genuine neglect. Yet we do expect students to develop their own reasons as a basis for action. We don't think that this can be accomplished by prescribing an eleventh commandment: "Thou shall go to college," and then attempting to rationalize this decision by recourse to the ensuing economic benefits to the individual or to the accrual of benefits to the society. Nor again do we favor adopting a negative stance connoted by a "survival of the fittest" attitude.

In these two excerpts, of course, we have only provided discussions from one point of view, that of students residing in a suburban and college-going community. Yet interviews with students in schools at the other extreme, where in fact almost no one goes on to college, reveal a similar picture of unexamined extrinsic reasons for at least aspiring to college.*

As a result, it seems that to a greater or lesser degree, the majority of high school students are confronting the issue of planning the next step, a step that often involves at least some concept of college. Yet rarely, we would suggest, is the student given an opportunity to use the question for exploration and elaboration of his own views, reasons, and motives. To attend college, or not attend, because it is a reflection of the accepted "thing" to do creates a vacuum within the student. The intellectually sophisticated student may then, in the words of one of the pupils, "make up some reasons." Beyond serving the purpose of a hollow set of rationalizations, it would be difficult to view such reasons as aspects of

* In a national survey of secondary school students, the reasons selected as most salient for attending college were: (1) preparation for work and (2) to earn more money. Students not presently planning on college selected these same dimensions as the most important in possibly changing their mind in favor of attending college (Flanagan, J. C. et al., *Studies of the American High School; Pittsburgh, Project Talent, 1962*).

genuine deliberation and choice, connoted by our phrase, "purposeful action."

The explanations for such a state of affairs are legion and generally quite legitimate. Guidance counselors, teachers, parents, and well-intentioned public information programs all seek to raise the aspiration level of all our youth. These efforts tend to rely on a deliberate set of extrinsic motives. They also tend to leave little space for the student to consider such information while attempting to reach his own conclusions. To update the dictum that "war is too important to be left to the generals," decisions affecting the future of our adolescents are too crucial to be left up to them. Rousseau set the question in generic terms when he asked, "Can we force people to be free?" Or, perhaps more realistically the question could be phrased, Can we create the conditions under which we maximize the possibilities that students choose, learn, and act for themselves? Autonomy and personal responsibility do not spring full blown, as it were, from the head of a modern day Zeus, at some magic age sharply separating the adult from the child. If we intentionally act in accord with such assumptions and recognize the sequential nature of personal (psycho/social) development, then our goals will not work at cross-purposes with our procedures.

At this stage the adolescent faces the discontinuity imposed by the necessity to choose something. He can perhaps too easily abdicate this responsibility. So as not to convey to the reader that college choice is the single confrontation students face, an additional illustration will be included here. In this case, a boy from an urban ghetto junior high school is talking about his future plans. He says:

Student I want to be something. I'd like to anyway. Most guys around here don't know what they're gonna do . . . but someday they'll see me, read about me in the papers. They may not be able to walk to come to see me, but I'll be known. They don't know me when I'm young, but they'll know me when I get to where I want to go.

Interviewer So people will know who you are?

Student Yeah—but sometimes I feel like I want to quit 'cause things are hard. You know that if you want to get anywhere, ain't no one gonna get you there for you.

This young man, perhaps because of circumstances, probably focused on the generic issues. He wants to be his own man, to be noticed and

recognized. Yet at this point he doesn't see how this might be accomplished. He notes further on in the interview that a lot of kids in the neighborhood talk about going on to college as a way of aiming at a career as a professional basketball player. "But you know what happens? They don't make it to college, then they wait around to get drafted into the service, get rejected for that, and then hang around the corner with nothing to do."

No matter what kind of a secondary school one might enter, the students all face the necessity of choosing and selecting from alternatives. As these examples show, the bases upon which such decisions are made are flimsy, extrinsic, and not necessarily related in any way to the integrity of the particular individual. The experience of school in general has been largely in functional terms—to do well in high school to qualify for admission to a "selective" college, to study hard enough to go to college as preparation for a career as a professional athlete, etc. The correlates of realism in the latter case may not be as high as in the former. Yet in both instances, self-direction, personal mastery, and competence as an individual in one's own right are missing. An important personal learning experience has been avoided, an opportunity bypassed.

Moynihan recently called specific attention to the human development and guidance problem of the urban poor. After examining the data from a national survey, he noted that a puzzling question arose concerning the problem of motivation. Students in poverty areas reported "the utmost attachment to all the approved attitudes toward education and clearly set themselves very high standards of performance." However it was absolutely clear that almost none of these same children met those standards. The expectancies are great. "What, on the other hand suggests nothing more than pathetic and doomed fantasy?" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 9). The problems of personal development cut across class lines, school districts, and other artificial boundaries, if we are willing to acknowledge their existence.

The Elementary School

A third example is an excerpt describing a group of fifth grade children in an actual classroom situation. In this excerpt we do not have the pupils' comments about their educational experiences, but rather a description of the process of education itself. In an experimental learning situation geared to the so-called "discovery method" . . .

. . . a set of unknowns . . . was presented . . . blank maps, containing only tracings of rivers and lakes of the area as well as the natural resources. They were asked . . . to indicate where the principal cities would be located, where the railroads, and where the main highways. Books and maps were not permitted. . . . Upon completing this exercise, a class discussion was begun in which the children attempted to justify why the major city would be here, a large city there, a railroad on this line, etc. . . . one young student . . . pointed his finger at the foot of Lake Michigan, shouting, "Yippee, Chicago is at the end of the pointing-down lake." And another. . . . "Well, O.K.: but Chicago's no good for the rivers and it should be here where there is a big city" (St. Louis).

(Bruner, 1959, p. 188)

In this instance the relation between learning and guidance may be extraordinarily close. The learning task has been presented in such a way as to maximize the students' initiative. The pupils' stage of psychological development is of course significantly different from the earlier excerpts, yet it does have substantial generic salience to the general framework we are suggesting. The development of mastery and personal initiative does not necessarily have to be delayed, or forced to a congruence with adult expectations. In fact a learning theory that held it necessary to learn by rote, to memorize, to refrain from inquiry until the facts are known, represents more of an inhibiting than a facilitating theory of learning, as well as of personal development. At the same time, to pick up an earlier point—in Biber's words:

The maturing of the autonomous processes is not, optimally, unilateral. It involves attaining equilibrium between dependence and independence; it includes the capacity to think and act independently while being able to accept a position of dependence where insufficient knowledge, experience or strength dictates the need.

(Biber, 1966, p. 157)

The growth and development of autonomous processes, in both learning tasks and personal development, are thus neither unilateral nor predestined. In our view it is a process that must be managed, nurtured and directed, especially if an optimal balance is to be achieved. Freud, many years ago, set the problem of an optimal balance quite clearly when he noted the difficulty of socializing a child with minimal interference to the child's creativity. In classical terms the problem was seen as learning

the appropriate balance between impulse expression and impulse delay or control, so that the child became neither a victim of an overly severe conscience (or archaic superego left over from early childhood) nor subject to the anarchy of uncontrollable infantile gratifications. Erikson has translated this problem to the stage of the elementary school pupil who may become subject to one of two trends, or even worse, may be wedged between the two.

The first trend, if carried to an extreme, exploits a tendency on the part of the pre-school and grammar school child to become entirely dependent on prescribed duties. He thus learns much that is absolutely necessary and he develops an unshakable sense of duty; but he may never unlearn again an unnecessary and costly self-restraint with which he may later make his own life and other people's lives miserable, and in fact spoil his own children's natural desire to learn and to work. The second trend, when carried to an extreme, leads not only to the well-known popular objection that children do not learn anything any more but also to such feelings in children as are expressed by the now famous remark . . . "Teacher, must we do today what we want to do?"

(Erikson, 1959, pp. 83-84)

In the dichotomy between over-control and permissive ambiguity one may be sorely tempted, especially with elementary school pupils, to rely on a prescribed dependency. There is a long history in both learning theory and personality development based on the Lockian principles of the *tabula rasa*. In learning, the assumption is that at some magic age (always in the future) the child can think independently, but for now he is not mature enough and must master the facts first. Through a kind of rote learning process he will be made ready for later learning "where he can be more on his own," so the theory goes. The stultifying effects of this theory of knowledge can be seen in some of the excerpts quoted earlier in this chapter. By building in a kind of cognitive rigidity in learning, as well as an emotional and affective search for the "right" answers, the ground may be laid early for the defeat of initiative. In the same way, a theory of personal development which emphasizes conformity and obedience through extensive supervision, either in child-rearing practices or in other attempts to mold child character to adult expectations, leads to a similar lack of competence of self. Instead of fostering personal competence, these procedures would enhance only a prescribed dependency of self on others. Enough has been said here and elsewhere of the deleterious effects created by conditions of obedi-

ence and conformity, both in learning tasks and in personal development, to make further elaboration unnecessary. The assumption of an essential passivity within the child, that he indeed presents himself as a "blank tablet" upon which one may write at will, and that he should accept without question both what and how he learns in subject matter and in self development, simply does not square with more comprehensive and viable theories of learning and human development. The same may be the case, in our view, of the other extreme trend that Erikson notes: a *laissez-faire* theory that the development of learning and self is an autonomous, automatic unfolding and should brook no intrusions.

The development of independence and autonomy in children, adolescents, and adults is, in our view, a continuous process. This is not to suggest, however, that the process is linear. Personal development, in fact, is discontinuous, marked by discontinuities reflecting a series of new tasks and challenges, as the present tasks are successfully conquered. Thus stages are marked by physiological and psychological changes, by inner state changes as well as by changes in external expectations and demands. The child and adolescent, especially, grow unevenly, by "great leaps forward" followed by periods of quiescence. Thus the identity has early roots in initial experience and is gradually reformed in successive episodes. Whether the personal identity so formed is essentially positive, pro-active, and competent will be determined by the degree of success at each of these developmental sequences. What we are suggesting, then, is that this focus become the goal of the guidance process.

THE DUAL CURRICULUM: PROCESS GOALS OF EDUCATION, TEACHING, AND GUIDANCE

The previous excerpts have been presented to illustrate a particular point of view and, indeed, a rationale for a guidance function—the ultimate relationship of a developing cognitive maturity, or so-called mastery of subject matter, to a developing personal or psychological maturity of the self. In the preface, we stated the generalization that an appropriate educative function might be conceptualized under the rubric of "education as liberating." The liberation involves two dimensions: the liberation of self, which we have termed *personal development*, and the liberation of self in learning task situations, which we have termed, for want of a more accurate phrase, the *development of cognitive/intellective maturity*. Both these dimensions might be achieved by students if

educators adopted a process goal orientation. The process goals involve reconstructing the concept of curriculum (what we want the student to learn) from its present univocal emphasis to a dual curriculum. Implicit is that neither teaching nor guiding can accomplish the basic objective by itself. Rather, the two functions should be viewed as separate but equal, if you will. Teaching and guiding could become simultaneous and sequential to the student's stage of development. We are not suggesting that the two functions combine in one person, echoing the 1930's with every teacher a counselor and vice versa. We are, in fact, suggesting just the opposite. The dual curriculum implies a frame of reference with distinct but related priorities—learning to learn with a priority on subject matter mastery, and learning to learn with a priority on mastery and competence as a person. Such a dual curriculum for education makes requisite a collaboration of the two priorities. Neither process itself is sufficient. Neither can make up for, nor should be forced to attempt to make up for, the deficiencies of the latter. Too often a guidance service may be grafted onto an educational program to act as little more than a supplement—to provide some personal attention. This may only indicate that the vehicle for education itself is in need of an overhaul rather than a minor addition. Guidance programs cannot make up for deficiencies in other areas. Unfortunately, this in fact too often is the situation leading to guidance as an antidote model. As Mathewson notes:

The belief that guidance, through personalized concern and attention can adequately substitute for the deficiencies of a narrowly academic program is a snare and a delusion. . . . If the broadly instructional phases of the curriculum cannot develop the student, no intermittent process no matter how individualized and specialized, can do so. (Mathewson, 1949, p. 169)

The reverse is also true, we would submit. An inadequate guidance program focused narrowly on providing students with test information, occupational information, or college admission information cannot be effectively overcome by more effective and efficient teachers. Their role and their concern must start from a different set of educational priorities, and these cannot be translated into an effective or adequate substitute for guidance.

By presenting the articulated plight of students in the first two excerpts of this chapter, we have attempted to underline the need for a joint effort through guidance and teaching for the liberation of the student.

It may be that there are those who still would refute personal development as an appropriate concern for education, who might insist on a clean separation between "subject matter knowledge" and "self-knowledge." We have been suggesting an organic connection between the two concepts, for by leaving the "self" out of the process of education we would manage quite effectively to eliminate the person from the process. The organic focus providing simultaneous development through a dual curriculum would prevent such an estrangement and indeed promote growth and development both personally and educationally. Then maybe we could stop implying that for the student himself, at least, there would be a significant difference in these two domains.

SUMMARY

We have noted the major problems presently confronting the field of guidance. The dangers inherent in continual random growth will only lead to disaster. More counselors performing a bewildering array of functions that have no educational rationale is an unhappy prospect at best. More counselors having their roles defined for them by outside forces and immediate exigencies is an even unhappier prospect because of the bitter irony involved in a role that purports to promote self-direction and control for students, but not for the counselors themselves. The opportunity is obvious and is growing more blatant every day, whether on college campuses or in secondary and elementary schools. Students are caught in the crosscurrents of the need for academic achievement at the possible expense of their genuineness as persons, or are caught between the incongruities of high aspirations and low performance at the high school level. Such crosscurrents are producing an ever increasing number of psychological casualties. Withdrawal is the present barometer, whether it be in the form of using drugs, dropping out, or running away. Many students still worry all the way from elementary school to college, hoping to find some confidence in self. Others, and in increasing numbers, have stopped worrying and simply have rejected everything in favor of "turning on" and "tuning out"—an alternative that is hardly a solution.

Thus we have little choice but to take the problem of personal development seriously. If we do not, we will have missed the chance to develop an effective guidance program. To attempt to help students by "adjusting" them to schools is simply not enough. A more comprehensive program and theory are clearly necessary. In this chapter we have examined the problem largely from perspectives provided by students; that led to commentary for an elaboration of the issues. In the next chapter we will examine in greater detail the theoretical foundations for guidance as a means of promoting human growth.

THE PLACE OF THEORY: WHY GUIDANCE NEEDS GUIDANCE

INTRODUCTION

Since the field of personality development in general does not provide us with a single comprehensive theory, the problem of theory for guidance and counseling is immediate. In fact if one views the many different theories of human development and personality that are currently proposed, one wonders if the different schools of psychological thought are all looking at the same thing. How is it possible for psychologists to study the same phenomenon (human behavior) and yet end up with so many diverse, contradictory, and competing positions? And to make matters worse, there are schools of thought within schools of thought. Thus the single classic psychoanalytic view of Sigmund Freud quickly spawned competing and diverse views within its own field. So too with the school usually denoted at the opposite pole from Freudianism, namely behaviorism. Although founded on a simple principle of the so-called law of classical conditioning, behaviorism itself soon contained divergence and multiple sub-schools (e.g., positive versus negative reinforcement). Such conditions have led some to simply eschew all further attempts to develop theory, a position

based on the contention that theories of personality are simply a matter of personal preference.

The above reaction, which embraces as it does a non-theory, may be partly justified because of the tendencies for theories of personality to become separate, narrow and, therefore, too confining as a set of explanatory concepts. For example, to claim that everything that a human being does results singularly from his schedule of reinforcement is overly reductionistic—or in Allport's terms, this view presents a theory that is, "threadbare, even pitiable." (Allport, 1965, p. 15.) Such narrow concepts and singular theories may result from an all too common attempt to emphasize a scientific technique that is not sufficiently powerful to grapple with the complexities of human behavior.*

The problem created by the complexity of human behavior, however, cannot be so easily dismissed. It is important to recognize that it may be fruitless to continue a search for the equivalent of a Rosetta stone in psychology. The conditioned reflex, the unconscious, the law of effect, etc., have all in their time been held up as the answers. Yet none has delivered. It may be wise at this point to recall L. L. Thurstone's famous comment that human nature itself is immune to our theories and proceeds on its own without regard to, or in spite of, our attempts to unearth the answers. Perhaps a less pessimistic position derives from Henry Murray's aphorism—Every man is in certain respects:

- (a) Like all other men.
- (b) Like some other men.
- (c) Like no other men.

In either sense, we can expect to uncover neither a single set of principles, nor an integrated super-theory that will explain all of human behavior. But this does not excuse us from the legitimacy of theoretical considerations. The difficulty, of course, is the need to work toward formulating sets of directing constructs and theoretical concepts while at the same time recognizing the limits of that endeavor.

In this chapter we will present basic considerations to illustrate the need for theory, especially in the case of guidance. We will then shift to a discussion of the ideas and concepts that are necessary as directing constructs. In particular, we will try to establish the legitimacy of a particular viewpoint toward child development, namely, the individual's urge toward mastery and efficacy as the single most important organizing construct for a guidance program.

* One of psychology's long-standing problems has been to resist the appeal of such scientific reductionism. With apologies to William Jennings Bryan, the fierce rebuttal might be that psychology should not sacrifice the questing human spirit on the cross of scientific reductionism. A highly interesting discussion on this point can be found in *On Method*, David Bakan; Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1967.

TOWARD A THEORY FOR GUIDANCE

In the specific case of guidance and counseling, the difficulty created by an absence of theory can be seen quite clearly. As was suggested in the first chapter, a laissez-faire attitude toward the psychological development of students generally prevails in educational settings. This attitude usually connotes a hands-off position with regard to personal or psychological education. We tend to prefer to leave such events to random forces. If the child learns to read, spell, and add, maybe he will also develop a strong and healthy personality. If he doesn't, so this view holds, then we may have to refer him for treatment in a clinic, but only in extreme and relatively rare cases. In fact, one of the early giants of American psychology, William James, suggested that child study (and implicit theories of human development) was not the appropriate concern of educators since it would interfere with the teaching art. He enjoined psychologists not to interfere with teachers: "Every-one who adds a jot or tittle of unnecessary weight to their burden is a foe of education." (James, 1958, p. 27.) This may be an example of another Jamesian productive paradox. If an educational practice, such as teaching or counseling, is not based on theory, or if the practitioners have no understanding of the concepts, then the practice itself may suffer. In guidance and counseling this means that practice can be almost anything at all, a situation that promotes dabbling and dilettantism under the guise of psychological services to students. It is in fact, guidance without guidance.

It is probably not an understatement to say that the service concept has so dominated guidance and counseling that more basic and significant questions are not even acknowledged, let alone answered. Instead, the counselor assumes a service orientation that limits and defines his role to minor administrative procedures. Thus Glanz defined guidance as, "Services, practicalities, bits of educational flotsam and jetsam." (Glanz, 1964.) The counselor is clearly not in the mainstream of the education of children or adolescents, but rather is an aid in the process. Two recent studies have tended to confirm that position. A study by Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) indicated that counselors performed the administrative function of selecting educational programs for the students in a secondary school. Not only did the counselors make the decisions for the students (hence the title of the book—*The Educational Decision-Makers*), but most of these decisions were made on the basis of socio-cultural stereotypes: e.g., well-to-do children were urged to attend col-

lege, poor children were "cooled off," and a lower set of aspirations were often encouraged. Similarly, a study by Armour (1969) indicated that the counselors performed functions limited largely to brief contact with students one or two times a year, which involved simple informational transmittal.

In such a context it may be ironic that the counselor sets himself up in a position that is patently impossible. The service orientation creates expectations in students and parents that he cannot meet. Yet a lack of theory continually forces him back to a service orientation to justify his role in the school. And this is not a productive paradox. Rather it forces guidance and counseling to spread further and further afield and grow in more and more unsystematic and random directions. Also, equating guidance with educational service (rather than just with education) promotes the current overemphasis on the *technique* of guidance rather than a concern with the *purpose* of the intervention. This all indicates quite clearly the need for theory. McClelland has cogently noted that even if we had an instrument or a method of intervention that was successful, if we had no theory, we would still be in a position of limbo. "Suppose . . . that the instrument worked but that we had no idea as to why or how it worked . . . in other words we had no theory. We would be able to identify talent potential without understanding its nature or the process by which it develops." (McClelland, 1958, p. 24.)

Thus we cannot escape the need for theory. Without it we leave practice to the vagaries of the moment, a practice in search of a rationale; indeed, guidance in quest of guiding principles. The choice between theory and no theory is a non-choice.

A Theory of Development Based on Adult Needs

As we suggested in the first chapter, another way of viewing the guidance theory problem is not from the point of theory or technique, but rather from the point of how children and adolescents in fact develop as human beings. The autonomous process, i.e., the maturation of personal direction and the development of a sense of individual efficacy, is not automatic. On the other hand, this does not mean or lead to a Lockian view of growth and development. Indeed, the *tabula rasa* view of human development appears almost as a universal assumption. Lawrence K. Frank has noted the tremendous variety of methods that various cultures use to "mold" the child, to make each child fit the adult stereotype of personal development. Frank has cited many instances of how

the natural physical appearance of children is altered (flattening heads, binding feet, etc.). He notes, cogently, ". . . the catalogue of practises that deform, distort or otherwise manipulate the physical structure is endless. . . ." (Frank, 1969, p. 70.) In addition to physical alteration, of course, other changes are imposed on children, some with far greater effects. Physiological functions from eating to bowel movements, and indeed even to breathing, are subject to adult manipulation and control. The variety of practices of psychological/moral inculcations is, in Frank's words, "astonishing."

That adults in the same culture and in different cultures have so many varied as well as contradictory positions on raising children, is probably the best testimony to the so-called homunculus theory of child and adolescent development. That theory holds that adults generally expect children to be miniature versions of themselves—mini-men and women. The result is all that molding, manipulation, and exhortation, all that pulling and stretching, all that pushing and demanding that goes on all around the world as each generation of adults tries to remake each generation of children in its own image.* The further implication of that view of children is also relevant; namely, that left to their own devices, children would do nothing, learn nothing, and accomplish nothing. Of course, every so often throughout history a romantic would come along like Rousseau, adopt a nativistic view that development should unfold magically without intrusion, and suggest such an approach as a theory for development. Equally absurd outcomes would soon follow, and one has only to read the lament of one person who tried to raise his child "naturally" for a case in point. Rousseau's disciple, Pestalozzi, commented in despair on his son's effective counterattack on the father's best of intentions.

A further difficulty in theorizing about child development is created by the subject himself: the child. Evidence indicates that the child is particularly aware of and sensitive to adult expectations, values, and beliefs. This means children sense quite accurately how adults really feel about them, not just what they say they feel. Apparently the nonverbal communication of feelings is correctly received by children. The adult-child relationship is a complex interaction or more poetically, in Jerome

* It is somewhat ironic that one of Sigmund Freud's truly brilliant insights was the neat reversal of this view; that in fact, the child was the father of the man, and that residing somewhere in each of us was a small child. By this he indicated the importance of initial learning experiences in governing our later attitudes and perceptions.

Kagan's phrase, a "ballet in which each partner responds to the steps of the other."

In a fascinating paper, Sheldon White has provided further evidence concerning the question of adult assumptions about the nature of children. In a study of twenty-seven primitive cultures, Professor White found that a substantial number regarded children younger than age five or six as "mindless." In other words, cultures tend to regard small children as something less than human. He also noted the large number of practices, such as initiation rites, demands that a child accept moral responsibility and partial adulthood, etc., that do not take place until age six.* The implication of such observations is that prior to this point the child is almost an empty organism with little potential to learn anything, or that adults merely tolerate a child's existence before he is six or seven. He also notes that in Western Civilization, the assumptions of English common law and Catholic canon law were similar; by the time a child was that age he was capable of knowing right from wrong, capable of confession, and eligible for first communion. Such precursors as these have exerted strong influence on our understanding of child development. In fact in the writer's view, it was probably the extensiveness of such assumptions that caused Western society in this century to reject so vociferously Sigmund Freud's major discoveries on the importance of early experience. It was Freud, of course, who ended once and for all the ideas of a "mindless" child, existing in a state of limbo prior to the age of six. The bitter denunciation of his revolutionary views stemmed from the divergence of those views from what people wanted to believe about the benign nature of early development. If a child was not in fact a mindless creature prior to the age of six, how could we really justify all those practices based on the assumption that the child himself is too young to know anything? **

The problem that we now face, then, is how may we view or theorize about how children grow and develop, simultaneously avoiding either

* In fact, he found "one culture that will kill a child if he becomes seriously ill prior to four or five years on the assumption that he is a snake or other animal masquerading in human form." *Changes in Learning Processes in the Late Preschool Years*, Sheldon H. White, presented at AERA Convention, Chicago, 1968.

** A recent example of a current practice can be found in the work of Bereiter. (See Bereiter, C. and Englemann, S. *Teaching Disadvantaged Children in Preschool*; Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1966.) He assumes that children of the poor "need" to be pushed, cajoled, manipulated, yelled at, etc., to make them learn to read. The fact that pupils (3 and 4 years old) do learn to read under such circumstances does not prove the point. What else are these children learning?

the *tabula rasa* view or the romantic and magical theory of a natural unfolding. The importance of interaction suggests that adult assumptions and expectations are not only transmitted to children but also influence the course of their development.

An Alternate View of Development: Personal Competence

Research evidence on important questions such as we are considering is by definition incomplete and partial because, as we've mentioned, there is simply no comprehensive theory of child development. However, if we examine a series of studies provided by different researchers, we may see an emerging consensus on the critical aspects of development. From these studies, then, we may derive a more comprehensive understanding of development and the role of a guidance function in enhancing and facilitating that development.

The essential hypothesis is whether or not humans possess an intrinsic capacity to learn, to explore, and to strive toward self-mastery and self-direction. Obviously, as has been stated in the first chapter, if a central role for guidance in the so-called dual curriculum is to enhance such a process of self-development, it is of the utmost importance to examine the basis for such a claim. The dominant theories of child development, aside from the general cultural expectation that children are simply small sized adults, have generally viewed the process of development as a result of either conditioning or tension-reduction. However, as J. McV. Hunt points out, neither of these views stands up to the test of evidence. Hunt systematically analyzed the research literature on this point, and although it would be redundant here to present all those findings, there are some that are particularly salient. The earliest and most significant study was done by Nissen in the 1930's. Hunt notes that the study was so controversial and challenging to the theories at that time that it was never really accepted. Briefly, Nissen demonstrated that animal subjects (rats) would endure electric shocks (the classical aversive stimulus of conditioning research), in order to move from an empty cage to a maze filled with novel objects. This indicates a desire for stimulation, exploration, and manipulation that is strong enough to overcome the expected barrier provided by jolts of electricity. Following a slightly different line of investigation, Butler, in the 1950's, found that animal subjects would engage in learning tasks if they were then allowed to peer through the windows to see humans passing through the nearby corridors. The simple prospect

of visual stimulation and exploration was intrinsically motivating. Finally, some of the classic studies done by Harlow with monkeys illustrate the same theme of the importance of intrinsic drives or urges. Harlow found that monkeys would work on puzzles with no outside motivations, simply for the interest of disassembling the puzzles. In fact two of his monkeys worked for ten hours continuously on the problem.*

Robert W. White, in a tremendously significant paper, "Motivation Reconsidered: The Concept of Competence" (White, R. W., 1959), carries the implications of these studies to penultimate importance. He notes that the traditional Freudian views of instinctual energy have been modified through the work of "ego-psychologists" such as Heinz Hartmann and David Rapaport. They have attempted to develop a concept of de-libidinated energy to free motivation from theories that restrict it to a singular effect of sexual or aggressive drives. While agreeing with the need to liberate a theory of motivation from such narrow constraints, White then quietly questions the need for such an awkward conceptualization in the first place—why go to the bother of positing that all drives are somatically based in either sex or aggression if we must then develop a logical explanation of how these drives are de-sexualized. Instead, White is convinced that a more logical explanation, and one that fits the evidence more easily, is the notion that animals and humans have a need to function, explore, and master an environment as "... part of the natural make-up of an adaptive organism."

White reconceptualizes the concept of "ego," again from Freud, as that part of the human personality that has the potential to strive for the "progressive mastery of useful actions." In fact, White wryly notes that Freud himself would not have viewed "ego" as a passive agent, or as simply a mediator between the demands of an inner reality ("id" drives) and an outer reality, if indeed Freud had simply looked at his own "ego"! It is just the theme of self-mastery and competence as a person that White sees as the issue of human development.

In a similar way, Gordon Allport's concept of pro-active behavior adds further weight to the view of child development implicit in a guidance model for education. He strongly criticized the many tendencies in psychology to compartmentalize and categorize human existence as essentially reactive and determined. As a result, it is not surprising that he was one of the earliest theorists to suggest that humans possess the

* These studies and many others are reported in Hunt, J. McV. "Environment, Development and Scholastic Achievement." In *Social Class, Race and Psychological Development*, Deutsch, M.; Katz, I.; and Jensen, A. R.; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1968, pp. 293-336.

potential for pro-active, autonomous, and self-directed behavior. His central view of man was one of "being" in the process of "becoming," of an "... agent that plans, that strives to master, a fighter for ends." (Allport, 1960, p. 75.) We should note that Allport's description of how this process develops has been subject to challenge. McClelland, particularly, has suggested an alternate interpretation of how such motives develop.* However, the main point is that the concept of pro-activity has not been successfully challenged and indeed, as noted, the concept has reached new significance through the interpretations of White.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Thus on the basis of a series of theoretical speculations and some research evidence, the view of personality development and the growth of personal competence as a potential focus of generic significance emerges. In fact, by extrapolation, Piaget's work vis-à-vis the growth toward relativism, Kohlberg's views regarding moral development, and Bruner's conception of the act of discovery in learning—all these buttress this general view of development. Bruner specifically notes that although his research tends to focus on cognitive development, the connection to White is direct; so much so that he even suggests that cognitive development, when allowed to develop in the mode of "discovery," will serve to increase the general motive of competence.

The child comes to manipulate his environment more actively and achieves his gratification from coping with problems. As he finds symbolic modes of representing and transforming the environment, there is an accompanying decline in the importance of stimulus-response reward sequences.

(Bruner, 1962, p. 92)

If we push this view even further, we may say that the general environmental response to the growing and developing child will determine the direction of that growth. This means that not only is the kind of formal learning activity we create important, but the informal learning environment itself may be equally significant. The learning tasks, the general

* McClelland had criticized Allport for suggesting that the process of motive development had to include a "change of function" mechanism, i.e., that original motives had to be transformed.

activities in the school itself, the curriculum materials, the attitudes the adults hold toward children, etc.: all these will regulate and monitor the child's growth. Rather than focusing on the classical model of learning where the child supposedly learns S-R (Stimulus-Response) connections, White suggests it may be more appropriate to view the process as the child learning R-S connections. The child tests out his emerging competence and alertly deciphers the meaning of how the environment acted toward him. The autonomy can be channeled, redirected, or even subverted by the environment.

We are aware of possible differences in the meaning of concepts such as personal development and autonomy across different social and economic classes. Such differences in meaning exist not only within our society, but across other societies as well. Such differences, although real in one sense, may still only represent stereotypes. For example (this may be an extreme, but will illustrate the point), in mental health procedures it has long been proclaimed that individual psychotherapy is the treatment of choice only for the middle and upper middle classes. Lower classes were not suitable because their values were incongruent with the implicit set of "treatment" values—self-direction, personal independence, achievement, etc. Apparently, these latter values were held as operable for only the more favored classes in our otherwise "classless" society.

A series of recently published studies, however, indicates that personal autonomy is indeed a highly relevant variable and value even in the lowest economic strata of our society. Unfortunately, this lower class autonomy is dysfunctional to personal development, since it takes place too early in the child's development. It is, in this sense, premature, unguided, and extreme, ranging toward anarchy. The child is literally left to his own underdeveloped personal resources to cope with tasks appropriate only to later stages of development. The foreclosure of the experience of childhood, with exploration, play, etc., means, quite starkly, that the normal processes of personal development, even prior to kindergarten entry, have not been allowed the necessary scope. This "cumulative deficit" precludes the development of both cognitive and personal capacities. The perceptual deficits in such children are now apparent through the work of researchers such as Deutsch et al. (1968) and John (1963). The impairment to personal psychological development is equally obvious. The so-called "danger orientation" so aptly termed by Malone (1969), indicates the extent to which the early experiences of such chil-

dren would prevent the gradual emergence of a competence in self, a self-mastery at the core of one's personality structure.

Personal Efficacy: Culture Bound?

Thus, before school age there may be important prior linkages between early perceptual cognitive development and the development of personal competence. Bruner and White both suggest such a linkage in the inter-relation between perceptual curiosity and competence as dual drives; the former as an attention focusing drive and the latter as a drive for active manipulation of the environment. If we accept this assumption about personality and perceptual development before school-entry, then the question of social class influence on the development of personal autonomy and self-initiative becomes derivative. In other words, we are positing a potential within each child that can be nurtured and enhanced if we so choose. There are no automatic limitations on this process, or inherent differences within children on this basic dual dimension of curiosity and competence. Thus the goals of the educational process and the dual curriculum are compatible in this framework, for all youth to some degree. The social class research that is now becoming available indicates, once again, the importance of initial learning experiences. In the so-called hard-core multi-problem lower class families, the need for a guidance process may be simply the need for intervention or "education" prior to regular school entry. The unanswered problem, in this case, is essentially the problem of reversibility or irreversibility. If Deutsch is correct in his analysis of the cumulative deficit, we may face the problem with resources that are "too little" and "too late" by the time the child reaches elementary school. It may well be that when the child's penchant for curiosity and active manipulation are not acknowledged by the surrounding environment with appropriate facilitating responses, these dispositions atrophy.

The development of competence, ego-mastery, and the other elements of personal growth are thus only for the "rich and the well-born," if that is what we want. James Coleman has vividly illustrated this concept. In a study that originated as a comparison between segregated and integrated education, he reached conclusions directly relevant to the guidance process.

He found that one of the most important elements relating to academic achievement was based on personal attitudes, attitudes measuring the degree to which the student felt in control of his own fate. In this

sense, Coleman was attempting to measure aspects of what we have called ego-mastery, self-direction or competence in one's self as an active agent. Some of his questions were: "Agree or disagree: good luck is more important than hard work for success." "Agree or disagree: every time I try to get ahead someone or something stops me." Coleman concludes:

However, despite the very large achievement differences between whites and Negroes at the 9th and 12th grades, those Negroes who gave responses indicating a sense of control of their own fate achieved higher on the tests than those whites who gave the opposite responses. This attitude was more highly related to achievement than any other factor in the student's background or school.

(Coleman, 1966)

Through an examination of theory and research, then, we may conclude that a view of human development (particularly child development) that comprehends personal competence as a basic drive of human organization, represents a major construct for any theory of behavior. It does not seem that an urge toward efficacy is limited to only certain classes. Rather, it seems more likely that the drive toward personal competence represents a *given*, and whether it develops or not depends upon the environment. We can see an analogy here to the concept of intelligence defined as capacity to learn. For years the theory of fixed intelligence was accepted. If a child was favored genetically he could look forward to a future of achievement. If not, he would simply have to accept a less adequate future. It has taken educators, as well as the general public, a long time to accept a revision in the theory of intelligence, in spite of the almost unanimous and conclusive nature of research evidence that demonstrated major cognitive/intellective growth as occurring over the first seven years of life, not fixed at birth (Bloom, 1964). In the area of personal development, we are now faced with the need for a similar revision of theory that is at least as far-reaching. Since personal development takes place over a long period of time, as a minimum probably twenty years, then the importance of revising our conceptions of growth and development has major implications.* If the child is not an empty organism, which he is not, and if development does not unfold automatically, which it does not, then we may decide that

* There is no evidence that personal development continues into adulthood. Stages of development in adult years are qualitatively different from the stages of development of children and adolescents.

an important educational function may be to guide and nurture that personal growth to foster efficacy and mastery. In the next chapter we will continue an elaboration of these views through a discussion of the value issues involved. Any view of personal development carries with it value implications because goals and objectives are inherent. However, before we turn to those issues, it is necessary to focus once again on the immediate issue of guidance and the schools. In this way we can see how far current practice is from a model based on personal competence and mastery.

GUIDANCE AND PERSONAL COMPETENCE

Probably the most direct implication for schools and guidance from this view is to change our conception of guidance and education. In the recent past there have been attempts to regularize a function for guidance. Although many different roles are suggested, Lortie has provided a good categorization, namely, the guidance counselor as a *therapist*, an *administrator*, or an *advocate* (Lortie, 1965). In all three roles, however, the focus of the guidance activity is in fact reactive and/or secondary. As a *therapist*, the guidance person is largely concerned with the emotional recrudescences from the past, as those interfere with present functioning. The therapeutic stance becomes psycho-therapeutic and the work is remedial and reconstructive. As an *administrator*, the guidance person functions much like our earlier comments concerning a service-oriented function. Minor administrative decisions concerning course changes, meeting application deadlines, arranging for college admission visitors; such functions occupy the major role in this category with guidance as a technology, again essentially reactive in nature. Finally, in the role of the *advocate*, the guidance person serves as a refuge for the students—a place where they can "get things off their chest." Once again the function serves as an exception, or as an atypical aspect of the school. Guidance is deliberately out of the mainstream of the school, and (following the analogy) exists in the quiet eddies.

The theme that is common to all three roles essentially construes guidance as an ancillary, a support function, or as a sidelight to the school. The shift we are suggesting involves a reconceptualization of guidance. E. J. Shoben is one of the few theorists who has given serious consideration to such a shift in focus. He has suggested that guidance move from its present position as a set of separate, often disparate and

incongruent services, to an educational function (Shoben, 1965). Guidance, separately and narrowly construed, can and does become little more than conventional wisdom or "sensible advice." There is little content to the practice. In fact, it is noteworthy that guidance textbooks usually deftly avoid the issue of a subject-matter base for the guidance, suggesting rather that the counselor is a "generalist." The result is that school guidance programs grow in erratic directions, as we have noted in the previous chapter.

The same situation generally prevails if we look at guidance from another perspective, namely, the mental health field. In a recent monograph designed to focus on mental health and schools, the major assumption was an "adjustment" emphasis—either for the early detection and referral of emotional/pathological conditions or to prevent or minimize pathological responses to unavoidable events, that is, to help children "weather" crises (Allinsmith and Goethals, 1962). Instead of suggesting ways to promote psychological growth and nurture healthy development from a positive framework, the authors focused on reducing the psychological traumas induced by events such as school failure, separation anxiety, hospitalization, etc. This is essentially a reactive position to propose as a model for mental health and schooling.

Thus either from within the field itself or from outside views, the subject matter basis for guidance remains elusive. On the other hand, as Shoben correctly notes, guidance could serve an educative function during the process of schooling. An educative function for guidance would mean focusing on the major aspects of education, rather than simply existing alongside it. Atmospheres for teaching and learning, questions of curriculum (what is it really that we want the child to "learn"), questions of school organization—all these are major educational domains and imply critical decisions that are presently discussed and adjudged without reference to guidance. Wrenn noted that less than 8 percent of the counselors in his extensive survey were involved even tangentially with curriculum development (Wrenn, 1962). Shoben suggests that a critical element is absent in most schools—questions such as the above are largely decided without any "human feedback" from the students. Through an awareness of the problems and stages of human development, and through constant contact with the personal agenda of children (that is, both the general and the specific) a guidance counselor could feed information into an educational system so as to change the cerned with students' educational experiences, in order to change the system. This would place guidance in a different role: one that is con-

kinds of tasks that adults impose on them under the guise of education.

We will have more to say on the present impact of education in the final chapter, but it will suffice for now to indicate that we can seriously question the extent to which schools nurture attitudes and capacities toward learning that are compatible with the general framework for development outlined in this chapter. The missing agenda in schools concerns the student's psychological development. Rarely, if ever, are the central ideas of White's concept of an urge toward competency or self-mastery through exploration and manipulation, or of intrinsically motivating discoveries and insights, included as central curriculum issues in school programs. In our view, these ideas could become the discipline base for guidance. Shoben's feedback notion would then serve to enhance the personal/psychological development of children and simultaneously increase the effectiveness and "potency" of education. These are problems of process and growth; they cannot be solved through a static or technically prescribed curriculum. Thus both guidance and teaching can join and nurture the process of growth in children and adolescents. This is not to say that we are seeking a return to the good old days or to re-introduce a so-called life-adjustment focus at the expense of intellectual development. As White makes abundantly clear, the strivings for mastery comprehend both intellectual and personal components. The growth trend toward general autonomy in functioning is what each child presents to educators. The difficulties ensue not from the children, but from the adults who dichotomize, depersonalize, and impose on children rather than work with the process presented.

In many ways, psychology and psychologists themselves are to blame for the present predicament we face. We have tended to overemphasize what adults (including educators) can do to harm children. If we are strict disciplinarians, we may encourage repression and inhibition. If we are permissive, we may enhance a pleasure orientation or an inability to delay gratification. The critical episodes of child development serve to increase our awareness of the possibilities for psychological trauma. Then we may wonder why adults become overly anxious in all their responses to children and adolescents. White notes:

There is a substantial amount of truth in this outlook, but when it is not counterbalanced by any sense of the child's own activity, his desire to grow, and his power to act selectively, its effect on parents can be extremely terrifying.

(White, R. W., 1952, p. 361)

SUMMARY

By reviewing the need for theory and noting some basic constructs toward a view of human growth, we have suggested a different conception for personal development. By assuming that the human organism strives toward efficacy, self-direction, and mastery, we see rather direct implications for guidance. Such an intrinsic drive indicates that personal development is not fixed at birth, nor necessarily automatic. When we speak of human potential for growth, the concept of competence becomes the reference point. We have not gone further in elaborating the concept in this chapter with particular reference to a developmental framework, including tasks and stages. This has been a purposeful omission because it may be too easy to overlook the basic concept while attempting to define stage-specific dimensions of personal growth.

In viewing the problem of current guidance theory and practice and the concept of personal competence, we noted both the present disparity and the future opportunity. Rather than a model for guidance that is essentially reactive and secondary to the main purpose of education, we suggested a pro-active model for guidance. The substantive and/or content basis for guidance could become the personal and psychological development of children through the concept of competence. In this way, guidance as a remedial function, or as an administrative ancillary to the school, or as therapy for a few children, could be reconstituted—a redirection away from separateness and toward a function within education.

VALUES: AS MEANS AND ENDS

INTRODUCTION

Any enterprise that affects people must inevitably confront the value problem. Although the value position that the writer has taken is certainly implicit throughout the chapters of this volume, it is necessary to set these values in context. Value questions, and more importantly how they are answered, are significant indicators of what an enterprise or a profession is attempting to accomplish and what procedures are used to achieve those goals. Thus both the means and the ends are available for examination by applying a value framework or by asking "value questions." Another way to put this might be to say values can describe both what a person aspires to and what means he uses to reach his goals.

Often these elements conflict, that is, the means to a goal might not be congruent with the goal itself. Then the person—or the profession, even—might confront what could be called a value dilemma. The dilemma, of course, also represents an opportunity to re-examine both means and ends which hopefully will provide new perspectives for solution. While we want to avoid an extended discussion on the issues of value resolution, however, it is important

to stress the necessity of examining values quite carefully in relation to guidance theory (what guidance attempts to do) and guidance practice (how guidance activities are ordered and organized to achieve the goals). Values represent the cluster of assumptions that undergird both theory and practice. In order to provide an adequate elaboration of values in relation to guidance, we will turn first to the definition problem, then review some of the most recent and relevant discussions of values and guidance, and finally attempt a synthesis.

THE DEFINITION PROBLEM

Many attempts have been made by philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists to distinguish between such terms as interests, attitudes, and values. These attempts at precise definition invariably produce contradictions and inconsistencies. One of the best summaries of these definitional problems is provided by the classic work of Kluckhohn (1952). He refers to Charles Morris, a philosopher, who defines values in general as the science of preferential behavior. Morris uses a threefold classification of values. (1) Operative Values: preferential behavior which need not involve any cognitive or conceptual thinking. An operative value is simply the value choice indicated behaviorally. (2) Conceived Values: preference for a symbolized object. (3) Objective Values: that which is objectively preferable whether or not it is desirable. Yet, Ralph Barton Perry, another philosopher, defines a value much more simply as any object of interest.

Kluckhohn tries to preserve a careful distinction between values and interests, since the philosophical definitions seem too broad. He bases his distinction on the difference between what is desired and what is desirable. Interest represents what one person or many persons want (desire), while value represents what one person or many persons ought to want. He takes the position, following Dewey, that the desired and the desirable are conceptually contrasted as between cathexis and valuation. "A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action." (Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 395.)

Kluckhohn also attempts to distinguish between attitudes and values. Value, he sees as unifying reason and feeling. If the rational element is omitted, then values become not substantially different from attitude or sentiment. Kluckhohn, however, admits that this distinction is not clear-cut.

He points out, for example, that the social psychologist McDougall defines sentiment in such a way as to combine the affective and cognitive dispositions. McDougall's notion of sentiment in this context is quite similar to Kluckhohn's definition of personal value.

Kluckhohn's attempt to differentiate conceptually between terms such as attitude, interest, and value does not remain distinct. The chief difficulty with his dichotomy between the desired as interest and the desirable as value is that inevitably there may be cases where the desired and the desirable are equivalent. At what point, for example, does a person's interest in music become a value for music? Kluckhohn, of course, is not alone in his attempt to formulate definitions. Psychologists have not been particularly successful in constructing distinct descriptions. For example, Thorndike (1936) uses values as a very general term. Values are simply a function of preference behavior as "felt satisfactions." Rosenberg (1957) goes to the other extreme by constructing a lengthy description of value, yet his description is also as general and global as Thorndike's. Rosenberg points out: "Values are things in which people are interested, things they want, desire to be or become, feel as obligatory, worship and enjoy." (1957, p. 6.)

Carter (1944), in reviewing vocational interests, says that many psychologists are no longer concerned with verbal distinctions between terms such as interest and value. In fact, Carter combines the terms: "It is fairly obvious that ideas as to the seriousness or importance of things will often be associated with ideas as to the interest value of those same things." (1944, p. 9.) He goes on to state that interest is basically defined as enjoyment and satisfaction, an affective dimension. One is struck by an apparent paradox. Carter sees futility in verbal distinctions, but then defines interests in terms that Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1951) use to define attitude.

The issue of definition becomes more clouded if we consider attitude as separate from interest or value. For example, Kretch and Crutchfield call attitude "an enduring organization of motivational, emotional, perceptual and cognitive processes with respect to some aspect of the individual's world." (Newcomb, 1958, p. 389.) Allport sees attitudes not as specific and limited, but as "mental and neural states of readiness organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects." (Newcomb, 1958, p. 389.) Newcomb defines attitude simply as "the predisposition to perform, perceive, think and feel in relation to an object." (1958, p. 389.)

Schafer, from an analytic framework, defines interests in similarly

global terms to Newcomb's definition of attitude. Schafer states that interests must be regarded as aspects, expressions, derivatives, or implementations in reality of major dynamic trends: "We become interested in what matters to us for deeply personal reasons." (1954, p. 123.)

All these attempts at specific definitions or global descriptions seem contradictory to some degree. There is also a constant tendency to use overlapping meanings for the same terms.* However, there is general agreement that values represent basic determinants of human behavior, are not inborn, and therefore result from environmental influence. The influence of the environment is probably a highly complex phenomenon of value infusion through deliberate instruction, identification, and reinforcement. Obviously, early influences of the home and contiguous environment are important, as are later influences such as education, peer groups, and representatives of the extended adult world. With this background we can now shift to the value problem in relation to guidance, especially since guidance strives (or at least purports) to achieve a position of significant educational influence on students.

Because guidance theory has not been well-developed as yet, most discussions in the literature tend to focus on the value problem in specific relationship to counseling as the form of intervention most apparent in a guidance program. While we accept this limitation in terms of the discussions available (with notably few exceptions), we again wish to emphasize that, in our view, counseling is but one aspect of the applied science of guidance.

THE VALUE PROBLEM: NEUTRALITY, INCULCATION, REPRESENTATION?

In the recent past there has been an attempt to set the value problem in a context that holds a position of neutrality for the counselor. Being non-judgmental, non-threatening, and accepting, the counselor is relatively "value-free." There is a conscious attempt to withhold his own values at a conceptual level, which is reflected at an operational level in the form of responses that are intended *not* to lead the student. The

* The best example of overlapping terminology is in the Allport-Vernon manual itself (1951). The title is "Study of Values. A scale for measuring the dominant interests in personality." But the purpose of the scale is further elaborated as a measure of interests, motives, or evaluative attitudes.

value position, of course, is not completely neutral but perhaps, more accurately, could be termed *laissez-faire*. Also upon closer examination, this position does represent one value quite explicitly, that of a relationship-centered model for education. In fact, the *laissez-faire* framework is consistent with the idea of a major focus on personal relationships. In a sense it is analogous to a previously held theory of *laissez-faire* economics, in which Adam Smith's invisible hand represented a kind of single mediating mechanism which would promote the most efficient form of economic organization. From another viewpoint Herbert Spencer derived a similar set of ideas for social organization extrapolating a value position from Darwin's principles of natural evolution. The analogy is based on the assumption of a natural law which governs economic behavior for Smith, social group behavior for Spencer, and individual behavior for the counselor in this mode. The natural law suggests minimal interference as a bench mark, because deliberate or conscious direction from an outside source would theoretically inhibit the natural processes. Thus Smith would see any deliberate disruption of the *laissez-faire* principle as promoting economic dislocations of the laws of supply and demand. Spencer would insist on non-interference with the existing social order, since, in his words, "Nature may have to be cruel in order to be kind."* For the counselor this would assume a less cruel position with reference to the process involved, but would still maintain the same sanctions against what might be termed more deliberate forms of interaction between the client and the counselor. Through the single mediating mechanism of the relationship, the client is enabled to grow, develop or self-actualize.

For example, Patterson counsels against any direct influence by the counselor. Within his value framework this would be considered "manipulation," obviously a pejorative. He does suggest, apparently in an attempt to beg the value question, that the counselor may present his own values as a person to the client, but only at the client's request. Evidently as long as the request is initiated by the client the possibility of direct influence is minimized, perhaps a debatable position to take. Patterson further notes that a discussion of the counselor's values may not be really central to the problem. He notes, "It does not mean that he [the counselor] is not concerned about the influence he has on the

* Although it is certainly beyond the scope of this work, it may be interesting to speculate on the development and evolution of this theory from Calvin's law of divine election to the social Darwinism of natural selection.

client . . . he recognizes this and attempts to be a constructive influence. But he does this not by attempting to manipulate.—He does it by being himself." (Patterson, 1958, p. 221.)

This value position becomes a rather difficult one to articulate. To value being one's self certainly places a guidance counselor in the mercurial position of representing a concept that everyone might agree upon and disagree with at the same time. In addition, there is certainly the implication that the counselor himself had best be a rather unique individual whose "self" encompasses all the worthy attributes of humanity, and few of its many shortcomings. It may indeed be quite vainglorious to rely on such a global dictum as "being one's self" as the basic value in a professional function such as guidance counseling.

This position on values is quite consistent with one of the views of guidance presented in Chapter 2. The reader will recall the role of guidance as a refuge for students, existing out of the mainstream of everyday education. In this framework the value for non-imposition and non-inculcation is clear. The counselor's own values are deliberately out of bounds. Thus the connection is obvious between the practice of counseling and the value assumptions that guide the practice. The former is an operational translation of the latter.

While it seems problematic that we can resolve the value dilemma for guidance by resorting to a position that assumes one person can be value-free or reveal his own values only upon request, the other extreme position is equally tenuous. That position assumes, quite pragmatically, that a counselor represents the dominant values of the culture and the organization that employs him. Generally this means the counselor is expected to represent and impart so-called middle class values to his clients. We noted earlier that most of the actual practice of guidance in schools is not based on theory, but is in fact largely administrative. This service-orientation is governed by just these same middle class values. The values are pragmatic, and the content of those values shifts in accord with prevailing general opinion. This means that the value position undergirding counseling, in practice, is (to use Riesman's term) other-directed. For example, this would mean that school counselors in the early 1950's would stress careers in engineering (which they did in the immediate post-Sputnik era), or the financial rewards of a high school diploma (which they do now to circumvent the drop-out problem). Or at the college level, counselors in the past would stress the importance of staying in college rather than withdrawing part way through as many

students now do.* Such pragmatic, service-oriented values have the apparent advantage of always being able to suggest what students "ought" to do. In this view we simply don't have to be concerned over the nuances, subtleties, or instances where values clash. The advantages that accrue from a lack of ambiguity far outweigh the disadvantages, according to this position. In almost a neo-behaviorist way, the view holds that the culture, especially the middle class culture, is influencing students anyway so we might as well make it systematic and efficient.

Aside from the fact that the deliberate promotion of one set of values by counselors varies in accord with the vicissitudes of the moment, probably the most damaging aspect of this position is simply the content of the values promoted. Shoben has correctly accused counselors of "smuggling" values. (Shoben, 1965.) By this he means that counselors will pay lip-service to the creed of individual differences, that is, we want to help each child develop his own potential to the fullest degree possible, while we simultaneously indicate what the student ought to do. Under the guise of a pseudo-liberalism counselors too often induce students into accepting the counselor's values rather than aid them in developing their own set of values. He notes that school personnel are overwhelmingly middle class in background, a social and economic position they attained themselves. This means such adults are all too willing to assume that this position and these values are indeed appropriate for all their students as well.

An interesting confirmation of this Shoben hypothesis can be found in the work of Becker (1952). His studies of public school teachers' attitudes (and values) indicated that the teachers did not like to work with youngsters from backgrounds different from their own. Not surprisingly such school personnel were both afraid of and actively hostile to lower class (and especially black) students. However, these teachers were also disparaging to upper class students, seen as "spoiled," uncooperative, and unmanageable. School personnel in general, then, and unfortunately guidance counselors are not an exception, both represent and attempt to promote one set of values, values that upon examination are highly conventional, conformist, and other-directed. Thus Shoben avers that school personnel manipulate students to force acceptance of these values, hence the process of value "smuggling." Edgar Z. Friedenberg makes much the same point when he notes that schools generally reward

* It would be interesting to trace the growth of this sanction in recent years, i.e., it's not only all right, but in some cases a positive good to value a "moratorium" during the college years.

conventionalism and "good citizenship" to such a degree that individualism is well nigh impossible (Friedenberg, 1959).

While the Friedenberg position may be an extreme statement based more on his own philosophic position than on specific evidence, there are data which indicate that students and teachers do not usually share the same values. In a series of studies conducted by this writer, which examined values in groups of teachers and students in one school system, it was apparent that only a small proportion of the students had value orientations similar to those of the teachers. In fact it was only the bright, high achieving pupils who were congruent with the teachers on the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values instrument. The bright but low achievers were generally the most dissimilar to teachers. Most striking was the finding that when these same bright but low achieving students were compared to specific teacher groups, they were the most discrepant of all in values with the counselors (Sprinthall 1964; Sprinthall and Beaton, 1966). Whether or not such value differences were ever acknowledged is a moot point. At least one theorist has suggested that such value differences between counselors and/or therapists and their clients are inevitable. As a result, we should not only acknowledge these discrepancies but deliberately set about to match counselors with clients on these domains of values. Lowe suggests that value differences cannot be resolved and concludes that value biases should be confessed and used deliberately. "We would further suggest . . . that they [psychologists] confess their philosophic biases and then turn those biases to fullest advantage by being of professional assistance to the special interest groups with which their values coincide." (Lowe, 1959.)

In the face of such relativism, it may be understandable to solve the value dilemma only by acknowledging the discrepancy as Lowe suggests. However, it does not necessarily follow that such an acknowledgment can also serve as justification for rectifying the differences. That simply is a cop-out. Unless we believe that values cannot change, it seems far-fetched to suggest that the solution to the value dilemma could entail such an awkward position. For example, it is well-known that traditional psychotherapists do not "treat" lower class patients for a series of reasons: the would-be patients find clinical assessment procedures forboding, a "talking cure" seems strange, introspection appears as self-centered and selfish, etc. In view of this situation we can, as Lowe suggests, acknowledge and then accept the incongruence between one view, the psychotherapist's, and the other view, the lower class patient's.

However, if we do this (which in fact has happened) then we relegate all the lower class/poor of the country to fend for themselves as far as receiving help for psychological problems.

Another solution might be to view the problem somewhat differently. In the first place we could decide that access to medical assistance and to psychological assistance was a right, not a privilege depending upon one's economic status. Given this change in values, we could then re-examine, for example, many of the assumptions connected with traditional individual psychotherapy. We might conclude upon such re-examination that at least part of the problem might be in the model of practice itself. We could then restructure our model for psychotherapy and decide if we had to accept the inevitable clash of value bias as a basic condition of therapy and/or counseling.

Thus the value problem is not simply a philosophic and hence esoteric concern, but an immediate and highly relevant domain for guidance in both theory and practice. For if we say that values are learned, not inborn, are relatively enduring as one of the contributors to personal consistency, affect and determine in significant ways how we behave (especially concerning issues of choice and decision), then we must accept the need for a viable framework or context in which to comprehend the value question. To assume either of the two positions presented thus far, at best only begs the question. As educators, counselors cannot avoid the necessity for a set of values from which practice is derived. We will now turn to an examination of an alternative framework for values as a basis for practice.

A FRAMEWORK FOR VALUES BASED ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Are there, then, criteria which may serve as goals for an educational practice such as guidance? Value neutrality by counselors appears as a non-solution. On the other hand, the deliberate inculcation of specific class-linked values seems a dangerous and paradoxical stance. All too frequently this second position could lead a counselor to perform the task of the middle class establishment. This is not an easy question to resolve. In a recent paper by Lawrence Kohlberg, the difficulties were particularly well expressed. He pointed out that while educational critics such as Edgar Friedenberg or A. S. Neill of the Summerhill School are persuasive in their denouncements of present schools, the alternatives

they imply connote a set of equally problematic values. For example, Friedenberg's research has demonstrated quite convincingly that the high schools in this country generally seek to inculcate a narrow set of conventional values—conformity, obedience in thought, acceptance of adult authority. He correctly presents the inadequacies of such values and their implications. However, the alternative he suggests is highly questionable, as Kohlberg notes (1968). Friedenberg implies a solution based upon aristocratic values, namely, that under conditions of minimal interference the child will grow to authenticity and individuation. There is no assurance that such a laudable outcome will in fact occur. The necessary conditions are not the sufficient conditions to any greater degree than Patterson's dictum that the counselor is to be himself would be a solution to value neutrality.

Similarly, A. S. Neill opposes adult control and direction of children in his school, but then uses the old school tie and loyalty to the Summerhill community as a sanction for controlling behavior. Thus he espouses freedom and individuality at one moment and then lectures an adolescent couple on the dangers of promiscuity, because such acts may endanger the future of the school. Neill makes a point of noting that the community surrounding the school may seek to close it if children are born out of wedlock. The pseudo-liberalism of proclaiming the sanctity of individual development and then appealing to the continuing existence of the school community as a sanction for preventing the adolescent couple from embarrassing that community is strikingly similar to many parents' lectures to their own adolescents. Thus Seeley's picture of Crestwood Heights as a prototypical suburban community in which there is a disparity between professed values for individual freedom and the actions of adults is not that dissimilar to the Summerhill community (Seeley et al., 1956). In both, the differences between the explicitly stated values and the implicit ones are substantial and apparently unresolved.

Thus we return to the paradox. What values are appropriate as a base for guidance that do not simultaneously contain inconsistencies such as those previously mentioned. In Chapter 2, we suggested that a viable theory for human development was contained in Robert White's concept of the growth of personal mastery or competence. Can personal competence represent a criterion for guidance that has relevance across classes and cultures? While this is admittedly too large a question to answer directly, are there sufficiently logical grounds to adopt that perspective at least as a working hypothesis? We had noted that one of the criticisms of the practice of psychotherapy stemmed from the value

problem; namely, that psychotherapy was inappropriate for poor people because we had assumed "they" did not really want to be autonomous and self-directed. However, an examination of the early lives of children of the poor has indicated the extreme opposite. Their motivation for autonomy was not only strong but prematurely so. The excessive responsibility that such children assumed prevented the development of a slow growth of cognitive capacities for mature thought. Early closure, stimulus-bound thinking, and concrete thought was their lot, along with permanent destruction of any chance for the growth of genuine autonomy.

John Shlien has suggested that the problem of values is really a problem in the selection of criterion measures. Outcomes of what we want to occur as a result of interventions such as education, counseling and/or therapy represent the real indications of values. Shlien further notes that the problem of criteria can be resolved if we view it as a problem in levels of abstraction. Without such a framework we will be constantly caught up in the paradox and contradictions implicit in so many of the usual measures. For example, in a "typical" case, a bright but under-achieving high school student might be referred to a school counselor. In such an instance, is the counseling goal (the outcome or criterion) to improve the student's grade point average? If that is the measure of effectiveness, we could say quite quickly, "Of course it's the counselor's job to insure that the student doesn't let all that ability go to waste." Improvement in the grade point average is obviously the goal of counseling. But is it? Can we really accept such a narrowly focused measure as the goal? Doesn't that assume (the implicit values) that improved achievement behavior is appropriate regardless of the circumstances—that the counselor is to help adjust the child to the system, to have him accept the tasks that the school requires? What if a more significant problem were that the school's curriculum was, *de facto*, a curriculum that demanded obedience in thinking and considered learning as memorization of the teacher's interpretation of events? What happens to our assumption that the counselor should help a student become an academic achiever in such circumstances? And this is not an esoteric problem. It is to a large extent a general problem of counseling and education. Thus, a narrow, specific, or focused criterion for counseling almost inevitably contains contradictions which are either philosophically embarrassing or simply illogical.

In light of the above, Shlien argues that instead of tackling the criterion problem by generating more operational criteria, which by

definition must be too narrow, we should consider a concept such as self-esteem as a goal and as a value. The assumption here is that each person carries around within himself a subjective sense of his own esteem. In fact Shlien presents the results of a series of studies which indicate that such a concept of self-esteem may well be a common cultural ideal. He notes that theorists such as William James, Kurt Lewin, and Karen Horney as well as researchers such as Butler and Haigh, and Dymond provide credence to this notion (Shlien, 1962). And in reference to the theme presented earlier, the writer sees a rather close relation between the concept of self-esteem and the development of competence, self-mastery, and personal efficacy. In fact if we apply a developmental framework, we could foresee a series of stages and tasks as the stepping stones of the process of self-esteem development.

From a slightly different theoretical framework, a further congruence may be possible between self-esteem, mastery, and personal development as criteria for guidance. Kohlberg's recent work has caused a dramatic revision in the general problem of "value" development. Prior to his work, values, or the presence of moral judgments in children, were generally conceived of in two ways. One school of thought, derived from Freud's early work, conceived of values as a result of the establishment of the superego (a term meaning an unconscious conscience). The conscience, as the critical psychological mechanism that would purportedly control and direct an individual's behavior, was established by the time the child was six or seven and was not affected by later identifications or influences. Thus the most critical element in the control and direction of human behavior, the development of a conscience, was completed at a relatively early point in life. The process of internalization of codes of conduct was early and final.

Unfortunately, research findings did not support such a view. In fact as early as the late 1920's Hartshorne and May demonstrated quite vividly that moral conduct was highly varied across situations. Such studies, as is often the case in human behavior research, tended to create a rival school of thought on the issue of moral development, or the growth of self-control and direction; namely, that behavior was determined by the situation rather than by an internalized set of standards. This implied, of course, that we needed no personality constructs such as self-esteem, self-direction or mastery, since behavior was affected by situational variables such as the possibility of being caught, or the amount of effort required to "cheat" in a given situation. Kohlberg's work, however, has rescued the problem from either of these two views. His studies

have illustrated quite clearly that the development of an orientation (which we can call moral development) is neither a process fixed by the time a child is six or seven (conceived of as conscience), nor is it a process solely regulated by specific situational effects. He saw the necessity to create a new conceptual framework for understanding the process; one connoting a series of stages of gradual development over time.

The process of moral development or self-direction was construed as a process of ego development, the facilitation within each person of ego capacities, i.e., ego strengths. The concept of ego capacity or ego strength is, of course, broad, but as Kohlberg points out it comprehends a series of ideas, namely, the ability (1) to foresee consequences of actions, (2) to weigh and think through problems, (3) to empathize (i.e., to understand the other's point of view), (4) to focus one's attention, (5) to control one's fantasies, (6) to manifest self-esteem and decision-making capacities.* Such capacities can develop over time. Kohlberg's studies have isolated six specific stages in development. This means there is a sequence in movement from one stage to the next; such movement is determined by the process of general maturation and personal experience in each stage.

Ego development, and by implication, "moral" development, is thus not simply a set of social behaviors learned like any other social behaviors, such as good manners, politeness in speech, etc. Also, such development is not subject to direct teaching. Procedures such as classes in "moral education" or deliberate instruction designed to inculcate certain values and virtues (honesty, obedience, etc.), have usually proven to be unsuccessful, thus adding weight to the idea of a sequential development by means of a slow process of maturation and experience through a series of stages.**

The development within each person of such capacities variously conceptualized as ego strengths (Kohlberg), self-esteem (Shlien), and personal competence (Robert White) implies in no uncertain terms that these concepts represent the goals for guidance—the values that a guidance program seeks to nurture and facilitate. We will suggest, in the chapter on individual counseling, that the process of ego development

* There is an ever-present danger that listing such concepts will connote a new bag of virtues or commandments. Kohlberg wryly notes that we may then be caught in being all things to all men, with the result that we are seen, as Lucy describes Charlie Brown, as a good man—"If only you weren't so wishy-washy." (Kohlberg, 1968, Burton lecture H.G.S.E.)

** It would be tempting to resolve the dilemma stated earlier, from these results. On the question of inculcating values vs. attempting to be neutral, a superficial solution would be to note that neither will really affect the child.

can represent the framework for counseling—a process of education with individual students, one at a time. However, that perspective is too narrow. To limit guidance to a single function of working with individuals one at a time avoids the major implication of this discussion on values. Values are major determinants of human behavior. They are not simply a bag full of virtues that we instill in children through procedures such as character-building programs. Value systems proceed through age and developmental stage sequences. A guidance program has at the heart of its function, the question of a generic development of values over time and throughout the sequence of stages. As we have noted, values don't simply develop on their own, any more than the autonomous process in any individual develops by itself. The capacity or potential for development resides in each person, but that does not insure the outcome. Some of the Kohlberg data, specifically focused on moral development, indicate in fact that the majority of subjects (either children or adults, across socio-economic classes and across cultures) move only part way along his scheme. Most value development reaches the equivalent of his Stages III or IV and halts. (See chart on p. 50.) In cross sectional and longitudinal studies, most people, when confronted with situations that explicitly contained a moral dilemma, made decisions either on the basis of Stage III—to act in accord with the dictates of conformity and stereotypes—“good behavior is that which pleases others and is approved by them,” or Stage IV—to act in accord with a literal interpretation of laws and an unquestioned acceptance of authority. The individuals who moved to higher stages on his scheme were those who had experienced extensive social participation and responsibility. Participation and responsibility seem importantly connected to the process of fostering maturity or “ego” and “moral” development. The two concepts are almost synonymous in this case.

Another theorist, William Perry (1968), has suggested a developmental framework that connects with the views under consideration. He examined a particular aspect of value development in a study of how students perceive knowledge, learning, and teaching. Since a major activity and experience of children and adolescents concerns learning and education, Perry sought to find out what meaning they comprehend from such experiences. Do attitudes and values toward learning shift over time, and does the shift in understanding connote a developmental process? As we pointed out, Kohlberg found that a child's general orientation toward values coincided with a developmental framework of psychological stages. In a similar manner and by extrapolation, we can

say that Perry found that attitudes and values toward knowledge and learning also imply a psychological/developmental sequence. While Kohlberg found three basic stages of value development: I Pre-Conventional, II Conventional, and III Post-Conventional (see chart), Perry denoted three major stages of values toward learning. He found that students entering college perceived the learning process and "knowledge" in a framework of "*Basic Dualism*," that is, as a kind of "black and white" thinking: learning the right answers, memorizing facts, reciting mechanically, reading every word of assignments, considering knowledge as additive, etc. This view obviously implies to the individual that the control and understanding of the learning process is outside himself. Some of the excerpts in the first chapter illustrate that view of the self as a learner. The teacher knows and reveals the "truth." The student passively accepts and records these "truths" for later presentation back to the teacher.

A second stage occurs when the student discovers that knowledge does not fit a Basic Dualism of Right and Wrong, and then shifts to a stage denoted as "*Simple Relativism*." This is a movement from black and white thinking, since it involves some understanding by the student that there is often more than one answer or one interpretation in history, political science, physics, etc. He begins to perceive that facts by themselves are meaningless and must be connected to a theory, and that theories themselves are only approximations. However, his view in this stage still contains elements of the preceding stage. He tends to accept, in a highly simplified way, the relativity of knowing, and instead of memorizing just "facts" he may try to find the "right" theory. There is still an element of conformity in his thinking and a tendency toward premature closure. In the third stage, "*Complex Relativism*," the student really begins to see himself in control of the learning process, accepts the ambiguity of no final answers and, in fact, begins to enjoy the process of complexity and relativism. Perry sees a critical dimension at this point, namely the student's ability to make a personal commitment to this view and fully accept the implications of self-direction.*

Certainly, Robert White's general concept of competence, Erik Erikson's framework for personal development (noted in the first chapter), Kohlberg's general scheme for value development, and Perry's scheme for values toward knowledge and learning—all imply the gradual development from simplicity to complexity, from other-direction to self-direction, and from the possibility of self-abnegation to self-esteem. To perceive

* On the chart, I have included a highly simplified description of Piaget's concepts of cognitive growth alongside Perry's for purposes of illustration.

one's self as growing from the relatively less complex to a more comprehensive and elaborated understanding of the richness and fullness of human potentiality, and particularly one's own potential, is clearly the major developmental opportunity and challenge presented to education and guidance.

If we now try to connect the ideas and concepts we have been discussing in these first three chapters, we may be able to develop an emerging framework for guidance theory. We have suggested the following:

Concept of Competence A drive to achieve active mastery over the environment. Theory and research evidence: Robert White, Jerome Bruner, Gordon Allport, J. McV. Hunt et al. The concept of self-esteem: John Shlien. These concepts can represent the objectives of a guidance program as educational goals and have been discussed at length in this and in the previous chapter.

A Developmental Framework Stages and tasks of psychological and social development. Theorists: Erik Erikson, personality development; Lawrence Kohlberg, value development and/or ego development; William Perry, values toward learning.

These can represent the specific aspects of personal competence at different ages and stages. We suggested in the previous chapter that children and adolescents are qualitatively different from adults. These qualitative differences may fit a framework of stage tasks. The concept of a developmental framework is, of course, common to many current theories of growth; however, it is important to remember that the concept of a developmental stage has a complex and special meaning that is often easily overlooked. Development in stages means that each new stage involves a change in the way a response is organized; there is a qualitatively different set of responses from the previous stage; and once an organism shifts into a new stage, the shift is irreversible.* For example, in the growth of cognitive structures (from Piaget, 1961), a child shifts from what may be called "concrete" thinking to "functional" thinking, or from functional to abstract. The shift denotes a major new way of thinking, is qualitatively different from the previous stage, and is not reversible.

* The author wishes to thank Lawrence Kohlberg for denoting in such a concise way the meaning of developmental stages.

A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDANCE THEORY

Age*	Erik Erikson Stages of Personality Development	Lawrence Kohlberg Stages of Moral Development
Infancy (0-2)	Trust vs. Mistrust	<u>I & II: Pre-Conventional Level</u> Obedience based on punishment or on belief that "might makes right." <u>III & IV: Conventional Level</u> Behavior based on "other directedness"—pleasing others, being good. <u>or</u> Obedience to authority as a set of fixed rules—"law and order."
Early Childhood (2-4)	Autonomy vs. Shame	
Play Age (4-6)	Initiative vs. Guilt	
School Age (6-12)	Industry vs. Inferiority	
Adolescence (13-21)	Identity vs. Diffusion	<u>V & VI: Post-Conventional Level</u> Behavior based on social contracts like the American Constitution (including Bill of Rights). <u>or</u> A universal ethical principle. Plato's "Justice," Kant's "Categorical," The Golden Rule, etc.
Goals and Objectives:	Growth toward a genuine sense of personal identity. (Erikson)	Growth toward ego strength. (Kohlberg)
	Growth toward self-esteem. (Shlien)	Growth toward personal competence. (R. W. White)

*Based on Erikson's work.

A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDANCE THEORY (cont.)

Age*	William Perry Development of Attitudes and Values Toward Learning	Jean Piaget Stages of Cognitive Growth (simplified)
Elementary School Age (6-12)	<u>Basic Dualism: "Right and Wrong"</u> 1. Learn the "right" answers and memorize facts. 2. Obey the teacher. 3. Read every word in every book. Books are always right.	<u>Sensory-Motor/ Concrete Thought</u> 1. Post sensory-motor 2. Serial-concrete 3. Operational thought patterns
Secondary School Age (13-17)	<u>Simple Relativism: The "Right" Theory</u> 1. "My own opinions are important as long as I end up agreeing with the authority (teacher)." 2. Complex ideas are acknowledged, but premature closure to solutions persists. 3. "I'll accept cognitive relativism because they want me to."	<u>Formal Operations</u> 1. Perceive abstractions 2. Probabilistic thinking
College Age (18-21)	<u>Complex Relativism: Critical Thinking</u> 1. Examine the basic assumptions behind concepts or positions. 2. Resist early closure on problems. 3. Comprehend the rival hypotheses.	

Goals and Objectives: Growth toward valuing complexity and self-direction in learning. (Perry) Growth toward cognitive maturity. (Piaget)

*Based on extrapolations of Perry's work. We do not have longitudinal data as to the exact developmental sequence of such attitudes toward learning during the elementary and secondary school years.

If we examine possible frameworks, then, it is well to keep in mind the special nature of the concept of developmental tasks. Erikson, of course, has provided the most well-known and elaborate discussion of tasks and stages; however, he does seem to err in including adult stages in his framework, since there is really almost no evidence or theory to suggest that the changes that occur during an adult's life are genuine developmental stages. Thus for purposes of illustration, we will focus on childhood and adolescence, and attempt to connect the Erikson framework to other aspects of personal competence. We have not presented a major description of Erikson's stages because they are so well known. Instead we will simply denote his stages in the briefest form, e.g., *Trust vs. Mistrust* as the major task during the first two years, and then piece together the Kohlberg and the Perry schemes to illustrate the specific stages and tasks of development.

SUMMARY

A framework for psychological/personal growth, based largely on the work of Erikson, Kohlberg, and Perry has been outlined, to denote in a less global way the goals and objectives of guidance. We began this chapter with the so-called value problem in order to make explicit what values might be most appropriate for a guidance program and to point out the impossibility of a value-neutral position. Since values are conceptualized as major determinants of human behavior, the value question cannot be ignored.

The framework for stages and tasks depicted in this chapter, clearly, is based on the concept of personal efficacy and competence developed by Robert White. This concept, and the theory and research evidence presented in Chapter 2, imply that there is a natural urge to mastery and self-control in each person. This differs from either the classical framework of Freudian psychoanalytic psychology or the behavioristic view. Freudian psychology assumed a drive-tension—tension-reduction sequence. An individual would work to gratify particular needs (usually directly or indirectly related to sexual gratification), and then the tension would subside. All other human activity was essentially a derivative or a by-product of this sequence. Thus, for example, learning was seen as a sublimation of both sexual and aggressive energy, not as an intrinsic process. White, however, has appropriately reminded us that the urge toward competency and mastery is both less awkward as a directing construct (or assumption about human nature) and more compatible with research findings and observations of human behavior. We will focus on the limitations of a behavioristic view in the next chapter.

One final point needs to be re-emphasized. Nowhere in any of the theories and frameworks presented here do we find an assumption that growth and development unfold automatically. It is important to underscore this point. *The growth toward efficacy and self-esteem is a potential, not an automatic, process.* In fact, Kohlberg has found that a person who has no opportunity for growth, either through education and/or experience, will not proceed from stage to stage in moral development. Rather, such an individual's growth will halt at one level. It is well to remember that education is a reciprocal process based on interaction, not simply upon good intentions.

Guidance is thus intimately concerned with the question of values and of value development. The focal point of that development is the original urge to master and control one's environment. Self-esteem, personal autonomy, and ego strength represent the potential end results. It is the writer's view that the process of guidance in schools, from the initial entry points at nursery or kindergarten to commencement, has as its special focus programs and systems designed to implement these goals. This may mean that we will have to re-examine our present concept of education and our ideas of curriculum (write large) in order to think in unconventional modes. What we want our child to learn may be much less a question of particular subject matter than we might imagine. We may be more concerned with the larger questions of his system for making meaning out of his own experiences: in short, the values he adopts for evaluating and guiding his own life.

BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION: AN UNCONDITIONED RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

In the last half of the twentieth century, the concepts and procedures implied by the term "behavior modification" have themselves become an aversive stimulus to many. In fact, the terms "behavior modification" or "conditioning" have carried with them a connotation of brainwashing, a harbinger of 1984 and thought control. Yet, in spite of this almost automatic response to the ideas of conditioning, can anyone doubt that conditioning meets the empirical test? It works.

People, cats, dogs, rats, salamanders, in fact all manner of man and beast can be conditioned. Through the careful sequencing of reinforcement, either positive (such as kisses, hugs, gold stars, verbal approval), or negative (shocks, smacks on the bottom, disapproving looks) we can change how people behave. In fact, this is usually the main rationale for conditioning—it's taking place all the time anyway. B. F. Skinner, a leading theorist of operant conditioning, says, "All men control, and are being controlled." (1956, p. 1057.) We're all being continually influenced positively or negatively. The implication is obvious. Let's

make systematic use of the means of control rather than allow random influence.

Conditioning as a theory, of course, has been around for a long time. We can go back to J. B. Watson in the early 1900's when he said, "Give me the baby." Watson indicated that he could shape the baby's future through reinforcement principles. As a result, an entire theory of learning based on operant conditioning has been in existence for years. Of course, it presents some difficulties as a theory of learning. The old problem of transfer of training, for example: if you condition someone to give one set of responses, what happens when you change the task? Another example would be the problem of generalization. Will a person continue to respond as conditioned when the reinforcers are withdrawn? And in what situations, and with what kinds of subjects, are particular reinforcers most potent?

Yet it would be a mistake to find fault with conditioning theory because it hasn't solved all the technical problems. No other theory has solved them either. So, these exceptions notwithstanding, conditioning theory and conditioning techniques work. We do, in fact, learn in part by being conditioned, and we have accumulated a considerable body of knowledge to support this observation.

THE EMERGENCE OF CONDITIONING

The question this poses is rather simple. Why, all of a sudden—in, say, the last three or four years—have counseling theorists and counseling theory suddenly discovered conditioning? * Is it something in the nature of our field that every so often we rediscover a "new" wave of ideas or techniques, ideas that bid fair to sweep the field? We have witnessed a succession of such past invasions. We need only to look back to the nineteen thirties to see the extent to which counseling was viewed as a one-shot vocational information service. Then, after World War II, the early writings of Carl Rogers swept over us. Suddenly, nondirective counseling became the wave of the future. And we are witnessing once again a new "old" set of ideas which is attempting, in its turn, to sweep the field. Behavior modification and operant conditioning are now offered to us as the system of the future. In fact, this has replaced the dialogue

* A highly publicized conference entitled "A Revolution in Counseling" was recently held. Behavior modification was suggested as the wave of the future. The conference papers were summarized by J. Krumboltz (1966).

of the 1950's—the directive vs. nondirective controversy—which is fortunately moribund.

From an historical perspective, the question remains—What is it about our field that seems to attract these tidal waves?—an important question. Why in counseling do we seemingly leap from one position to another, with each new position attempting to discredit its predecessor? It's possible to ascribe this to outside forces, i.e., counseling theory and practice is a victim of circumstances beyond our control. But that hardly is an adequate answer. It may be that we bring it upon ourselves. For example, the diffusion and confusion that has existed for years in attempts to define a counselor's role and function invites and indeed beckons for total solutions. Because we have had difficulty in pinning down what we think a counselor should do, a definition that is as complex as it is elusive, we have created a vacuum that seeks a total solution.

Guidance is still too often defined as an adjunct, an ancillary service, or a loose conglomeration of practices. We noted this in the earlier chapters. An updated version of the old dictum now reads, "Those who can teach, do; those who can't, *guide*." Given this circumstance then, i.e., guidance and counseling as a profession in the process of being formed, we apparently end up seeking total solutions. But, as long as we have no adequate and consistent rationale for our profession and our role, we are prone to seduction by the fads and fancies of the moment. With no basis, or an inadequate basis, from which to judge the applicability of the new ideas or the new dimensions that are proposed, they quickly become orthodoxies and hence tend to sweep away all that has gone before.

It is this almost chronic weakness in counseling theory that must be underscored as we examine the ideas of operant conditioning and behavior modification. On what basis are these ideas compatible with the goals and role of counseling? On the surface, at least, it contains an unmistakable appeal, a way out of our definition problem, a clear statement of role and technique. In fact, nothing could be clearer. The counselor says to the client, "Tell me what you want to change about your behavior and I'll apply the techniques." There seems to be no threat to personal freedom. The client is invited to state his problem and the counselor then selects a reinforcement schedule which brings about the desired outcome. Indeed, the age of technology is upon us.

Aside from the logic of a rationale which says that since conditioning is going on all the time anyway we might as well harness it for specific purposes, there is an additional reason for suggesting that counseling

and guidance adopt behavior modification principles. We live in a technological age. Technology, through a series of "great leaps forward" and scientific breakthroughs, has changed our lives significantly and over a short period of time. Travel, communication, and space exploration are only a few examples that are described by the phrase "our shrinking planet." The result of all this is, quite naturally, a tendency to see all problems as essentially problems that can be solved by technology. Thus, human engineering as behavior modification through the application of scientific principles is simply another objective using the same approach. In a technically oriented society, we seek to define our objectives in clean, unambiguous language. We are product-oriented and view results in quantitative terms. Therefore, because technology in general has produced so many astonishing and visible results, it is small wonder that technological solutions are being proposed for human problems.

At the most general level, then, the idea of using systematic behavior modification techniques has been introduced at a time when our faith in technology is at its zenith. We may be witnessing far more than just an innocuous technical innovation. Belanger (1968) has pointed out the general danger that technology creates. Technology is introduced into a given situation as a means to an end—a method, a technique, a strategy, or in the words of a French existential philosopher, an "ensemble of means." * Since the introduction of a technique is simply to create a more efficient operation, whatever the purpose, it seems at the outset that there is really little cause for concern. However, when we apply technology to problems such as human growth and development, the context itself may be so changed that 1984 becomes a reality. The application of a technique can create two equally disastrous consequences. The first is obvious—the means to an end becomes an end in itself—the technique becomes the goal.** The second consequence that Belanger foresees is the possibility that the technology will then distort future goals in order to make those goals amenable to technological solution. The full circle possibility thus is that the servant (technology) becomes the goal (the means to an end becomes an end in itself) and then defines future goals that can be solved through the application of technology. Educational problems and human growth problems are redefined to

* See *The Technological Society*, Ellul, Jacques; Vintage Press, New York, 1967.

** For example, teaching machines might be used in a class to allow pupils to learn at their own pace. However, if one examines the means (the teaching machine program) to this objective (learning at one's own pace), it becomes obvious that most of what a pupil learns from a so-called teaching machine is to answer factual, "objective" questions—a far cry from the ostensible goal. A new goal is substituted by the technology.

create a means for the new ends of technology. The technology of behavior modification, in the case at hand, can become quite easily a new orthodoxy, an orthodoxy surrounded by a scientific mystique.

Like all orthodoxies, it has its special language; for example, "counter-conditioning," "systematic de-sensitization," or "contingency reinforcement," and that most particular phrase which it tacked on to all words—"behavior" e.g., listening behavior, talking behavior, and nodding . . . behavior.* In addition to the special language, there is the appeal of simplicity. It is proposed as a parsimonious theory: attractive, direct, forceful. We need no "mentalistic" conceptions such as self-esteem, self-confidence, attitudes, or values. "The simple laws of reinforcement provide an alternative to a mentalistic conception of behavior." (Holz and Azrin, 1966, p. 791.) We need to make no inferences from behavior to concepts or constructs of personality. Man is, indeed, in this view, a black box. With the proper control of antecedent conditions we can direct the consequent behavior. And, the behaviorist adds, "I have the methods of manipulating the antecedent conditions."

What then are the difficulties with such an approach and such a set of assumptions? If, for a moment, we look beneath the surface of behavior modification theory, we find that all is not quite so neat and tidy. The basic problem is clear. Can one human being systematically and rigorously condition another? Even in the most simple studies, such as asking an "examiner" to respond only to plural nouns of a subject, the results were something less than systematic, rigorous, and consistent. For example, "Krasner (1958), in his review of studies of verbal conditioning found that about one quarter of the studies failed to find any increase of verbal responses. Similarly, many studies reported difficulties in achieving conditioning. Unexpected procedural difficulties arose." (Holz and Azrin, 1966, p. 795.)**

Under the heading, "Influence of the Observer," Holz and Azrin describe the problem of using a human as an examiner or observer. They note that if the experimenter is strongly in favor of conditioning,

* In this respect, behavior modification is really following in well established footsteps. For example, dynamic psychology had its own "trade" names: "cathexis," "de-libidinized energy," "parataxic distortion," etc. A theory in psychology apparently takes on added luster when it has special words and phrases, especially if in so doing it makes everything sound so much more "scientific."

** Holz and Azrin classify the methodology problems as: (1) Delineation of the response class, (2) Thematic control, (3) Response units, (4) Operant level, (5) Duration of sessions, (6) Adequacy of stimulus, (7) Consistency, (8) Immediacy, and (9) Influence of the observer. They provide an excellent review of the problems involved. This work should be carefully reviewed by anyone who proposes behavior modification as a systematic counseling technique.

he exhibits certain biases in how he scores his results. In one study, "pro-conditioning" experimenters scored ambiguous words as *positive* when they occurred during the reinforcement period, and *negative* at other times. The authors also note that at least in one study, the results were not significant because the observers did not know what results "should" occur. Perhaps the *coup de grâce* came when the authors actually reversed the effect of reinforcement by instructing the examiners to expect different outcomes. Some observers were told that disagreement with a subject's statement of opinion would produce more opinions than would agreement with those opinions. The reverse was told to another set of observers. The results were diametrically opposite, but in accord with the expectations given.

Rosenthal has provided further evidence concerning the problematic nature of so-called objective scientific procedures when human beings are experimenters. Through a process he denotes as covert communication, the experimenter's subjective feelings and expectations are transmitted to the experimental subjects. It seems to matter very little whether the subjects are rats learning T-Mazes or being kept in Skinner Boxes, or human subjects giving Rorschach responses, learning reasoning tasks, nonsense syllables, etc. Whenever the experimenters (those who were supposedly running the experiments) were told to expect different outcomes, the actual outcomes were almost always in accord with their expectations. The critical point in this so-called self-fulfilling prophecy is that it was not intended by the experimenters: "Perhaps it is appropriate to stress the unintentional aspect of the self-fulfilling prophecy—the examiners and experimenters tried hard to avoid having their expectations affect their subject's performance." (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968.)

Do we need to rewrite the "Law of Effect" when we're using the species *homo sapiens*? Does the "Law of Effect" become the "Law of Expectation," and as such, become subject to the frailties of "subjectivity," personal bias, and a host of other human characteristics? At least one might suggest that something like the attitudes, values, or other "mentalistic conceptions" of the experimenters and observers has something to do with these apparently unlawful outcomes. Perhaps in the hands of humans the laws of reinforcement are not quite so simple, straightforward, or effective, nor so easy to apply.

Certainly, if one reads Solomon's presidential address to the Eastern Psychological Association, the monolith of conditioning theory appears to generate disagreements within its own ranks. In discussing reinforcement theory, Solomon noted that we have avoided investigating what

may be the most effective means of reinforcement—the use of punishment. He says of Skinner's prior contention that negative reinforcement is ineffective:

I admire the humanitarian and kindly dispositions contained in such writings. But the scientific basis for the conclusions therein was shabby . . . and tinged with a laudable though thoroughly incorrect and unscientific sentimentalism and softness.

(Solomon, 1964, pp. 248, ff.)

Skinner's views are apparently laudable but have no place in science, since "pure" science has no connection to "dogmas or social philosophies dealing with punishment." It would be Solomon's contention that our social philosophies or dogmas have inhibited us and made us afraid to investigate punishment as an effective method for modifying behavior. Apparently the relationship between the process we use and the outcome we would desire is of small concern to Solomon. For example, he notes that even if the treatment, e.g., negative reinforcement, induces so-called neurotic or psychotic effects, these are "side effects."

The side effects are frightening indeed—but there must be some rules, some principles governing the appearance of such side effects.

(Solomon, 1964, p. 250)

Indeed, there may be some rules governing the appearance of "side" effects induced by negative reinforcement, but this is essentially beside the point. In counseling we obviously can never disregard the process we use to achieve outcomes. We can never be so devoted to behavior change as outcome that how we "get" there would be unimportant.

What we need to underscore is both the obvious inconsistency and perhaps hopeless illusion that is being pursued by "pure scientists"—i.e., looking for human beings who have no feelings or attitudes that may "bias" how they work on other human beings. We would also stress that reinforcement theory, whether positive or negative, does not hold all the answers as to how people learn. How we learn about the world around us, or how we learn about ourselves, resists singular or monolithic theories. And the corollary follows: the totality of human behavior is not so simple that it can be changed exclusively through the application of so-called laws of reinforcement. It then appears, "The questing human spirit will always reject such rigidities."

Unfortunately, or fortunately, what we find forced upon us is a con-

ception of man that is too complex to be reduced simply to schedules of reinforcement. At the same time, this is not to totally discard reinforcement as an empirically established phenomenon; that would be surely tossing out the proverbial baby with the bath! We should emphasize that our profession can afford neither the luxury of totally dismissing reinforcement nor totally accepting it. The former would be short-sighted; the latter would be a repetition-compulsion of our previous errors to accept totally any single view dictating a specific theory or set of techniques. Such thinking will keep us in a state of confusion and our profession subject to undue influence. Thus we need to view behavior modification as a partial description, not a new orthodoxy. But then the question still is with us, What is our role? Until this is reasonably clear, we will not be strong enough as a profession to select aspects of ideas, techniques, and theories that are currently available. Therefore, we should emphasize the partial and incomplete nature of many ideas about counseling. For example, it is clear from the work of Carl Rogers that certain conditions facilitate personal exploration and self-examination in a counseling session. But it does not follow that this need be the exclusive focus or theory for counseling. Similarly, positive reinforcement or conditioning does influence what a client says and indeed how he says it, but it does not follow . . .

The problem is to recognize the danger in *pars pro toto* thinking, that is, mistaking the part for the whole, and in the case of behavior modification, there is a double danger because on the surface, its appeal sounds unbeatable. In fact, it is just such a value-free connotation that concerns one the most about conditioning. "Have the client specify at the outset what behavior he wants to change, then the counselor helps and aids the client to accomplish his own objectives." It sounds like we have solved the old value dilemma, the dilemma we have all struggled with: Does the counselor "impose" and "inculcate" his values on the client? Does the counselor try to assume a neutral position and pretend he doesn't have values? In behavior modification we leave the specification of the objective to the client. But how many times do clients, in the first session, present a "problem" or a "concern" or a "presenting complaint" that is never mentioned again? As you work with a client and aid him in exploring both his ideas and feelings, you often find that what he came in to see you about, ostensibly, had little to do with his real concerns. The difficulty is simple. We're too complex to know really what we want. In fact, one could almost define counseling as a process through which the client explores and examines progressively more and more about

his own feelings and thoughts to clarify what he is *really* after. Behavior modification with its specification of a contract between the client and the counselor, written, of course, in behavioral terms, may imply premature closure on the "presenting complaint," or an undue narrowing and focusing on perhaps superficial aspects of a client's concerns.

If we compare counseling to the major aspects of behavior modification, a distinction appears. The locus of control and responsibility for action in counseling is with the client. In conditioning, once the objective is stated in behavioral terms, the counselor then "treats" the client, that is, he prescribes for the client. The difference between working "on" versus working "with" may be slight, unless, of course, you happen to be the client. We do need to avoid a semantic trap implied by the term "behavior modification." All counselors are attempting to induce, to nurture, to have an effect on, to influence, and to change behavior. On the other hand, that does not mean that behavior modification, that is, the direct intervention to change behavior, is either the only way or indeed the best way to accomplish such goals. One way to see this more clearly is in the difference between the terms "to educate" versus "to control." Because behavior modification theory seeks to avoid mentalistic conceptions as meaningless intervening variables between stimulus and response bonds, the thrust is toward a direct control of responses, i.e., a direct focus on behavior. However, other theories of personality, or indeed other sets of assumptions, view such intervening variables as the crucial determinants of outcomes or responses such as are subsumed under behavior. Thus, from these theories we would focus on an individual's self-concept, values, or attitudes, since such personality constructs are viewed as responsible for how a person ultimately acts. The difference, then, is between focusing on attitudes (for example) and seeking to influence through increasing a person's awareness, versus a focus on behavior and the scheduling of responses. The former can be thought of as increasing alternatives, expanding and developing more adequate self-control and initiative; the latter implies a narrowing, a prescribing and directed focus on outcome, with the locus of responsibility on the counselor. It's almost as if the counselor takes over (temporarily, of course) for the client, rather than counseling as a shared endeavor. Even though the ends of both approaches may be similar, how the goal is reached (i.e., the process used) is distinctly and crucially different.

Can the theory from which conditioning arose, then, change enough so that some of its procedures can become part of the counselor's repertoire? This question still remains. Nothing would be worse than a coun-

selor who is unaware of the possible influence on behavior through conditioning. Nothing would be worse than for a client to be caught in a double bind, where a counselor was attempting to increase an awareness of client attitudes and feelings, and then subtly or unknowingly condition or reinforce conflicting behavior. For example, a counselor might attempt to aid a client in developing his own opinions and views and then subtly convey to the client how he (the counselor) wants him to act, or praise the client when he achieves a congruence to his own expectations.* Thus the problem for counselors is to be aware of how we actually do condition (perhaps unintentionally) through our selective responses. And most difficult of all to remember in this regard is that rewards and punishments exist in the eye of the beholder rather than in an objective state. It is how the client perceives events as punishing or rewarding—not simply what we intend. Whether he sees words, smiles, frowns, as approving or disapproving, subtly but inevitably influences him directly and indirectly. So we are forced to recast the question; it isn't so much that we have the choice to toss out conditioning and say, with a sense of imperialism, "That theory has no place in my counseling." Conditioning occurs whether we want to admit it or not. And we need to develop systems of counseling that more adequately take the phenomenon into account.

CONDITIONING AND COUNSELING: INCOMPATIBLE GOALS

Thus we return to our original dilemma: to derive a generalized counseling model that is not restrictive, not limited to a single dimension nor mutually exclusive, where both the means and ends of counseling are congruent and the complexities of any human being are respected. There is the ever present danger in a helping profession such as counseling that we create a cult in attending to others' problems. As Khelif has noted, "The professional altruists constitute a new healing faith like members of the oldest profession, their routines are composed of other people's emergencies." (1966.)

* In a research study (Sprinthall and Mosher, 1969), we have been struck by the ability of high school students to quickly fathom what school personnel such as counselors and teachers really want, not necessarily what they say they want. Often, school personnel, as well as parents, convey a pseudo-liberalism to an adolescent—"You are to decide for yourself, but you had better end up agreeing with me!"

However, if we can construe our role more broadly than is possible either according to the orthodoxies of the past, or indeed under any new proposed orthodoxies, then we may emerge from our dilemma. What we need is a broadly based, comprehensive counseling model, in which we can draw together the aspects of individual learning. But first we need a focus. A focus for counseling theory is a necessary basis from which to derive a series of functions and roles. At a general level, Robert Callis has pointed out, "The primary goal of an organism is to behave in such a fashion that he is able to extract from his environment the satisfaction of his needs not only at the moment but in a sustained manner in the future." (Callis, 1960.) We should emphasize the phrase, "*That he is able to extract*," for it connotes a central focus for counseling—to develop in those with whom we work the ability to control and direct their own efforts, not only in the moment but in the long run as well. This characteristic, the need to deal effectively with the environment, is not something that we need impose on our clients, nor is it a fanciful construct dreamed up by some armchair abstractionist. The ability, indeed, the necessity to deal effectively with the environment is a given, inborn, innate human tendency.

Thus the opportunity is present within each child for initiative, independence, and autonomy—the need to deal effectively with the world at large. Counterpoised to this tendency, however, is the condition of dependency. Of all the species, it is the human neonate who is the most dependent, most underdeveloped, and hence, exposed for the longest period of time to control from without. This exposure carries with it the temptation for adults to encourage dependency rather than to nurture competency in their young. Especially in the initial stages of development, we see the two dimensions alternately. Whether the strivings for competency continue to mature depends on our responses. These strivings will not unfold automatically.

If we turn for a moment to the current scene, we may see more clearly the urgency of the educational problems we face. The current unrest within our college students stands as mute testimony. Prior to entering college, they have too often been denied the opportunities for developing a sense of competence and mastery. Counseling has been almost nonexistent during the important formative years in grade school. Counseling at the secondary level has too often attempted the impossible. We cannot build on inadequate foundations. Witness the price we pay later on, as young adults literally destroy themselves, opt out of society and withdraw from the real world into a world of LSD, marijuana and "speed."

There is a poignant and powerful parallel in the social unrest in our cities. For years we have been talking of the social dynamite that the appalling conditions have created; yet we have avoided, delayed, and excused ourselves. This is a reminder of what the real agenda of counseling is all about: to aid others in developing their competency to deal effectively with the world.

For this purpose we do not need a new breed of engineers, human or otherwise. We do need counselors who can educate, and educate in its root sense, to draw out, elicit, and develop the students in their charge.

George Miller in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association underscored the problem of behavior control as a model for application to human problems (Miller, 1969). While the field of psychology, as the study of human behavior, has quite naturally become a resource for information upon which to build programs, the effect of selecting one principle and one dimension of learning has been to constrict the development of adequate methods derived from psychology. Miller sounds a significant note of warning with particular regard to the methods of behavioral control derived from conditioning. He suggests that a concern for the techniques of behavior control through conditioning, at best leads to myopia.

At best, control is but one component in any program for personal improvement or social reform. Changing behavior is pointless in the absence of any coherent plan for how it should be changed. Too often, I fear, psychologists have implied that acceptable uses for behavior control are either self-evident or can be safely left to the wisdom and benevolence of powerful men.

(Miller, 1969, p. 1068)

It is, of course, folly to suggest that the objectives or goals of any program of behavior control are self-evident. The choice of a reinforcement schedule directly implies a certain goal. In fact, as Miller so cogently notes, the scientific control of behavior could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The difficulty, as we have noted earlier, is that the apparent scientific basis for conditioning appears so formidable superficially. If we dig below the surface, we find that conditioning is to a greater or lesser degree, in Miller's words, a "technological fix." And, as we pointed out earlier in this chapter, technology's power to achieve success in other fields adds to the possibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy for the application of psychology in general and guidance in particular—fame by association one could say. This all tends to obscure the fundamental weak-

ness of behavior modification as a model for guidance. Again, Miller suggests that reinforcement theory for humans (at least) is "complicated by man's symbolic proclivities and by the fact that the disparity between experimenter and subject changes when the subject is also a man." (Miller, 1969, p. 1067.) What is called man's symbolic proclivities may be the most important features of man's potential for growth.

SUMMARY

This chapter analyzed what might be considered the major rival position, at present, for a basis upon which to build guidance theory. That position, espoused in a number of recent articles and books, suggests behavior modification techniques as the means to make guidance practice efficient, scientifically based, and effective. We have examined the basis for such claims through the views and research of the exponents of that position and have pointed out inconsistencies and pseudo-scientific aspects in these claims.

The theory of behavior control, while attempting to be parsimonious—attempting, that is, to describe phenomena as simply as possible—too readily sacrifices the complexity of humans to the single principle of the "Law of Effect." It virtually ignores developmental stages: stages of moral development, personal development, epistemological development (conceptions of knowledge), cognitive development—so much so that we may have inadvertently left the human being out of the process! By also eliminating as mentalistic any concepts such as personal efficacy, urges toward self-mastery, and the like, the behavioristic view appears decidedly singular and drastic as a basis for guidance. Instead, we would suggest that the more complex conceptions of growth and development presented earlier can serve more adequately as a basis for guidance practice. It is true, nevertheless, that the definitions here aren't as clear-cut as in behavioral control and that there are internal inconsistencies yet to be worked out.

As well, we have to admit that the framework, at this point, is at best a skeleton with much work to be done. However, it does seem that this is the direction to follow: the choice in favor of education as a framework for intervention to promote growth, versus human engineering to manipulate and control others.

COUNSELING: ITS DUAL FOCUS

INTRODUCTION

Thus far, we have explored problems inherent in establishing a theoretical basis for guidance. To counter the random, oftentimes chaotic, and occasionally contradictory development of guidance as a profession, we have suggested the necessity for theory. To avoid further disorganized growth, we have proposed that a series of constructs, such as personal competence in a framework of stages and tasks, become a base for guidance as an applied science of human behavior. An applied science, by definition, has as its major focus human growth in natural settings such as schools and colleges.

We now turn to some specific considerations of applications of guidance—or, more simply, guidance as practice. In this chapter we will focus on the most common, yet at the same time one of the most confusing aspects of guidance: the practice of counseling. The discussion begins with the problem of definition and proceeds to elaboration of a model for counseling, conceived of as one part of guidance viewed as an educational function. This is followed with an example from a counseling case illustrating some of the key elements of counseling in this model.

COUNSELING AND GUIDANCE: A PROBLEM IN DEFINITION

Although no one has yet proposed a specific definition of counseling which is satisfactory to all, there is, more by common consent than anything else, general agreement that counseling is a very significant aspect in any general model of guidance. In fact, some would consider individual or group counseling as the central core of guidance (Rogers, 1965). This position would stress the importance of in-depth exploration of feelings about self, and the confidential nature of such a private and personal counselor-client relationship. The position emphasizes a separate and distinct guidance role limited quite exclusively to the establishment of an appropriately sensitive and accepting relationship with clients. "We have come to recognize that if we can provide an understanding of the way the client seems to himself at this moment, he can do the rest." (Rogers 1951, p. 30.) In this view, with such a strong emphasis on growth of self toward self-actualization and self-realization, guidance may be synonymous with counseling, and its function circumscribed to highly sensitive listening conveyed through "empathy" and "unconditional positive regard."

Emanating from this single posture, individual counseling as concept and method for guidance swept the field, inducing near total acceptance as the proper focus. Super has noted that guidance theory may reach the stage where it can assimilate useful ideas and modify itself in the light of newly discovered facts, rather than be swept by them as it was by Rogerian theory (Super, 1964, p. 156). When Carl Rogers proposed his ideas, the field of guidance in general showed no such ability to assimilate and modify, but rather accepted the views without an awareness of their implicit limitations. By focusing so exclusively on the emotional and affective component of students or clients, the counselor was creating a role that was almost nontranslatable, or at least quite unintelligible to an emergent profession in education. In fact distinctiveness of function, it could be claimed, was deliberately blurred and obscured so that the client-centered teacher, counselor, or psychotherapist were figuratively joined under the common goals of the actualization of self.*

* We do not plan to engage in a long theoretical discussion on the meaning of self-actualization, nor do we question the possibility of "positive forces for growth" or "growth-promoting relationships." We do point out, however, that these views seem too global, too total, and thus too exclusive of other views to provide an adequate framework for guidance in education.

In our view, this obfuscation proved a substantial hindrance to guidance theory. The counselor was denied, in principle, the opportunity for an objective assessment of client and process. Client-learning in counseling was limited to actual experiencing based on an implicit dichotomy separating knowledge from experience. While it is possible to continue an analysis of our difficulties with this model of counseling, our chief concern is the resultant limitation on counselor activity, not only with clients but also with the school as a social system.

Counseling on an individual basis as a means of enhancing more effective personal choice will, of course, assume a significant portion of the guidance professional's role. But we do again want to stress that this is still only one aspect, not the entire role definition. We think that some of the most enduring difficulties in reviewing counseling and guidance literature derive from the lack of acceptance or understanding of this problem. If counseling remains the sole and real core of guidance, then we will continue to witness attempts to wiggle out of the impossible trap created by the sheer numbers of school students involved. Too often the "splendid isolation" of counseling (at least in theory) from the rest of what goes on in an educational setting creates a bind. Solutions are sought which must be temporary at best, such as seeing each student (in a caseload of 400 or 500 students) at least twice each year. The idea that any counselor, no matter how well trained or competent, can provide a significant learning experience (such as promoting more effective individual decisions and personal autonomy) in two 45-minute sessions a year is incredible if it were not ludicrous. There have been other attempts to deal with the number problem through modifications of individual counseling procedures: a more limited number of sessions combined with group guidance, reduction in time for counseling sessions, plus a series of other suggestions which, taken as a whole, really represent little more than administrative juggling and hence an avoidance of the main issues.

COUNSELING: ITS ROLE IN GUIDANCE

We have stressed in this book, a general view for guidance in education as a complementary educational function implying concepts such as normal development, personal autonomy in interdependence, and stage tasks and discontinuities. From this view, it is possible to derive a function for counseling as one aspect of the guidance profession. This means, however, that we are required to discard the limitation of equating in-

dividual counseling with guidance. As we noted earlier, guidance as a concept and profession represents an applied behavioral science. Counseling is one aspect of this science, one part of the guidance function. To define and differentiate these concepts is not an easy task, and we will be most candid in admitting that one of the most consistent themes and most remarkable achievements in guidance theory in general has been the ability to confuse through definitional obscurantism. Indeed the ambiguity that usually confronts a reader in guidance is probably a reflection of the uncertainty with which the views on counseling and guidance were elaborated. Lortie captured this uncertainty when he stated as the goal for an article on guidance: "I shall attempt to demonstrate that the current position of the counselor contains diverse, contradictory functions and that members of the occupation will be forced to resolve thorny issues in moving toward the professional model of work organization." (Lortie 1965, p. 128.) Lortie noted in substantiation that McCully, one of the leaders of the profession, could find no consensus on what were the essential and primary services offered by counselors. We would add that if it is hard to find a consensus as to present function, it is very difficult to foresee the emergence of a professionally distinct model for guidance. But let us return to the thesis of this chapter, that counseling may represent one of a series of guidance functions.

There have been a series of developments within the field of counseling theory which have broadened the scope of counseling as an aspect of guidance, and which point to a direction and definition for counseling within the aegis of guidance. As we have noted elsewhere, the acrimony over the rather tiresome dialogue between the so-called directive and nondirective counseling theorists has mercifully subsided. These orthodoxies of the 1950's have apparently run their course. There seems to be a substantial recognition that this forced dichotomy had created a stalemate. Loughary has gently reminded us of the need for understandable articulation: "As our profession became more visible, we were asked with increasing frequency to explain our functions and describe our procedures, and we began to describe what must have appeared to many listeners to be more akin to religion than to a systematic discipline." (Loughary, 1965, p. 46.) The thesis of nondirective counseling and its antithesis, directive counseling, has given way to a synthesis. Through this resolution, a counseling role emerges which not only permits other activities for the guidance counselor, but also implies that the overall guidance function itself can subsume counseling. The resolution has come,

we feel, from the recognition that neither position was tenable when viewed from the framework of an educational function. Nondirective counseling theory became too broad. Froehlich noted the increased emphasis on therapy:

. . . the followers of this school of thought have over-emphasized psychotherapy at the expense of counseling. Carl Rogers entitled an early book *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. One of his disciples has written a book entitled *Introduction to Therapeutic Counseling*. More recently Rogers has wisely dropped the pretense of counseling and has called his latest book, *Client-Centered Therapy*. . . *

(Froehlich, 1960, p. 373)

As long as distinctions between counseling and therapy were held as irrelevant, so long could nondirective theory hold a place as the model for guidance. In fact as we pointed out in the introduction, by blurring distinctions between counseling as an educative function or as a therapeutic function, client-centered counseling-therapy attempted to become the definition of guidance theory.

Similarly, the assumptions behind the so-called directive counseling models came into question and could be considered inadequate. The directive posture assumed that the counselor possessed information, content, and facts which he then told to the student. An informational deficit was, in effect, the presenting problem and could be quickly and efficiently resolved. In our view, this concept of guidance is superficial, even though, as we indicated in the introduction, the position represents the major rationale for guidance practice. The imparting of information as the major theoretical role for guidance is as disjunctive to the goals of guidance as is the classroom teacher who functions merely as a presenter of content. Both avoid a major educative goal—the process of disciplined inquiry in the case of the classroom, and the process of learning to make one's own personal decisions in the case of counseling. These two aspects of the process of education as the major educative goal, represent for us the point of complement between teaching and guidance. For teaching, as we have noted, this would involve the growth of individual autonomy in the use of ideas, facts, questions, and content in the various subject disci-

* Perry (1955) has documented this same point by noting the astonishing decline of references to "counseling" in Rogers' more recent writings when compared to his earlier work and the dramatic expansion of client interviews from short to long term cases; from counseling to psychotherapy.

plines, such as English, social studies, science, etc. For guidance this would involve a similar process, but with a shift in focus to the creation of personal autonomy, purposeful action, and effective personal decision-making.

COUNSELING: A DIFFERENTIATED THEORETICAL BASIS

The synthesis of ideas for counseling as an aspect of guidance has been recent. While it had been recognized that counseling with individual students would represent a major segment of guidance, in practice, probably by definition if for no other reason, it has never really been clear just what this function would involve. In fact it probably can be demonstrated that while university training centers were engaged in the "directives" vs. "nondirectives" controversy, in practice, the counselors in schools were generally following a non-model—eclecticism. There is now available some rather extensive data on this problem. A recent investigation demonstrated forcefully that guidance counselors in general do not involve themselves to any extensive degree in individual counseling. If pressed for a theoretical view, counselors tend to describe what view they don't hold and call what they do an eclectic approach* (Armour, 1969). This kind of eclecticism has been called the "smorgasbord approach," or "cafeteria style" counseling. Almost any kind of interaction between a counselor and a student is called counseling. Counseling is represented so broadly that the concepts have almost no meaning at all. The essential superficiality of an eclectic approach is probably more of a symptom than anything else. It is a symptom of an excessively restrictive model for guidance counseling that has been prominent.

The development of ideas and concepts for counseling within the frame of guidance is now becoming insistent. The dissatisfactions with the rigid orthodoxies of the past have produced a trend to a more comprehensive set of concepts. We will draw heavily on the ideas of some theorists in outlining important counseling concepts for a guidance role.

As we noted in Chapter 1, there were a cluster of assumptions and concepts descriptive of a guidance model. These assumptions pointed to a direction different from a service or ancillary role. By describing educa-

* It has always struck us that eclecticism in guidance or education lacks a consistency, originality, and genuineness that is very analogous to eclecticism in art. The artist simply borrows a few of the attributes of great art of an earlier period and completely misses the essence of the ideas and aesthetic qualities portrayed. So too may the eclectic counselor operate!

tive, developmental, and pro-active concepts as general goals of guidance, we can turn to counseling as a specific case within this framework. A leading theorist, Brayfield, noted an emergent consensus for counseling which includes: (1) a primary focus on counseling with normal people, (2) an emphasis on the personality strengths and assets of clients, and (3) an increased emphasis on cognitive activities, especially those involving choice and decision (Brayfield, 1963). Some of the most important contributors to this consensus, particularly with reference to counseling, have been theorists such as Perry, Bordin, Hummel, and Tyler. There is a strong common theme from these writers which stresses a counseling model that comprehends both rationality (cognitive problem solving) and emotion (the affective determinants of behavior). It is in such a combination that differentiated counseling models are possible. A differentiation helps set counseling apart from other forms of education, such as teaching, and equally from other forms of one to one "treatment," such as psychotherapy. We plan to outline briefly a few of the major ideas developed by the above authors as examples of the consensus.

Perry (1955) identifies two dimensions of counseling: (1) the "direction of regard" by client and counselor and (2) the intensity of involvement. In counseling, the counselor and client often examine the latter's role areas or problems. The term "role" refers to various sectors/areas of the counselee's present social existence. In an educational setting, for example, the individual's major role is as a student confronted with certain educational and vocational decisions. For Perry, counseling would focus on the social roles with which the individual is concerned. Counseling is not directed toward broader aspects of personality, or "psychodynamics," i.e., the interplay of instinctual and unconscious forces affecting human behavior.

The intensity of the counseling involvement represents a second parameter. The counselor in the Perry model works with the client on the pertinent role problems. Therefore, the intensity of the counseling relationship will be significantly different from what is typical of psychotherapy. Transference will be at a minimum. Perry also notes that the so-called personal or psychological counseling would still fit the role problem framework:

This position can be defended on two grounds: (1) In one set of conditions the word "personal" turns out to mean "social"; the person comes to the counselor about his personality in a social sense . . . or (2) he comes, in a general dissatisfaction in his function in most of his roles. . . . (Perry, 1955, p. 404)

Counseling, then, connotes role problem solving. The client can be aided in learning "the skills of choice and management among life's roles." (Perry, p. 401.)

Bordin's recent work (1968) is relevant because he also emphasizes a counseling model directed toward a problem solving process. Counseling is focused on the rational elements in this process, rather than on the intensely affective areas. This does not deny the reality of emotional and irrational forces. Bordin suggests a cognitive-conative balance through which the counselor, while acknowledging the latter, works toward enhancing the former. The array of personality variables involved in any such dimension is, of course, infinite. However, Bordin takes particular note of that segment of personality that is mostly involved with the organization of plans, choice among alternate plans, and what is sometimes called purposive action.

The differentiation between the cognitive and the conative is similar to the distinction in psychoanalytic terms between the ego and id. In a sense, Bordin is revising the more traditional analytic theory of personality to include a greater emphasis on ego functions of thought, planning, and problem solving. This framework of ego processes, then, becomes an acknowledged basis for a viable counseling theory.* Bordin notes:

The measure of the effectiveness of our counseling is not how thoroughly or how completely the client's feelings and emotions have been brought into the counseling relationship, but how much flexibility, increased integration of feelings, and better ability to handle life situations (present role reality) for his own satisfaction and productivity have been achieved.

(Bordin, 1968, p. 371)

Hummel's work (1965) in developing an ego-counseling model represents another important theoretical contribution to a general definition of counseling. A central distinguishing feature of Hummel's "ego-counseling" is the importance it ascribes, theoretically and methodologically, to "secondary process" (i.e., to the ego functions of impulse control, planning, logical thinking, and problem solving). Ego-counseling, then, is operationally involved with cognition—with analysis and thinking activity. The particular focus is on the *personal condition* of the individual, i.e., reasoning about, and revision of, one's own (rather than abstract, or

* Bordin is currently involved with the development of personality theory in such a framework. The emphasis is on constructive or adaptive functioning, with theoretical analogues to the work of Erik Erikson and Robert White.

others') reality problems, plans, and actions. A concern with cognitive theory follows logically. In short, the special "cognitive-conative balance" characterizing ego counseling derives support both from ego theory (from Allport, Hartmann, Bronfenbrenner) and from the "fruitful promise for counseling theorists in the work of Piaget, Bruner, Rapaport, George Kelly, and of others who have inquired into the nature of thinking." (Hummel, 1965, p. 97.)

Ego-counseling is not a narrow or naïve (i.e., pre-Freudian) rationalism. It assumes, however, that ego energy and ego processes can be functionally autonomous within the personality structure; that, in Allport's terms, "the rational functioning of the proprium (i.e., ego) is capable . . . of yielding true solutions, appropriate adjustments, accurate planning, and a relatively faultless solving of the equations of life." (Allport, 1961, p. 46.)

Tyler's recent outline (1969) of counseling clearly relates to these notions. She construes counseling as the "appraisal with" the client of the array of alternative "possibility structures." The goal is an enhanced rational understanding by a client, to enable him to choose the most appropriate course of action. Although Tyler's terminology is somewhat distinct because of her orientation toward individual differences as the basis for theory, there is an analogue between her concept of appraisal and the concept of counseling advanced by the contributors already noted. Her term "possibility structure" refers to the long-range strategies for choosing that are possible for an individual. Other theorists identify this concept as ego organization (Hummel), or ego processes (Bordin). Further extensions of counseling theory may be derived from this aspect of personality.

We suggest that the counselor's role and function can be viewed within this comprehensive model we have derived from the literature. For example, the counselor provides special individual assistance to relatively normal clients. As Tyler notes, the client does not necessarily need to have a "presenting problem" since the aim is for increased effectiveness of behavior-choice. However, the nature of our present society confronts the individual with certain discontinuities and therefore requires choice. This is particularly true for the period of adolescent development, and may be equally relevant at the elementary level. In settings such as school or college, the student population is obviously confronted with the realities of choice: educational, vocational, and personal decisions must be made. At any given point, some of these students may not resolve these role area concerns. The complexity inherent in our increasingly

technological, corporate, and bureaucratic structures means that decisions become categorical imperatives with attendant "real" anxieties. "No longer can youth contemplate its future under the protection of the great social stabilizers of the past. No longer can one counsel within the framework of Victorian decorum, theological certainties, or the Pax Britannica." (Allport, 1965, p. 377.) The simple time lag or prolonged adolescence that our educational system imposes serves to heighten the problem of adequate decision-making and performance by our youth. The extensive "rites of passage," while attempting to confront responsibility, create the ground upon which the counselor and client stand.

COUNSELING AS METHOD

The model previously described for counseling may appear overly rationalistic because we have deliberately emphasized the goals of the counseling process in terms such as more effective cognitive direction, increased awareness into present role demands/tasks, or an enhanced rational perspective of an immediate "problem" or environmental press. However, in terms of counseling procedures, we do wish to emphasize the importance of the interpersonal relationship, while retaining the cognitively based concepts as goals. By truism, if not by definition, all counseling is centered on the student. Counseling cannot but involve examination and exploration of his "private world," his way of perceiving, thinking, feeling, etc. To this extent, then, all counseling theories are at least partly phenomenological. Also, as a result, all developed counseling theories share this view of a sensitive, understanding, accepting relationship as at least one essential ingredient of the process. We by no means disagree or dispute the relevancy of this aspect of a counseling process.

We hold that a genuine and sensitive concern for the client is a necessary condition for effective counselor-client collaboration. The critical issues in counseling most surely connote parameters which are personal—those of the counselee. Hence, the counselor must be free of a requirement to make objective academic evaluation of the student, or to impose sanctions (grades, discipline, detention, etc.). The relationship must be unencumbered by requirements to teach in a pedagogical sense, in order to permit a stance toward open-ended exploration by both client and counselor. At the same time, we do view the goals of the process in terms other than the experiencing of an accepting interpersonal relationship. In this sense, the relationship becomes part of, but not the exclusive ele-

ment in counseling. Perhaps we can best illustrate this view by suggesting that the effective counselor is "tuned in" to both the emotions and the content expressed by a client. As a result, the counselor may often "reflect feelings" in the traditional Rogerian sense, not only to clarify possible meaning but also as an indicator that he does, in the best sense of the word, "understand" the client. But, the counselor is *not* enjoined by theory to go no further in the interaction. In fact we are suggesting just the opposite, that the clients and counselors work effectively through an open-ended dialogue. Perry's phrase "heuristic set" or Bordin's "mutual deliberation" connote similar meanings in this regard. Bordin, in particular, notes the problems created by a narrow counseling model that limits the interaction to subjectivity and affect exclusively. He points out that the counselor who is proceeding exclusively at the affective level may be congratulating himself on having successfully involved the client in the therapeutic process.

However, the counselor is often astonished at the consequences of his failure to help the client arrive at a redefinition of his goal and task. Suddenly the client will pull up short and say something like, "Well, this has been very interesting, now I guess we'd better get down to business and talk about my specific decision. . . ."

(Bordin, 1968, pp. 223-224)

This suggests that the counselor's activity in individual counseling includes respect for both sides of the human condition, ideas and feelings. The counselor can suggest alternatives and clarify consequences. Tyler indicates that in this mode, the counselor should be flexible enough to encourage expression in taciturn clients, present alternatives, and make vague meanings more explicit to the client (a kind of interpretation). The counselor acts to clarify the structure which surrounds the client, to illumine possible encumbrances as an initial step. Bordin denotes this as the clarification of task and goal of the counseling process. The stance of the counselor, then, consists of at least two major elements: genuine interpersonal sensitivity and a flexible response set. The latter implies an active set of responses, a problematic orientation (i.e., questioning, suggesting alternative perceptions, introducing different modes of viewing the presenting situation, etc.) to promote an open-ended exploration and examination by the client of his own "self" in the present reality situation.

Some recent research investigations have tended to confirm the importance of flexibility and openness as critical dimensions of counselor effectiveness. Counselors who were able to respond to both the thoughts

and feelings of clients were adjudged more effective than counselors who tended to operate more or less exclusively in either the cognitive domain or the affective.*

Case Illustration

As an example of this counseling model for guidance, we have selected a case for presentation. We should first mention some of the explicit assumptions in the model. The focus is on the clients confronted with the so-called normal stage tasks, or what we have termed "discontinuities" of development. In other words, what could be classed as normal educational problems in a broad sense become the emphasis of self-in-situation. For example, in this case, the student, a college freshman in his second semester, had done exceedingly well academically in secondary school and in his first semester in college. Both the secondary school and the college were noted for their high standards of academic performance. His past record indicated clearly that his performance was more than competent. His measured ability on intelligence tests and college entrance tests placed him in the upper reaches of any comparable ability-grouping. In secondary school he had been very active in many co-curricular activities. He had been strongly recommended for college as a young man of character and promise. If anything, he probably represents the majority of college students who attend so-called selective liberal arts colleges, institutions that pride themselves on their devotion to academic excellence. He could be considered "typical" in this population of bright, highly motivated and conscientious college students.

The student presented himself for counseling assistance in March of his freshman year. Over the previous weekend, he had literally run away from the college, or as he put it, he "found himself" at the bus station and then on the bus to a relative's home at a considerable distance from the college. When he returned, he asked for an appointment to speak with a counselor. In the first few sessions, he described the "usual" difficulties often found in college students—sudden inability to concentrate, constant shifting of attention either in class or when reading or writing papers, and the attendant growing despair and panic. The more he tried to concentrate and the harder he worked the less he accomplished. The derivatives of despair and panic pushed him further and further into the cycle of more worry and less achievement each succeeding week. In this,

* This research is summarized in *Dimensions of Effective Counseling*, Allen, T. W.; Whitely, J. M.; Sprinthall, N. A.; Mosher, R. L.; and Donaghy, R. T.; Merrill, Columbus, Ohio, 1968.

the fifth interview, he had almost reached a standstill as he describes, in the initial stages of the session, how he "finds" himself hanging around.

Counselor says as the client walks in, "How are things going?" The client answers dejectedly, "Not so well at all."

Counselor 1 You mean things are starting to close down?

Student 1 Yeah, or close in, depending on how you look at it. I always used to wonder when I read in magazines about juvenile delinquents, how it was that they happened to get. . . . Well, I mean . . . The reports would always say something like: "These young people with nothing to do hang around street corners because there's nothing else for them to do." And I couldn't understand that at all. I mean, it seemed that there was always something for anybody to do, if they wanted. Now though, I can see their point of view, because I find myself hanging around street corners.

Counselor 2 Yeah.

Student 2 And it kind of worries me, because I'm not a street-corner-hanger, normally.

Counselor 3 Seems like instead of doing the other stuff that you usually do, you find yourself just hanging around.

Student 3 Yeah. I'd just go down to the Square for a half an hour or so and just hang around. Look at the world go by. Like last night, I was working in the library in the afternoon, getting some work accomplished, changing my pace and really settling down. Well, getting some accomplished. And then after dinner I said, "I think I'll go down to the Square." And I just did, and then I said that I'd take in a movie. And I didn't get back to my room until 12:15. And I wonder what it is that makes me so that I just leave everything. Because, well, it's fine on Saturday night if there's nothing else to do. Even then, there's always something to do. There's always term papers or something. But now—I mean, I do have a lot to do; I could just keep working. There's lots for me to do. It doesn't seem right that I should be able to just go down and take in a flick, or stand on a corner and watch the girls go by. I'm concerned about it. I just do it without thinking. Before I was thinking about it anyway.

Counselor 4 This is what's kind of puzzling. Is it when you see that you have all this work to do. . . .

- Student 4* I can just forget about it. I mean, I admit that it's good to be able to forget about your work and have a good time, but not when you're supposed to be doing your work. And it seems that the more I do it, well, the more I do it! The more you eat, the more you want.
- Counselor 5* The less work you do.
- Student 5* Yeah. It's surprisingly easy.
- Counselor 6* There's a kind of realization that by now, and maybe for the first time, that there isn't anyone looking over your shoulder.
- Student 6* Yeah. And there's that other business too, about the big city. Now like so many other things that we do, it's just a word. I mean, I knew this city. I used to live near here, and I've spent some time in here. I've heard about people being corrupted by the big city, but I didn't worry about it because I said that that was for hicks. Here it is. You walk out and there's the Square on the other side of the brick wall.
- Counselor 7* It sometimes seems more interesting.
- Student 7* Especially with nobody around to say, "Don't you go down to the Square." Just to be pulled in by it all. I'm kind of concerned that it will keep on going like that.
- Counselor 8* And it does kind of seem that there has been this realization that what you do on a given day is what you do, in that there's nobody to tell you anymore what you're supposed to do. In the first semester you didn't have this feeling so much.
- Student 8* No.
- Counselor 9* You just came and you sat down, working the way you had always worked.
- Student 9* Yeah. I assumed . . . I don't know. I just didn't think about it anymore. Not going down to the Square never occurred to me.
- Counselor 10* It was just as if you kind of transposed your way of working before. . . .
- Student 10* Yeah, the same attitudes . . . breaking down . . .
- Counselor 11* . . . by being here, and now you can just walk out of the library and not do the assignment. And the more you do this, the more you do it.
- Student 11* Yeah. I don't want to flunk out. . . . There are only five weeks

left anyway. If I try I can make it. I want to come out of this year with a pretty good average, decent anyway. Something I don't have to hide. When I come back next year, I don't want this atmosphere of the city or the Square working on me. . . .

Counselor 12 Seducing you?

Student 12 Yeah, exactly. This is why people take leaves of absence, and I don't want to do that. It's undesirable. I said to myself one time, "All right, you spend too much time hanging around the Square. You've got to avoid the Square completely." It's sort of like. . . .

Counselor 13 You don't think about that.

Student 13 Yeah. You can't very well avoid the Square.

Counselor 14 I guess I'm kind of wondering whether or not, in a sense, it's, even though it's different, it is somewhat similar, because before it was doing what other people told you to, or being directed by outside. And now you're still kind of directed by outside, kind of being drawn to the Square. Not as if this is on your own initiative. . . . And it's almost as if you're not really in charge of the way you are working. It's mostly done in terms of meeting outside expectations.

Student 14 Now that interests me because I was. . . . Tuesday we had this lecture. I wasn't paying attention, but something he said was: "The only real man is a man who is his own master." That sounded pretty good. So I said that when I'm faced with the choice of working or not I should just ask myself, "Are you your own master?" It seems like a question of . . . if I don't work and if I go to sleep it means that I'm not controlling myself.

Counselor 15 The difficulty here is only in one direction. You will only admit mastery when you're sitting down and studying. Maybe it's a little bit different to say, "At this point, I think it's appropriate for me to go to the Square and waste some time." Or, "At this point it's appropriate for me to study." In either case, you have made a decision. You're in charge of what's going on.

Student 15 I have the feeling that if I decide to waste time, or should not study, then I'm not making the right decision. It's not me.

Counselor 16 Well—it's part, though.

Student 16 I mean, I feel that I don't do enough studying. People tell me: Well, maybe you can't do too much studying. We had this fellow

at school and he could only work six hours a day. He said that's all he could work. And apparently to him this was very strange, because to him everyone should work a lot more than six hours a day—that's just a drop in the bucket. Six hours a day. I don't know. That's beyond my wildest dreams. I only do a couple of hours a day of studying. And it's not solid studying at that. So I feel that whenever there's this question of studying or not studying to be answered, it should . . . the really right thing to do is to study, 'cause I don't do enough. I just don't put in enough hours.

Counselor 17 So it's to get the feeling that you're doing more than you're doing now, and then this would give you a better feeling of your desire to not do some work.

Student 17 Yeah. If I felt that I was doing enough, then I would be free to say, "All right, I'll take a break now." I really have this feeling that when I say this now it's not the reasoning that's saying that. It's the desire or the voice that says, "Don't worry."

Counselor 18 Your breaks are taking over.

Student 18 It's an excuse. It's not a help. It's not like a coffee break.

Counselor 19 And this is the way it feels to you. That's your kind of fooling yourself, and saying that this is an excuse so that you can get out of doing it.

Student 19 Yeah. But I still do it. So then I feel that I'm not mastering anything. This master thing worked for a day maybe.

Counselor 20 But then that kind of got worn out.

Student 20 It was even pretty good when I started to go to sleep over a book. I'd say, "All right now. . . ." And it worked a couple of times. I'd say, "All right, who's boss here?" Usually I went back to sleep. So I guess you can guess what I decided. I feel, in a way, that I'm being carried along, and this was fine when I was being carried in the right direction. Now, either I'm being carried in the wrong direction, or I'm *letting* myself be carried in the wrong direction.

Counselor 21 But there is a kind of a similarity between both times. It's just that at that time you were being kind of directed or carried along, and it resulted in your working. But now that external control has been removed. And so nobody really knows if you go to class, or if you get all of your work done. And they won't really know until the end of the semester.

- Student 21 I never worried. People said . . . then of course, most people never said it. This applies to me. Well, I don't know if they can take all that responsibility for leading their own lives. I think that different schools would be better for them, where people could keep an eye on them. I don't think these guys are really. . . . They say, "Well that's ridiculous. You just have to work." Now I see that maybe if I were under more supervision. . . .
- Counselor 22 Kind of like the difference between this place and a military academy. . . .
- Student 22 Yeah. Where there is this atmosphere. . . .
- Counselor 23 Independence is kind of a pain, huh?
- Student 23 Yeah. And the more people talk about it, talk about the problems of independence, eventually you say, "Hey, that's me. I'm having trouble." Maybe I wouldn't have thought of it if people hadn't worried about it. But now I do worry about it.
- Counselor 24 And this is why you're kind of puzzled, because you see what the people are talking about when they speak of juvenile delinquency. They're hanging around, rather than doing anything else.
- Student 24 I couldn't see how it was at all possible for anybody to just stand on a street corner. What a fantastic waste of time. I mean, the least you could do is go to a library. Well . . . in some ways now it sort of makes some sense just to hang around.
- Counselor 25 'Course, at the same time. . . . The ordinary stance, when looking at studies, is it's something I have to do because I've been told to do it. This *feeling* still is hanging on, I think, when you look at putting yourself in *charge* of studying.
- Student 25 I realize that it's wrong, which is maybe an advantage, I hope, to have over the average street-corner-hanger. Gee, that's not much consolation.
- Counselor 26 Well, as a matter of fact, if you weren't aware of this you wouldn't really be concerned. You'd just say, "This is the way things are, so I'll live in the present."
- Student 26 Of course, if I were that kind of guy I probably wouldn't be here anyway, because I would have felt that way before. There were so many times at home when I guess, I realize now, I could have gotten away with a lot of stuff. But I felt, you know, that if there was a rule about studying or something like that, it wasn't

just the form of the rule; it was the spirit of it too that had extended toward my attitude. If it said, "All right, this is a time for studying," it just means, not that you can't do anything else, but that you're really supposed to apply yourself.

Counselor 27 Well, it had a desirable outcome, in terms of doing well and getting good grades and getting into this college.

Student 27 I guess I was what they call a straight arrow. I mean, I never thought of it that way.

Counselor 28 You mean play by the rules?

Student 28 Yeah. And even when there wasn't any rules to obey which you thought. . . . Not trying to get away with as much as you could.

Counselor 29 Sounds like Immanuel Kant. [*N.B. The client is studying philosophy.*]

Student 29 Yeah. I don't know what to do now.

Counselor 30 Well, is it act as if . . . ?

Student 30 No. . . . As if, what you do, you tell everyone else to do, would be a guide line for everyone else. Usually I say to myself about this time of year, "If any complications arise, just don't worry about them. A summer at camp will straighten all this out." But now, I . . . well, I'd get to camp and as a counselor I'd get nights out. I'm concerned now about just going into town and standing on street corners. You know, that's not going to help me. Then I'll come back here. . . .

Counselor 31 It's like the only thing you have to look forward to, then, are the interludes at camp.

Student 31 Yeah. It used to be, as a camper, I never got the opportunity that I got on street corners! It was a really refreshing change. And it will be too. I don't think I can keep myself doing that.

Counselor 32 You may become totally unproductive if you let this kind of feeling take over, that you're just going to watch the world.

Student 32 Yeah. It's things that I've heard about and talked about, and it was just an idea, a totally incomprehensible thing, like standing on street corners, and then suddenly I was standing on a street corner. Well, it doesn't make much sense, but you can sort of see the way people might want to do this. They hang around a little more, and then you say, "Well I can see how people

can be dragged in by this." They say, "Oop, I've been dragged in." You see it and then you're part of it.

Counselor 33 It looks so alien to begin with.

Student 33 The more you look at it, it becomes natural.

In this part of the session, the counselor and client are taking a long look at just where the client now stands. They examine his attempt to escape from the painful experience of not studying by hanging around the city square, and his try at a solution through positive thinking (lecturing to himself, "The only real man is a man who is his own master."). Also, the dialogue is beginning to center on one facet of his situation—the meaning of independence particularly in reference to a shift in motivation from explicit direction by outside sources to internal or self direction.*

Since the basic problem appears to reside in the necessity to shift modes in motivational patterns, in part due to the changed environmental expectations between school and college, it is probably most appropriate for the counseling process to center on these issues. The counselor, as a result, does lead the client in this sense, into an analysis of his present experience as the basis for reflection. As the client reflects on his experience in this mode, he may confront what he has been facing at an implicit level for the past few months. We pick up the dialogue as the counselor restates the present situation and its implications at both the cognitive and affective level:

Counselor 34 Almost as if there's a kind of basic desire to throw your hands up and say to hell with the whole thing. And this is what's kind of boiling inside, these two positions. Almost the extremes of either: work the way you used to and go by a set of external controls, or else you don't do anything and become totally unproductive.

Student 34 I don't want to do that. I don't want to become totally unproductive. It's not really good.

Counselor 35 And probably you can't go back to the other way either.

* It is obvious, as we indicated earlier, that goals like independence, personal autonomy, initiative, etc., are dependent to some extent on environmental situations. In this particular setting, students are confronted by substantial freedom—no regulations for class attendance or dormitory hours, minimal supervision, etc. In most of the classes the student is handed an extensive general reading list, a course outline, a schedule denoting when and where the lectures are held, and the dates for papers and the final examination. Then he is left on his own resources to develop effective strategies for handling his own program.

Student 35 No. There's this desire to. . . . Now it's there, and I don't know what to do about it. Can I just pen it in there? No, because then it will come out all at once. Can I give a little leeway at a time, or then it will sort of take over. Or is the median between the extremes here just one of the extremes? Is the right combination of . . . you know, doing what you feel like doing and doing what you should be doing, is the median the right thing between those two? Is it just to do what you feel you should be doing?

Counselor 36 Is there any way you get the two connected? So that, not only doing what you should do, but also, so you feel like doing it too.

Student 36 Actually, maybe that's the way it used to be. There's the cause or result of something. . . .

Counselor 37 But you really weren't aware of the other side.

Student 37 Yes, that's true. The only things that I wanted to do were things that were good. I wanted to work hard and be good and be a nice guy. I thought that was a good idea. So if that was my goal in life, fine. But now if I feel like doing something else, it sounds bad. And it should be.

Counselor 38 Well, even then, the working side is classed as straight arrow.

Student 38 Yeah.

Counselor 39 As if there's just one dimension. You either work or you don't. It's beginning to look like rather than things fitting into compartments, there's more complexity involved. And that in a sense, by putting yourself in charge, this involves seeing the relativity, rather than just two either-or positions. I guess I kind of get the feeling, one of the reasons why it's difficult for you to sit down and study is, to some extent, that this is so much defined as the way you used to be.

Student 39 You mean. . . .

Counselor 40 Of going along with what other people expect. That that feeling is now beginning to look alien.

Student 40 Oh, yeah.

Counselor 41 Rather than the feeling of not doing anything, as not something that was alien or that you wouldn't have to do.

- Student 41 You mean, why should I throw myself into this just because it's what . . .
- Counselor 42 What people like?
- Student 42 Yeah.
- Counselor 43 'Cause you did this in the first semester. You came and buckled right down and kept on doing things the same way you had done them in the past.
- Student 43 Why should I do this? Maybe there is a reason I shouldn't do it.
- Counselor 44 There's kind of the beginning of the awareness in the second semester that you could get away with things. And that nobody was really checking you out each day and saying, "Well now, you get this much and this much and this much accomplished. And so it's almost a switch from the fact of seeing yourself as a worker, where goofing off is alien, to the other extreme when goofing off is kind of a thing that feels O.K. and working seems alien.
- Student 44 So what do I do about it now?
- Counselor 45 I guess I can help you find, while we're going, just kind of exploring around and trying to see how you're viewing things, and whether the feeling involved in different activities. . . . And what's involved in this change of a process that puts you really in charge of what's going on. 'Cause again, I kind of get the feeling that the old total ways can't help you. You're aware of this, that it's not the way things really are. And especially around here. Nobody is going to tell you what to do. And even at this point, I think if somebody did, this might just give you something to go against.
- Student 45 So now that I'm in it, I can't go out the way I came in?
- Counselor 46 That's what it kind of sounds like. You can't go back to putting all these concerns out and making them alien and say, "All I want to do is work. 'Cause this is what's expected of me."
- Student 46 You mean I'll never be able to go back? Oh, darn.
- Counselor 47 Well, how do you feel about it?
- Student 47 Well, I'm disappointed. I wanted to go back. You mean I've

got to live with this corruption? I don't want to. You mean it's got to become a part of my life? That's really just horrible.

Counselor 48 It's kind of an awareness that you have to handle it too.

Student 48 Yeah, but I don't want to. I just want to get it out. Maybe it wouldn't have happened this way if I'd gone to. . . . I don't want to say it.

Counselor 49 This may be true. If you'd gone to some place where things were pretty well structured; if it was perfectly obvious that you had to go to class, and assignments were done and handed out in such a way that you just had to focus on getting them done and handed in because it's kind of a checking system; it keeps you on the track.

Student 49 In some ways that seems damn attractive! I never really thought of it that way.

Counselor 50 The attractiveness is kind of the feeling that you don't have to worry about those other concerns. You don't even have time.

Student 50 The system sort of eliminates the . . .

Counselor 51 It's built in to eliminate the ambiguity of saying, "Here you are confronted with a series of things, and then you have to really choose."

Student 51 I don't want to have to go to the point of saying, "I don't want responsibility." But, it would be nice.

Counselor 52 Well, if being responsible by accepting a structure that says this is what you do . . .

Student 52 Well, I don't want the responsibility of having to choose.

Counselor 53 I guess it's kind of a question of why this environment is set up this way. That you're almost forced to this kind of awareness. In your case, you became aware of this fairly early, in your second semester here. In other cases it might not have been till the senior year. In another instance, maybe never. The person might go along saying, "This is what I'm expected to do, and so I do it without really questioning." Or even realize that it's possible for them not to do what people expect.

Student 53 But now that I'm here, I can't go back?

Counselor 54 It kind of sounds it.

- Student 54* It really is disappointing. You mean I'll never be able to go back where everything is absolute?
- Counselor 55* What do you think?
- Student 55* Well, I want to go back! I really do. I could become a monk.
- Counselor 56* Or, you could go along with the way things are set out for a career.
- Student 56* Is there anything else besides those two?
- Counselor 57* I take this as an extreme example of what I mean.
- Student 57* It sounds sort of good.
- Counselor 58* Well, you know, that's just the way you've been kind of operating, and to some extent this is natural. I think after you had adopted that kind of perspective, and it worked—it got you through school; it got you into Harvard; it got you through the first semester; a good record—I'm not sure that it makes too much difference or whether we can say, "Well, maybe it would have been better if. . . ." It's happened and this is what you're seeing right now.
- Student 58* I guess I have to admit it too. If it's going to come at any time at all, it might as well come now. I'd rather have to face this problem now than have to get out for a year and be working and married, or some terrible thing like that. That's ugly to see. So I guess, if it's going to happen, it might as well happen now.
- Counselor 59* Well, to some extent, it also ties in with what we're talking about—concentration. Whether or not the concentration on a subject has to be something that's specifically oriented to preparing you for a specific career, or a kind of more open set of studies that will continue to allow you to explore your own interests, your own competences, which is this middle position where things aren't really clear-cut; as opposed to just being able to say, "Well, look. I came here to study and to attend four years to get a degree with this major so that I can get this kind of a job." Where everything is nice and firmed up and clear and you can see the future, in unambiguous terms. But now you're becoming more aware that this doesn't seem to be the way things work. And for this reason you kind of experience this feeling of regret and wish that things could be that way.

In this section both client and counselor were intellectualizing about the problem of independence and making one's own decisions. The counselor is suggesting that the present reality may be, in a sense, irreversible. The "good," hard-working, "straight arrow," can no longer provide the guide to his emerging future. At this point the counselor is apparently in advance of the client's perceptions, hence the number of times the client questions the counselor—S.45: ". . . I can't go out the way I came in?"; S.46: "You mean I'll never be able to go back?"; S.53: ". . . I can't go back?"; etc. Thus, the counselor at C.59, with perhaps an inordinately long summation, comes back to the client's feeling of regret and his wishes for structure and direction. At this point the client somewhat shifts the emphasis to more private or more personal aspects of his difficulties in the form of the conflicting expectations of his parents and a girlfriend:

- Student 59* I used to have a girl friend who told me that I never made my own decisions, and just let my parents make them for me, and that was bad because eventually some day I would have to make my own decisions. And I kept telling her that maybe I liked it this way. I wasn't sure, because I had never tried the other way. She seemed to be doing pretty well with her method. She said that I ought to start making my own decisions, and I said that I liked the way I lived. I liked to have my decisions made for me. I guess she was there all along; she thought it was a good idea. And now after I've seen both sides of it, of course, to a degree, not very much, now I like the other way more than ever. Having it really set up; slide down the chute instead of . . .
- Counselor 60* Go alone.
- Student 60* Yeah. Just follow the path that's laid down, rather than try to find my own path in the wilderness. Seems good.
- Counselor 61* It's the feeling of the wilderness that makes the other so attractive.
- Student 61* The feeling of being able to decide my own fate has a sort of desirability. In that case, the thing I have to do . . . the first decision is to decide whether I want to have my life decided for me or whether I want to decide my own life. And then after that, and I have to do that before I can decide what I want to decide. The basic decision is: do you want to be a thinker or a doer? But, that's slanted—a thinker or just a doer. That's the way she kept putting it, that I was ducking my obligation.

Counselor 62 What obligation?

Student 62 The obligation to think and to decide—to make my own decisions, to run my own life.

Counselor 63 You mean the obligation to yourself as a person?

Student 63 Yeah. The obligation ends supposedly, if I could contribute anything to the world, or to anything. The obligation to whom-ever I was going to contribute.

Counselor 64 As a productive person.

Student 64 I owe it to myself and to the world to decide what would be best for everybody as opposed to . . .

Counselor 65 Isn't that primary?

Student 65 Well, yes, as opposed to, instead of just looking around for what to do, just say, "O.K., I'm going to jump into this thing." Assume and have faith that the system will take me to happiness and . . .

Counselor 66 And courage?

Student 66 No, not courage. The other one takes courage. One takes courage and the other takes faith.

Counselor 67 Trust in yourself?

Student 67 Trust in the system. Well, if I trusted myself, I'd be able to make my own decisions.

Counselor 68 Be in the driver's seat?

Student 68 Yeah. But this way, if I make the first choice. . . . There's one choice I do have to make, and if I take one path, it means that I don't have to make any other choices at all; or I can take the path that leads to many choices.

Counselor 69 All the time?

Student 69 Yeah. But, even if I want to take the no-choice path, I do have to make *that* decision. There's no question that I . . . that you have to choose some way of living.

Counselor 70 Well, still though, this is still different than a kind of an un-examined choice, or some kind of unexamined way, that you were doing before.

Student 70 It would be different, but it would be. . . . Hopefully, I would

be able to retain the same faith in the system. Although now I would be better off for having ventured into decision-land.

Counselor 71 You have been aware that you are in fact confronted with at least two, or maybe more, choices, and that you've examined them and then decided yes, I'll go along with the expectations. But at least you're aware of them to have chosen.

Student 71 Hopefully, I'd stop wondering, if I ever wondered before, "Gee, I wonder what this other business is all about." I'd say, "Well, I know what it's all about now."

Counselor 72 Either way, it's more of a considered decision?

Student 72 Yeah. If I choose the decision-making line, I'll never be settled down.

Counselor 73 You'll never achieve a total solution?

Student 73 Always.

Counselor 74 Sounds as if this girl hit you hard.

Student 74 She was one of these people who was really strong for a lot of things, for integration, and peace, and . . . that sort of thing. And I sort of . . . I was for integration, but I'm not a sit-down striker or such a strong pacifist. Maybe basically war is wrong, but I like to think of myself more as this is the way things are.

Counselor 75 And maybe it's better not to get involved.

Student 75 Yeah, that's it. She liked to get involved. She sort of had faith in me; she wanted me to get involved.

Counselor 76 It sounds like this relationship was almost cast in this dimension, that if you were going to go the way you used to go, that she wasn't interested. Maybe you had to see it as a choice either with choosing for her or for your parents.

Student 76 You sort of hit it on the head.

Counselor 77 Rather than choosing for you.

Student 77 Well, yeah. Well, it was for me though. Basically it was whether I wanted to be. . . . It was which side I wanted to. . . . It was whose side I wanted to line up on, but it was me who was doing the lining up. I mean, it was still: would I be happier with her point of view or with my parents' point of view?

Counselor 78 But still it's another thing to say your point of view, not theirs and not hers.

- Student 78* She kept saying that too. Sometimes I go over on her side, and I say, "All right, I guess all the things you've been saying are right." And she'd say, "Just don't say that, don't just line up with me because it's me. You're supposed to figure it out for yourself."
- Counselor 79* You see, I think, as I say, this sounds like it gets very difficult, because then, to some extent, you must have been feeling that this was a choice of turning your back on your folks.
- Student 79* Yeah. I don't want to do that. If I didn't care I could say something like, "There are poor people in the world and I should join the Peace Corps."
- Counselor 80* Well, if you didn't care for your folks, there wouldn't be any problem.
- Student 80* I can't just evolve and just follow the path of certainty?
- Counselor 81* Of course, even there, I don't think the picture is really and completely a clear position because I certainly got the sense last time that your dad was saying, "If philosophy really seems to be the thing that you're interested in, then O.K. You don't really have to see college in terms of majoring in economics or engineering because this would be what I want."
- Student 81* I thought about philosophy, but not seriously because I was afraid. . . . When I decided the first time to be an engineer, I'd been flopping around from one to another. I called up home and I said, "Dad, I decided to be an engineer." I met with a resounding note of approval. I guess I stepped on the right wire. He really sounded good. I was kind of surprised when he said this business about philosophy, because even if I had wanted to think about it seriously, I wouldn't have gotten very far with it because I would have realized that if I had said, "Look, Dad, I don't want to go into engineering, I want to be a philosopher," I would have thought that I'd get the evil eye. He would have said, "Well, you go back and think about it." And I was really surprised by what he said. But the thing is, I didn't say it and he approved it. Although I had it in mind, I don't know that he'd do that. It was sort of his idea, as far as he was concerned. He wasn't saying, "All right, if that's what you want." He was saying. . . . It was sort of a change on his part; maybe it's internally consistent somehow. It wasn't as though I had decided to change and he had O.K.'d it.

Counselor 82 It's also maybe fair to speculate that maybe this is what your parents want. . . .

Student 82 You mean, want me to think for myself?

Counselor 83 To pick out the one that seems the most appropriate to you.

Student 83 But I have a funny feeling that they feel that I'll. . . . If you think one thing is right, you can say, especially someone you've been bringing up for seventeen years, eighteen years, "You can choose for yourself now, whichever one you want." I think they have pretty much faith that I'll look around and say, "O.K., it's the way I've been brought up." They'd be shocked, surprised, and dumbfounded if I said, "Well, look, I'm going to go out into the world, and I think I'll go down to Alabama and work in the slums. . . ."

Counselor 84 Somehow you get the feeling that. . . .

Student 84 This might not go over too well. Even though they say, "Make your choice."

Counselor 85 Maybe they're not particularly clear really. Maybe they have both of these feelings. On one hand, maybe they'd like to have you go your own way. At the same time they also have some feelings that maybe you should follow their way.

Student 85 So I think they're 100 percent sure that if I didn't go in their direction I would go pretty close to it, maybe going into big business or being an engineer for a big company or something in that general vein. Not being a day laborer with a good philosophy, or not going down to Alabama at all. They're pretty sure that I'm not going to turn around and pull a fast one on them. And they are right. I wouldn't, exactly.

Counselor 86 And this is just where the bind is, because to some extent it is seen as, if you really chose for yourself, that you might be turning your back on them.

Student 86 If my only considerations had to do . . . not at all with them or anything, maybe sometime I would sort of turn my back on them. But one of my considerations is them. I'm not saying . . . even in my. . . . Even, as you say, how about deciding for yourself, I still couldn't. . . . I mean, that would still be a consideration. One of the things I don't want is to sort of leave them.

Counselor 87 This is the thing that makes it difficult, because to some extent

this is the bind. It's perhaps a little explicit with the girl. To some extent it is a kind of parallel to your studies and your choice of a major, and to looking ahead to a career.

Student 87 It all ties in.

Counselor 88 These things kind of line up, and it's seen in a dichotomy that you go along with their way, or if you choose for yourself this will be against them. Or with the girl, it was even for her, not for them. And I guess what we are trying to work on is some perspective in order for you to step out of the dichotomy. But, again, to some extent, choosing for yourself is not only seen as turning your back on them, but also if you do you'll be unproductive and will stand on the corner. And this is why it seems like it would be better just to go home, because this has worked in the past, and this has gotten you to where you are now.

Student 88 I might be satisfied with being able to find some place. . . .

Counselor 89 Where you fit in.

Student 89 All they'd have to do would be to pour me into the mold.

Counselor 90 I think that might be all right except that there are these other feelings involved, the feeling that you had when the girl confronted you. And there is some doubt.

Student 90 And that's the sort of thing I'm worried about. If I thought that . . . or chose to go into that way, I might sort of become, instead of more flexible, I'd become sort of ossified. Which is fine, for *that*; and what if she comes along, or somebody like her comes along, and says. . . . And then if I'm really in that way of life and somebody opens my eyes again and brings me back to the world of decision, it would really throw me for a loop.

Counselor 91 This is the thing, because it may come up again, with a girl, as it seems to be coming up with your studies, where the end is your choice of concentration. And so whenever you're going to be confronted with a decision, you can't abdicate it.

Student 91 If I could squelch it entirely, and be sure, 100 percent sure, that I could throw it out of my life, fine. But there's always this plan where. . . . It's sort of like bones: little baby's bones, if they're flexible enough, they bend easily, but as you get older you get harder, and if you do manage to break them, then they're sort of brittle and they're not going to go back together very well.

I don't want to find myself at the end of the road with a bunch of pieces.

Counselor 92 Torn between.

Student 92 Yeah. And no way to put them back together.

At first it seems as if the difficulty is that the client has trouble making his own decisions (as represented by the girl friend) or accepting the parents' direction. The issue becomes more complex, however, when he notes (at S.81ff.) that his parents were not violently opposed to the choice of a college major in philosophy rather than in engineering. He is also aware that he would probably be "fooling himself," temporarily at best, if he tried to hide from personally determined decisions. He foresees the possibility of being thrown for a loop (S.90 and 91) and draws the analogy to brittle bones of an adult being torn apart, "And no way to put them back together." Although the counselor apparently misses the client's meaning in the initial stages of this portion of the session, the client is able to move into a discussion of the double bind he is in.*

The session ends with the student's awareness enhanced, but there are still some rather poignant doubts about what he is now facing.

Counselor 93 And there also is this general feeling that to some extent you have been kind of shaped to accede to what your parents are saying.

Student 93 But I never thought of it until now, really trying to go back, making a conscious effort. I never thought of it quite this way—to go back to naïveté, tempered naïveté. Maybe if I can find a way to do that, except for this one little loop hole. . . .

Counselor 94 Well, you're kind of looking at the alternatives. This looks like one.

Student 94 Except for that one thing.

Counselor 95 Because, in a sense, you know what we're doing is working on your awareness of where you are and kind of who's running the show and examining the feelings that got connected with these various positions.

* At C.62, 65, 66, and 67, the counselor asks questions that probably don't need to be asked. The client is moving at a good pace into his awareness of where he is, caught between two poles and struggling to find a way out for himself. In retrospect this would suggest that excessive questioning of this nature would carry a danger of refocusing the interaction too far from the client's real perceptions and feelings.

- Student 95* I feel if I got put back, if I could put myself back, I'd be able to get all my connections connected and get back to work without any trouble at all. Because that would be part of it all, just through . . . get in there. . . .
- Counselor 96* And yet, on the other side, it seems like you've been around more frequent occasions now where you've confronted this, kind of making the same choice over.
- Student 96* And if I decide to make decisions, I am going to have to do that all the time. That seems like a pretty crummy alternative to the other. I mean . . .
- Counselor 97* Especially, you see, when it's connected up with your feelings of gratitude toward your parents. Because then it begins to sound like you're being selfish.
- Student 97* If I go the other way? I don't want to do that.

There is always a certain incompleteness in any report of an individual counseling session. Closure and/or a dramatic or comprehensive solution to issues of personal growth and development are really not the goals of the process anyway, any more than supplying the "right answer" is the goal of teaching. Instead, individual intervention in the form of counseling has attempted to enhance the process of personal reformulation that had been created by the environment, e.g., the demands for independence by the institution, a girl friend, and quite possibly including the student's family. The previous "system" the student used to handle such "crises" was clearly obsolete. The content of his personal reformulation was clear. However to accomplish such a switch would require personal courage as well as a cognitive understanding of the parameters of the discontinuity.

SUMMARY

This chapter has been particularly concerned with developing a definition for counseling as a part of guidance. In reviewing the definitional problem, it was important to note that attempts to view distinctions between counseling and psychotherapy as irrelevant simply obscure instead of solve the problem. Further, equating counseling and guidance as synonymous creates other difficulties, because of the circularity in logic of defining a process through reference to itself.

Overall, we suggested that counseling be defined as one application of guidance. Its focus, then, although aimed at the student's phenomenological field (his perceptions, feelings, and ideas), could be construed simultaneously as an educative function. This means that counseling as process becomes one way to promote and facilitate growth toward self-mastery and efficacy.

A case illustration detailed the process of decision-making in a single counseling interview. The student's realization that he could no longer abdicate the control of his choices to others constituted a sharp reminder of the real goals of guidance. His grappling with that particular problem served to point up discontinuities often experienced in the growth process as well as the opportunity for educational intervention in the form of counseling. His plight may have an ironic parallel for the field of guidance as a whole, as the profession attempts to define its own role in self-direction and mastery.

TESTING AND APPRAISAL: A SERVICE TO WHOM?

INTRODUCTION

The use of psychological tests has traditionally been one of the most visible aspects of guidance practice. The development and use of tests to measure cognitive variables such as ability, aptitude, and achievement, as well as tests to measure non-cognitive variables such as interests, attitudes, and values, has a long history. It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine this development or to review the technological aspects of testing. We do not plan an extensive review of statistics on concepts such as reliability or validity. Most well-known tests in both the cognitive and non-cognitive areas of testing have been developed and refined to the point where it makes little sense to cover this ground again.*

However, we do not mean to indicate that the present state of sophisticated test development provides an answer to testing as an aspect of guidance. In fact, just the opposite may be the case. Too often the use of tests assumes that an

* For descriptions of tests, reviews of applications, and analyses of validity and reliability criteria, the reader is referred to standard works in the area such as Super and Crites (1962), Goldman (1961), and Cronbach (1960).

informational deficit exists in the client and that once he sees, on paper or on a psychological profile, his own pattern of inventoried abilities, interests, and aptitudes, he will somehow assimilate the information as if he were a trained psychological expert in testing. Along with this assimilation problem, or as it is more frequently denoted, the test interpretation problem, there is another more basic problem: the purpose of testing itself. Is the test being used for the client, for the social system, or for the psychological expert? The role of testing, in our view, becomes inordinately complex because these purposes too often overlap, creating a hazy set of undifferentiated concepts for tests and guidance. Too often it is not clear which goal the testing program is to serve: the client, the school, or the mental health movement. Thus we find that the current popular controversies revolve around the issues of to test or not to test; culture-fair versus culture-biased tests; factor-pure versus artificially "loaded" tests; and comprehensive, accurate, predictive tests versus inadequate, non-valid measures. To this add the highly controversial aspect of psychological testing as an invasion of privacy, and we have all the elements for an unending and unresolvable great debate over testing.* To begin to unravel the elements of this controversy, it seems necessary to discuss the issues of priorities and focus, as a way to understand the purpose of tests. Since the main theme running through this book is a broad definition for guidance in education that will promote personal autonomy, this end becomes, by definition, the first priority for a discussion on the role of testing.

PROBLEMS IN TESTING

For purposes of illustration, we have selected four areas for a discussion of common difficulties in the use of testing as an integral part of both guidance theory and practice. In general, a highly significant role for testing has been promoted largely as a basis for the systematic accumulation of objective, scientific, and hence useful information about students. The steps in this process are obvious: tests are administered to students; the results are analyzed by fairly common statistical procedures; the results are returned to the student. In the most common situation, the student might take a "paper and pencil" test of abilities and a test of interests. These are usually construed as the most relevant variables in an educational or vocational decision about which objective information might be helpful. In reporting the results to the student, a counselor might explain the results of the ability test and the interest

* See, for example, the special issue in the *American Psychologist* on testing and public policy (V. 20, 11, November, 1965).

test, indicate certain areas for mutual deliberation, or suggest that the student consider, by himself, particular alternatives which the test results might suggest. In counseling centers the use of tests would not differ significantly from the mode used in secondary school guidance programs. The amount of individual or personal attention might be greater, but the same essential procedures are usually followed: an ability "profile," an interest "profile," and interpretation of the meaning to the student in terms of his patterns of resemblances to particular criteria groups. The inadequacies of this approach are at least fourfold: (1) The statistical model upon which the resemblances are derived is inaccurate. (2) Many of the tests, especially the most commonly used interest inventory (the Strong Vocational Interest Blank), are almost totally empirically based. The tests, as a result, provide no theoretically useful concepts for a student to understand the implicit choice process. (3) Interest and ability factors are very general, even if we accept a narrow vocational placement purpose for testing. (4) The amount of information that is actually understood and retained by clients in this framework is most probably very insignificant.

We plan to examine, at least briefly, each of these four issues to illustrate the deficiencies of this model:

(1) *The inadequacies of the profile interpretation as a statistical model.* Because it has been recognized that tests generally measure only parts of a personality structure, the concept of the test battery has been accepted as a more comprehensive method of gaining important information about clients. This means that a series of test results have been presented to clients, rather than the results from one test at a time. The basic difficulty is that the results from test batteries are presented largely in the same manner as a single test result was presented. The counselor, subjectively, has tried to connect a series of discrete, one-dimensional test scores as if all of the information about the client had been systematically and simultaneously combined. We shall call this the problem of rigorously combining "outside" information for the client. The reason we use the term "outside" is to denote an important concept. Up to this point, the client has answered a series of questions (a test battery); he has not seen the results, and he probably doesn't have any real insight as to either the purpose of the tests, or why he took these particular tests rather than others. Perhaps he holds the common misconception that the test process will provide the answers and make his decisions for him. In other words, the common expectation of clients, and perhaps the rationale for subjecting oneself to the testing, is to gain an answer or to solve a

problem. Thus the client has "given of himself" and answered sets of questions designed to unearth some of the many sides of his "self" as a person. He doesn't know what it all means. The essential information, then, is still "outside" the client.

In this context, it may be possible to view what happens when the results are presented. The "outside" information is usually shown to the client through a series of graphs and charts, as well as verbally. There is a "stacking" of profiles—"this is how the client's interests look," "here is a picture of how the client's abilities appear," etc. Sub-groupings within interests, abilities, and values can be presented, usually in a similar manner. This method has sometimes been referred to as the "parallel stalks" model. Each line or "stalk" represents one tested dimension of the client's responses. A point, or more recently a "percentile band," represents the client's position on each dimension. Then all points or bands on this horizontal are connected to form a vertical line—the *profile*. The amount of statistical error in this procedure is considerable, since it is based on what statisticians refer to as a "uni-variate" model. The system makes a separate, discrete, and complete analysis of each tested domain without taking into account the possible inter-relationships of the tested dimensions.

The profile is, at best, only a visual representation of a numerical score and, as such, adds no information. It had been devised in the hope of conveying information more easily to students through a visual graph. But the procedure is misleading. Students do not know that the order in which the profile stalks are presented is arbitrary. Nor do they realize that the choice of scale intervals on the profile is also completely arbitrary. Thus, one important criticism is the misleading appearance: "The appearance of profile shape which the graphic chart suggests is greatly influenced by arbitrary choices of the order in which the stalks are presented and the arbitrary choice of scale intervals." (Rulon et al., 1967, p. 184.)

Far more important, however, is the omission of essential information. Information that forms a necessary basis for comparison is excluded. The purpose of the "profile" is to illustrate the student's pattern of resemblances to a series of criterion groups, such as his abilities in a series of areas, or his interest patterns in comparison to a series of groups (or constructs). The profile can illustrate the important variation of a single group on a single test, but as soon as further tests or further groups are added the representation becomes inadequate. It is important to note that the "covariation" of groups (how they are similar as well as dissimilar) cannot be represented on profiles, and therefore has to be overlooked entirely. "It becomes impossible to reveal graphically in any practical man-

ner the characteristic variation of several groups. . . . Thus, the limitations of the graphic system lead inevitably to the attempt to single out some typical standardization group to use as reference. . . ." (Rulon et al., 1967, p. 185.)

It has been a truism in the science of human behavior that behavior is multiply "caused" or over-determined. It is necessary to represent this complexity, if tests are used, in a more sophisticated mode than is possible through a two-dimensional representation presented in a piecemeal fashion. For what now occurs in test interpretation is a "layering" effect. A profile of abilities may be presented. This is then overlaid by a profile of interests, values, or personality traits. Given this mass of two-dimensional data, the student and the counselor sit down to assimilate, organize, and synthesize the information into a meaningful pattern. At the most obvious level, the client's input is overloaded. It has been demonstrated that humans can understand or comprehend from four to seven "pieces" of information. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram note: "Thus it is about four or five symbols (words, elements, items, things, chunks, ideas, thoughts) that will easily group in consciousness at one time. . . ." (1960, p. 31.) The information overload which this kind of test interpretation involves confronts the client with a well nigh impossible task. To retain and recall such a complex amount of information as a basis for an "informed" decision is simply out of the question in this arrangement. Of course, more serious is the aspect that the information itself is only partial and, therefore, perhaps misleading. It may have been an ironic blessing that clients could not comprehend the stacking of profile information, since the information itself was too limited in the first place. Thus the first objection to test interpretation through the "profile" procedure is that it combines the worst of both statistical and clinical methods. The inaccurate statistical analysis becomes the inadequate basis upon which the counselor, through clinical skills, attempts to convey an erroneous synthesis to the client!

(2) *Objections to the non-theoretical basis of test interpretation, especially for the most commonly used interest test, the Strong Vocational Interest Blank.* We are directing our remarks toward the SVIB to illustrate the problem created by a completely empirical test that is used to help students arrive at their own decisions. We are not criticizing the predictive power of a test such as this; indeed, it is certainly true that in study after study, the SVIB has consistently provided an accurate basis for prediction, both for short and long time spans. However, the empirical aspect, which excludes theory or directing constructs, creates a double bind for the client. He is caught between the completely pragmatic basis

for the test on one side, and the limited (or at least somewhat arbitrary) array of occupational groups on the other. In a sense, the test becomes a kind of "black box." The client submits his answers to a series of questions, and the "black box" returns a profile to him charting his similarity in interests to a series of occupations.* A problem arises if the client asks a question, such as, "I understand that because my interests are similar to bankers [for example], I should consider banking as a possible occupation. But why do my interests resemble those of bankers?" The answer to this question moves "outside" information (i.e., data about the student that he does not know) further "outside." The client can only be told that bankers tend to answer questions about personal likes and dislikes in a manner that is highly congruent with his answers. This certainly creates a sense of mystery for the client, unless the examiner wishes to attempt to teach him the intricacies of reliability and validity (which would only confuse the issues even more!). The client learns about a piece of data without an understanding of the process that produced the outcome. The test itself has no theory or constructs which can serve to explain the observed relationships in any other than pragmatic terms. The client is asked, then, to accept the outcome without an explanation of how it was derived—because there is none. In our view this creates more guidance problems than it solves.**

(3) *Multipotentiality as a problem for test interpretation in guidance.* Each individual, on the basis of any single variable, such as interest or ability, has multiple opportunities for the realization of this factor in numerous school programs or careers. People have potentialities in an array of areas, so that the matching-of-man-to-job concept is obviously no longer relevant. Both people and the oft used criteria, such as occupations, are multivariate. Yet many of the procedures we still use are implicitly based on the matching of a narrow array of psychological variables to a narrow criterion, such as a specific job or a narrow band of jobs. The univariate model builds in a bias which will overlook viable alternatives, both in the client and in the criterion. The array of psychological

* We will have more to say on this aspect of vocational guidance in the last section of this chapter.

** Most texts on test interpretation attempt to skirt this issue by suggesting that the test information should be used as a basis for the client to derive what meaning he can from the data. It appears that this is asking the client to elaborate a theory of interests as factors in occupational choice—a task that still eludes most professionals. If a theory for occupational choice was not included at the conceptual level in the construction of the test, it may be a difficult task indeed to expect the client to accomplish this.

variables within any single person presents him with many, rather than few, alternatives and options. In a recent study, Thorndike and Hagen demonstrated this problem quite clearly (1969). They pointed out the substantial overlap in measured ability factors across a wide range of occupational classifications. We wish to underline the fact that this overlap was only based on ability factors and excluded other known variables important to occupational groupings. If other factors such as interests, values, or perhaps personality dispositions were included, the variation would undoubtedly increase for both persons and careers.

The multipotentiality of each individual, as well as the multiplicity of opportunities, must remain a basic reference point of any testing program for guidance.* If these cannot be adequately accounted for in the test procedures (as is usually the case), then testing should be eliminated—no information in this case is better than misinformation.**

(4) *The client's understanding of test information as a problem in the use of tests.* We noted in point (2) that the phrase "outside" information indicates data about the client that he as yet does not "know." The problem we now view is the transmittal or communication problem—how to get "outside" information "inside" the client. The usual position on this question is to leave it up to the counselor. If we examine some of the research evidence on the subject, we shall become concerned over this dictum. Goldman has reviewed a host of studies on the communication of test results and concludes:

As a group, these studies provide only limited evidence on the values derived by people from receiving reports of their test results.

(Goldman, 1961, p. 353)

This is not really a surprising summary. Bixler and Bixler remind us:

The grading of examinations at the end of the quarter verifies the ineffectiveness of books and lectures in giving information to students. Vocational test interpretation is much more personalized and there is

* Sometimes these facts lead to the argument promoting the sanctity of individual differences: humans are so complex and the within-person variation so great, that all measurement must be ideographic. The failure of nomothetic research, or "group" trend results which leave so much unexplained variance, we feel, is more a failure of method than of concept.

** Along these lines Crites, at the 1964 APGA Convention, provided a tour de force on testing by reading a transcript of graduate students discussing their almost hopeless confusion over the interpretation of test results.

greater opportunity and reason for the student to distort or disregard information given to him.

(Bixler and Bixler, 1946, p. 147)

Summary of Present Models for Testing

The four inadequacies are by no means exhaustive, but rather illustrative of some of the difficulties with the present use of tests for guidance: the statistical model is usually faulty; a theoretical model in some cases is absent; important variables within each client, as well as in outcome criteria are too often excluded; and the present evidence indicates that, after many years of testing, clients do not well understand test results. We have not included in this discussion other deficiencies in testing for guidance, such as error of measurement, etc.* Also, we have not examined the directive-nondirective controversy in the area of testing. In reviewing the writings of nondirective theorists, it strikes us that there is really no issue to discuss. The nondirective position is either explicitly against the use of tests on philosophical grounds or else based on the highly questionable but clearly client-centered view that the client should select what tests are to be used. The basic assumption is that anything less than total subjectivity to the client becomes a barrier to client initiative, a hindrance to client autonomy, an impediment to client self-actualization. We have already indicated that, in our view, this assumption is dubious.

TESTING: A DISTINCTION IN PURPOSE

To clarify a role for testing in guidance, we suggest three general but distinct purposes:

(1) Tests to provide information for selection, classification, and distribution of clients, to serve primarily the interests of the particular administrative system.

* Goldman notes in speaking of test score variation and reliability: "We may appreciate the crudeness of this measurement by applying this degree of error to a bathroom scale. The percent of variation represented by most of these broad bars [on the Metropolitan Achievement Test and the Otis in Thorndike and Hagen, 1955] would mean that if this third grader got on the scale once and had a weight reading 60 pounds, we could expect that if he got on the scale 100 more times, 68 out of 100 of those times the weight would register between 54 and 66 pounds, and the remaining 32 times, it would be outside this range. We would probably not keep a bathroom scale of this sort for very long." (Goldman, 1961, p. 283.)

(2) Tests to provide information to the psychological expert for decisions about clients.

(3) Tests to provide information primarily for the client's own decisions.

Testing for Selection

These distinctions all emanate from the concept of where we place the basic locus of responsibility and control for decisions. In the first case, for example, tests are used by admission committees in colleges to sort applicants into two groups. The client does not participate in this decision, but test information ("outside" information) about the client is the relevant data. Another example would be the use of tests by school systems to classify and distribute students across various curricula. Thus if we know that ability level *W*, interest pattern *X*, achievement level *Y*, and extra-curricula activities *Z*, relate to successful performance in College A (or more accurately perhaps, are what College A "wants" or "needs"), then the college uses the tests' results to assign students to one of the binary categories.* Tests are used, and properly so, to serve allocation functions and to provide data for distributive decisions about clients or students. The locus of the decision remains clearly in the hands of the institution through its administrative official. It is, however, quite erroneous to ascribe this testing function to a guidance purpose. The tests *do* serve a purpose but *not* a guidance purpose. Testing for selection or identification of students (that the system deems essential), or testing for the distribution of students across various curricula: these are testing functions that primarily serve the institution. Only indirectly, and in some instances very indirectly, would testing for this purpose serve the direct interests of the client.

The boundaries between testing to serve the client's decision or the institution's decision need clarification. An example might be (again using our college illustration) the use of tests for admission. The candidate would be required to demonstrate a particular level of competencies. However, once he is admitted, testing (not necessarily the same tests) could be used to provide him with information about himself in relation to a series of choices where the decision would be his own. In the latter part of this chapter, we shall provide some examples of the form that this

* Student applicants often desire to know their "chances" for admission to a particular college. A wry comment is sometimes: "Fifty-fifty—you either make it or you don't."

kind of testing would take. In the main, we wish to emphasize the distinction by purpose. *Tests to serve administrative purposes, which leave the power of decision with the system rather than with the individual, are not tests for guidance.*

Testing for Diagnosis

A second purpose for testing, which is often confounded in a model for guidance, is the role of tests for the psychological diagnosis of children. In any school system there are numbers of children who have moderate to severe emotional problems which impair their learning ability. The estimates of emotional problems usually run from 8 to 15 percent of almost any sufficiently large population or group; a school setting is no exception. There is an obvious need for differential diagnosis of these difficulties as a first step toward appropriate treatment or remediation. A careful analysis of the child's intra-psychic balance, or a clinical appraisal of the child in relation to the environmental press is necessary. An identification of learning disabilities rooted in the child's past experiences is essential. This kind of information, again, is "outside" information. The pupil is usually given a carefully selected battery of personality tests specifically designed to tap information about his make-up, with increasing emphasis on psychological dynamics. For example, the examiner may use an individual test of intelligence, a sentence completion test, a Thematic Apperception Test, and the Rorschach Ink Blot test. As McArthur and Dinklage note:

The purpose of a test battery is to have the time to observe one person in action under a variety of circumstances, working on a variety of problems, and, whenever possible, for a variety of observers. Such variegated samples of his functioning afford the psychologist the opportunity to contrast and compare, to see what behaviors are more ephemeral, what behaviors more enduring aspects of the person's life style. The tests themselves are a means of varying the situation; the conclusions drawn are the result of logical shifting of the collected evidence. More thinking time must go into each session than the sum of the testing time and the time spent on the clerical work of test scoring. White says it well: "The diagnosis of each personality is a miniature scientific experiment."

(McArthur and Dinklage, 1961, p. 34)

The results of such testing can be essential for decisions to be made about the pupil. The assumption is that the pupil's difficulty or emotional adjustment is of such an order that he cannot make his own decisions. In the long run, that would be harmful and self-defeating. If the test results confirm this assumption of extensive emotional difficulty and inordinate interference with normal behavior, then the results may also indicate the appropriate course of action to follow for the client. For example, the test information could provide a basis for referral to a "special class" or special form of treatment. Of course, these decisions must be reported to the client in such a way that he, and if necessary, his parents, will accept them. This is not the same as providing information to a student which gives him a series of options or alternatives for his own consideration. We have observed that school settings seem to be particularly ambivalent about this issue in testing. In our view, this ambivalence probably derives from a lack of clarity as to purpose. If a school, or any educational setting, decides that something more than simple detection of emotional problems is in their proper scope, then it is necessary to draw specific guide lines for diagnostic testing.* We do need to underscore one important point. This kind of psychological testing cannot be accomplished in a haphazard way. There is no legitimate short-cut to "instant" diagnosis. The "miniature scientific experiment" of personality assessment commands a commitment of staff, time, and money. Lacking this basic commitment, diagnostic testing should not be practiced, for inaccurate half-analyzed psychological information about a student can be much more detrimental to his future than a complete absence of such data. Naturally, neither situation is commendable, but too often, some diagnostic testing is thought to be better than none. In this case it is a rather dangerous illusion.

We do emphasize that the psychological diagnosis has a very definite and important role, but for a specific purpose and a specific population. We see as untenable the view that objective appraisal of students is dysfunctional for guidance. For students whose personality encumbrances place them outside the range of normal behavior, whose

* We would argue, of course, for the inclusion of psychological services for diagnosis and appraisal as essential school services. Allinsmith and Goethals note that the school is the one place where all youths congregate, thus providing a framework for early detection/ diagnosis, and a more hopeful prognosis. The recent growth of the mental health movement in schools provides a rather compelling rationale for psychological diagnosis which is early and sufficiently competent to prevent even more serious complications at later and more disturbed stages (Allinsmith and Goethals, 1962).

past experiences so significantly influence their present perception that they literally cannot accurately perceive reality—for these students, accurate appraisal of their personality deficits is critical. This mode of evaluation is, however, different from guidance testing, although not, we wish to stress, in opposition. It is different for the very reason that the problem is different. The power and initiative for decisions cannot be left to the student in the context of emotional disturbance. Psychological diagnosis forms the basic data and the necessary information about the client which the psychological expert uses as a legitimate and systematic basis for selecting the appropriate course of action for the client. Testing that is appropriate to enhance normal behavior and personal autonomy is not necessarily appropriate or even useful for abnormal behavior. The identification of abnormal patterns is the challenge to psychological testing.

Tyler provides a convenient distinction between diagnostic testing and guidance testing. The difference is implicit in the distinction between psychological appraisal of a client and appraisal *with* a client. On this basis, we now turn to the third dimension of testing purposes: a guidance purpose.

Testing for Guidance

A guidance purpose for testing can be illustrated by our use of the terms "outside" and "inside" information. Leona Tyler denotes this as the difference between appraisal *of* versus appraisal *with* the student.

The most distinctive feature of counseling (guidance) as compared with other varieties of psychological appraisal is that it is appraisal *with* the client rather than *of* him. It is his own awareness, not the counselor's, that is important. Often, if not always, he will see before the counselor does some characteristic of himself and his situation that leads to a restructuring of possibilities. The task of the counselor is to facilitate the client's self-appraisal rather than to make an objective diagnosis.

(Tyler, 1964, pp. 78-79)

If we accept this posture for testing, that of enhancing the client's ability to make his own decisions, then it is necessary to examine again the concept of developmental stages and tasks. Put simply, the question is, what choices may be open for consideration by the student at any particular point in his passage through the educational system? In this light, the normal developmental stages and tasks form a framework of choices

around which guidance testing can be ordered. If we go back to our college freshman illustration, perhaps this will be clarified. Some time during the freshman or sophomore years in a liberal arts college, students are confronted with a particular choice, the choice of a major or area of concentration. In most instances, as long as the student is in reasonably good standing, he has a relatively free choice of area. Generally he makes his decision on the basis of a subjective weighing of one or more pieces of information. He may have taken "survey" courses, attended a department meeting for prospective concentrators, or talked with a few upperclassmen. The amount of data he has will vary tremendously, and most of it is gathered in a rather haphazard, unsystematic, and random manner. A counselor, in this situation, might help the student explore some of his feelings and confusion, but even the counselor is still operating largely from an intuitive framework.

Whitla, who directs a testing program in a liberal arts college, notes that for many students, the choice of a major often makes college a "dazed encounter—with the student unable to grasp meanings in the work required." He points out:

Interview studies conducted in this Office have given us some disconcerting insights into the ways decisions about concentration are made. Often such random factors as having friends in the field, the chance encounter with a particular course, the influence of a professor who made the subject mean enough to merit further effort, were the determining ones. When choice of concentration is made by chance, or because it is a relatively safe or easy choice, or because the personality of the teacher is charismatic, the impetus toward a discipline can be essentially external rather than a commitment to the field as a body of knowledge.

(Whitla, 1964, p. 20)

Thus many decisions about concentration may in fact be made on the basis of chance, situational factors, e.g., a charismatic teacher or family pressure, or perhaps on unexamined personal factors. Occasionally, tests are used to provide some additional bases for a decision, but these are largely derived from the inadequate and misleading univariate model we have previously outlined.

At this point, then, the student is facing a discontinuity. He is requested to move to a new stage in his educational process, to select a major course of study for his upperclass years. He has little to go on as a basis for choice except a subjective and somewhat volatile collection of some

"outside" information he may or may not have gathered. Then he tries to translate this outside information "inside" as a basis for choice. The result, too often, is probably chance rather than choice as the determinant of his major. The "migrations" in college majors attest to the existence of a substantial amount of change, most of which, we would argue, is the result of an inadequate original decision.

A MODEL FOR TEST INTERPRETATION: A REVIEW OF STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

Without going into details of statistical derivation which are available elsewhere, we will illustrate how it is possible to marshal relatively systematic and valid information that will serve as a more adequate basis for a decision such as selecting a college major. This implies two stages: (1) a method for presenting relevant data—a systematic collection of outside information, and (2) a translation of this data *into* the student. The latter point is, of course, the crucial one. The assimilation and understanding, by definition, is important if we expect the student to make *his* own decision.

The problem of arranging significant data for a student has been an unusually difficult one. Two statistical techniques, multiple regression analysis and multiple discriminant analysis, have been used separately, and each procedure contains serious shortcomings. Regression has been appropriate to predict how well a student might do when measured on a criterion of "goodness," such as grade point achievement. Discriminant analysis has been used to place the student into certain nominal or *a priori* categories, such as similarity to or membership in groups, but without regard to the question of successful performance within the group.

Two examples may illustrate the problem. If we wish to predict how well a student may achieve in various curricula, the usual procedure would involve a regression analysis. The assumption here is that usually a student will elect the area where he may do the best work. But some rather anomalous results incur if we follow this procedure. Research in a secondary school has shown that if students chose between a "business" curriculum and a "college prep" curriculum, "on the basis of highest expected grade (G.P.A.) relative to the average grade for the curriculum, all students would choose the business curriculum." (Tiedeman and Sternberg, 1952, p. 261.) In other words, the regression analysis would predict

that students in the college curriculum should elect the business curriculum on the basis of highest expected grade point achievement.

It also happens that regression analysis will yield completely opposite results if we change the criterion from highest grade index "relative" to the average grade to a criterion of just the highest grade index. In the latter case *all* students would choose the college curriculum if they followed the prediction.

Earlier, Hull (1928) had suggested multiple regression as a method to predict success in occupations for all entrants to the job market. As was pointed out, this ignores the fact that a person must first be a member of the specific group before his rank in that group can be estimated (Rulon et al., 1967). The authors cite examples from a study by Dunn (1959). She found that the multiple regression equation, when used to predict success in chemistry as a college major, ignored mathematical ability. The reason for this was simply that the criterion group (students majoring in chemistry) *all* had high mathematical ability. The variation in math ability was very narrow. Low math-ability students do not major in chemistry. Thus math ability did not correlate with grades in chemistry. The variance in math ability was eliminated prior to entry.

A perhaps less pedestrian example is provided by Rulon (1951) in his, "The Stamina and the Separile: A Fable." He describes the plight

of a poor hexagon who looks like this  , in the midst of an identity

crisis, i.e., it does not know whether "it" is or should be a square,  ,

or a circle,  . The point of the fable is simply that depending on

which statistical procedure is used, the hexagon can be either. It can "be" a very superior circle and only a very mediocre square if regression is used. However, using discriminant analysis, "it" turns out to most resemble a square. In fact "it" looked more like a square than most squares!

When we compare a student's test scores to scores of people in various groups (such as people in various occupations or in major fields of concentration in college), if we wish to find which group the student is most "like," then discriminant analysis would be the appropriate procedure. Discriminant analysis by virtue of its characteristics will maximize the differences between two groups or across a series of groups

(Sprinthall, 1964; Tiedeman, 1951; Rulon, 1951; Cooley and Lohnes, 1962). The result will be to emphasize the similarity of the student's scores to the group he most resembles. The limitations of this procedure are minimal. In fact, as Cooley noted (1963), it is not limited to just two groups as was Fisher's classic work in statistics. The procedure may now be used with multiple groups and a multiple battery of tests. However, the discriminant procedure does not replace multiple regression analysis in a general sense. If we select a criterion of "goodness," such as predicting how well a student would achieve in a particular subject, then regression analysis would be necessary. To return to our fable for a moment—the hexagon is a "good" circle by regression or most "like" a square by discriminant analysis.

King (1958) demonstrated, just using discriminant analysis, that measures of interest were the major contributors to efficient prediction of college concentration. Although he did not compare regression and discriminant analysis, his finding of comparative differences among predictors represents a significant contribution.

The studies cited are examples of the multivariate procedures that are now available to combine data from test batteries. We have pointed out, in an earlier section of the chapter, a need for more comprehensive procedures to accurately process data from a series of tests. In the broadest terms, research and the development of methodology indicate that an array of tests is appropriate, not just separate measures of interest or ability. Also, simultaneous analysis of the resultant multiple variables is indicated and possible only through multivariate procedures. Finally, studies have indicated that depending on the multivariate procedures (discriminant analysis or regression) the outcomes of such forecasts or predictions will vary. What is clearly needed, then, as the first step to effective test interpretation to the student, is a method of analyzing test information that is congruent with both the concept of a test battery and multivariate procedures. In the latter case, however, it is also clear that we could hardly be completely satisfied with either procedure by itself. Test information ought to provide the student with an accurate and comprehensive picture of his abilities and his interests, in relation to groups he resembles most and where he may succeed. In other words, a forecast based on test information should include elements of both "like" and "good." Test information of likelihood of success (from regression) and of maximum likelihood of membership in nominal groups (from discriminant analysis) needs to be combined. For example, a student facing

choice of concentration could then receive test information that would tell him not only which group of concentrators he is most "like" but also how well he is likely to achieve in any of those groups.

It is suggested here that when test information is processed through both discriminant analysis and regression analysis, then a comprehensive rather than a truncated picture can emerge. The student can see himself in relation to how well he might achieve in a particular area combined with how similar he is to students who are currently members of that area. Both maximum likelihood of success and maximum similarity are thus included. A prediction along both dimensions is obviously necessary. In this circumstance the prediction to the student might include a ranking based on both maxima (similarity and success): group membership and grade achievement. He is most "like" chemistry majors with honor grades, next "like" psychology majors with regular grades, and so forth through all of the programs and achievement levels that may be meaningful.* The procedure can also specify the relative weights of predictor variables for each group. However, in order to prevent confusion for the student, it is unimportant to explain the complex make-up of the predictors. In fact, one of the substantial inherent advantages is the directness of test interpretation that is possible. For example, there is no need to carefully differentiate between the elements on the test battery. The student could be told rather simply that in choosing a college major both his pattern of abilities and interests are useful in comparing himself to students already in various fields. A second obvious advantage to the procedure is that the data can be analyzed in an immediate time sequence and compared to a meaningful reference group. The student is in college now. He wants to choose a major for next term. The procedure can provide data for that step and in those terms. We have to explain neither some of the fuzzy concepts on tests of ability (visual-spatial relations, for example), nor similarity in interest patterns to at least a few rather remote occupational keys (on the SVIB, for example). In a similar way, it should be possible to provide test information to students at earlier educational stages as well.

The suggested procedural analysis of test information could become very useful at all choice-points or decision-points that the student confronts—in selecting a program in junior high school and in high school as well.

* Tatsuoka originated a scheme to combine the two procedures, regression and discriminant analysis, into what he termed a "joint-probability index" of membership and success in a given group. For the technical details, procedures, and derivations, see Tatsuoka, 1957.

Guidance information would be available and understandable throughout a sequence of decisions, although the specific array of choices would vary according to the context.

For example, for a high school student, the forecast might include his relative standings in categories such as Cooley and Lohnes (1966) have used in Project Talent. They found, incidentally, that broad but immediate choice categories were the only efficient way to classify choice possibilities. They classed high school boys into just six categories: physical science, medicine-biology, humanities-social service, business-college, technology-non-college, business-non-college. Any further refinements in categories were not justified. It was neither efficient nor justifiable to provide for highly specific categories because specific career choices by adolescents in secondary school are simply too volatile. Cooley and Lohnes note that only 35 percent of twelfth grade boys planning on engineering had similar plans one year later. The retention rate in other specific fields varied from 26 percent for a one year span to 17 percent over the span from the ninth grade to high school graduation.

While this certainly underscores the need for up-to-date and accurate information, there are other important considerations. In secondary schools particularly, we foresee the development of increased flexibility in curriculum planning, increased student options, elective courses, and a breaking down of the rigid tracking system that now exists in most schools. These are the directions that schools must move toward as it becomes more and more evident that transformations are needed to educate students to live significant lives in the last quarter of this century. These issues will be discussed at greater length in the last chapter, but such concerns obviously have a special relevance as we examine the role of testing for guidance.

In this chapter thus far, we have been outlining several serious deficiencies in testing and appraisal. The first point was a needed clarification as to the purpose of testing itself. The second set of problems concerned the inadequate statistical procedures that have been used to accumulate test data, once the purpose had been clarified. Now we can turn to the third and final issue: How can a student be helped to understand not only *what* the assessment information means, but also *how* that information will allow him to act in ways compatible with our directing concepts for guidance? Since we have developed a theme of guidance for human growth under concepts such as personal autonomy, self-mastery, and competence, how can those processes be enhanced through

the transmittal of assessment information? Since we now have the means to accumulate accurate information, we need to develop procedures to transmit the data. When we noted earlier the difference between "outside" information and "inside" information, this indicated that the critical dimension is to devise ways for students to capture the information and process it on their own terms. Students need to use the information as a basis for exploring and examining the choices and decisions they confront. Such a context is the only way to avoid the charge that guidance testing would inhibit or deter self-development. If the test information is not fully comprehended and controlled by the student, his own freedom of action and choice will be limited in arbitrary ways. Indeed he will be no better off than the students who received erroneous information in the case cited earlier. In that case, there was the ironic safeguard that the transmission process itself was usually so confusing that decisions were probably made on other bases.

TOWARD A METHOD FOR STUDENT INFORMATION-INTERACTION

To suggest a solution, given the immense complexity of the problem of interpretation, may be premature. However, the pioneering work of Tiedeman (1968) on this problem gives evidence to suggest new and dramatic procedures for information transmission. The reason the problem is immense is by now obvious. What we are focused on is the process of teaching and learning. The student needs information as *content*, such as knowledge of his various capacities, aptitudes, and interests. He also needs information of *process* to develop his own self-direction, control, and a sense of personal initiative. Tiedeman uses the phrase "agency" to denote as a process goal, the ability of the student to take charge of outside information—a personal agency that will allow a person to fully explore current and projected alternatives and options, to change his mind (so to speak), and take another look at some previously neglected or discarded choice.

Until Tiedeman's concepts and procedures were available, the transmittal of guidance information was analogous to the most sterile of all the traditional teaching procedures in a regular classroom. The student was essentially passive in both contexts. Guidance information was as

significant as rote memorization of English poetry. The almost total failure of what has been called vocational guidance has been clearly presented elsewhere. (See particularly Barry and Wolfe, *Epitaph for Vocational Guidance*, 1962.) Suffice it to say that the complete lack of process interaction between the student and the vocational information prevented any meaningful personal development. Students went through the motions in guidance classes: occupational information was dutifully examined, "career" days were held, charts and job profiles were presented, and then the students went their own way.

The Tiedeman model holds that vocational or career development will be totally ineffective if we continue to view it as a separate, outside aspect of the student's life. Rather, we need to view career development as personal development—a person managing the emergence of a career in the world of work. In this regard, the individual will go through stages of development analogous to the stages suggested by Erik Erikson. Career development is then a dynamic process through a sequence of stages, with early beginnings in personal exploration and examination, gradually emerging through a series of choices and eventual commitments that an individual will make. The critical point with regard to career guidance and school children is that such a process of personal growth can be facilitated. Tiedeman has created a system based on the active interaction between pupils and "outside" information (data about education, occupation, and the pupil's own idiosyncratic interests, abilities, values, etc.). In that context each student can actively explore such information over time. Through junior and senior high school, for example, an exploration and examination of questions about "self" can occur: Where am I headed? What kinds of opportunities seem appropriate? Am I being too selective? Have I passed up some avenues for the future by being too safe? These are a few of the questions that students can confront as they interact with the information system. The student, not the guidance expert, is put in charge of operating the system (which is computer-based, since only a computer could both store and retrieve instantaneously, masses of data concerning "self" and educational/occupational information). As the technical details are available elsewhere, we have chosen to focus on the concepts involved, namely, a means to accumulate accurate information, and second (and by far the more important), a means through which a student can learn about himself in a career development framework that deliberately puts him in charge of the process. He experiences a system designed to teach him of his own initiative, potentials, and above all, of his ability to choose for himself.

Vocational Development and Aspects of Personal Development

A general developmental framework for guidance objectives has been suggested (Chs. 2 and 3), based not only on Erikson's stages of personal development but also on Kohlberg's study of stages of value development, and Perry's ideas on stages of values and attitudes toward learning. To this we can tentatively add a framework of stages in vocational/career development. We must remember, however, that vocational or career development is *not* providing superficial outside information to students, or as someone put it, "Just giving the kids the employment section of the paper." As a person develops, he inevitably thinks about himself and the world of work; and he thinks particularly about the choices he may make. How comprehensive his thinking is on such issues of self and career will depend to a large extent on the quality of guidance available to him. Studies have shown that common sources of information and assistance in this regard vary from the inadequate to the erroneous. In fact, it is often the case that the poorest source of assistance on such decisions was provided by the student's own parents. Thus, the need for education vis-à-vis self and career is obvious. Also, on the basis of a group of theorists, it may be possible to connect this need to the model for development previously outlined.

Super has indicated, from his studies on the development of vocational maturity, that stages and tasks do appear in both a sequence and a manner that fits the concept of psycho-social stages. The changes that occur over time are significant; the person develops a new way of perceiving himself in regard to career that is qualitatively (not just quantitatively) different from previous stages, and appears irreversible (Super 1963). Tiedeman and O'Hara, in a similar framework, have focused major attention on the sequence of the choice process itself as a genuine developmental phenomenon (1963). Such theorists are thus currently engaged in working out the concepts that will bring vocational development from its present inadequate status to a position where self and career development will be an integral part of guidance for human growth.

While this framework is being developed, the procedures to interact directly with students at various grades in school are also beginning to be tried out. In this way the problem of test interpretation for guidance can be re-cast into an educational and learning format. We then have a time span beginning at elementary school and extending to high school

and post high school to aid students in their learning about self and career—a learning that primarily entails the development of personal initiative and mastery over the process of choice. Otherwise we will still be caught in the myth of testing, appraisal, and guidance as providing information for a single choice, at one point in time, that is definitive and unchanging.

S U M M A R Y

This chapter reviewed several common problems associated with guidance and testing. Four major difficulties were underscored, all essentially derived from purposes antithetical to the general concepts of guidance. Major distinctions were then presented between test information for institutions or outside experts and information for the direct benefit of the student. Only in the latter case could testing and appraisal fit the model for guidance described in this volume.

The next part of this chapter described the statistical problems associated with the accumulation of accurate appraisal information for the student. Most current methods are highly inaccurate and confusing. Examples were presented of how measures of interests and abilities (so-called non-cognitive or motivational variables, and cognitive variables) could be combined to provide information at various choice points in the student's educational experience.

Finally, the chapter concluded with a discussion of career development as an aspect of personal development. Newly emergent theories completely revise the old static views of career development as equivalent with information transmittal. Instead it now appears that a genuine framework for self and career is possible, and that the framework does conform with the concepts of development described earlier in this volume. This will provide a comprehensive basis for guidance that will include career development as an essential element, not just an adjunct, of human growth.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS: CONSULTATION AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

In the first four chapters, we discussed theories for guidance and suggested that guidance could become a major educational function paralleling and complementing the teaching function, from elementary school through college. We noted that personal development could rightly become a primary focus for educational intervention, and we compared certain assumptions about human growth concerning those issues. In Chapters 5 and 6, we examined some specific aspects of guidance as practice, namely counseling and appraisal. These functions, appropriately defined, should always be part of an effective guidance program. Initially, the plan for the book called for a third chapter on aspects of guidance under the rubric of consultation. Clearly, counseling students individually or even in groups, and establishing a reasonable program of on-going assessment with students, could not become the only functions of guidance. If this were the case, it would be far too easy for either aspect to remain isolated from the main thrust of the school. Quite naturally, then, a guidance function as consultant or commentator on the school itself, the organ-

ization of people running the school, and the relationships between the school and the community seemed an obvious third aspect.

In spite of such an obvious implication, the role of guidance as consultant is almost nonexistent. In practice, as we noted earlier, school guidance counselors take almost no part at all in the planning of the curriculum (Wrenn, 1962). This means that curriculum, defined as what we as educators want the student to learn, is developed exclusively by the subject matter specialists; no one considers the personal development of the students, their stages and tasks. In fact, if we examine the kind of consultation that is practiced (and then only in a very small number of schools), we find that it focuses on individual students, not on the school or the educational program. In this sense, consultation is really concerned with "problem" children one at a time, where the questions tend to be referral problems, diagnostic problems, etc. In fact, in some few schools this consultation is quite substantial, composed of teams of specialist-resource personnel (school psychologists, remedial speech and reading teachers, school psychiatrists). While we do not suggest that such consultation is inappropriate, this model does not serve as a basis for changing the instructional program or atmospheres for learning in school, except in quite indirect ways. Mary Alice White has noted this problem as the "Little White Clinic" in the "Little Red School."

As a result of the present state of consultation, we decided to focus instead on general questions concerning the present impact of schooling, in order to demonstrate the need for guidance as educational consultation rather than as simply remedial. We shall turn first to a general outline of the problem: institutions, students, and the so-called hidden agenda.

THE HIDDEN AGENDA: WHAT IS LEARNED IN SCHOOLS?

Since the advent of McLuhan, it has become fashionable to conceive of all problems as problems of communication and media. In another sense this connotes the importance of what is called the *hidden agenda* or the *implicit curriculum*; namely, what is really learned during the process of education. There is no question that students spend large amounts of their life experience in classrooms, from elementary school through college. Philip Jackson has estimated some seven thousand hours during elementary school, and a similar estimate can easily be made for the secondary school. It is probably not an overstatement to say that children in the process of growing up spend more waking hours in a school than in any other single setting. Thus by sheer exposure, what a person learns about the world and himself is probably affected in major

ways by that extensive experience. The messages he sends and receives to teachers and to students can be both his feedback and his feed-forward. The medium which encapsulates all these messages is contained in the attitudes, values, and expectations of the senders and receivers. We noted earlier that Rosenthal's work had demonstrated the critical nature of such variability in conveying messages. It is also interesting to note that his work suggests, at least in the area of interpersonal communication, it is the audio-channel that is most significant. Voice tone, inflection, affect, etc., are more significant than the content of the message itself in conveying expectations, even when the expectations are apparently unintentional. How we perceive others, feel about them, regard them—such messages are transmitted not so much through body language or visual channels as through the auditory.

A student spends substantial time in school, during which he is constantly sending and receiving messages or communication units. From these messages he learns far more than just how to spell or multiply or "find Chicago," for example. This means that the most general perspective is necessary to view the process of guidance and the growth of students. By the concept of curriculum, we really mean what the adults who manage a school (or what the community who hires the adults to manage it), want their students to learn. Learning, in this framework, encompasses much more than simply a series of discrete skills or separate school subjects.

The School as a Reflection of Society

The overall organization or atmosphere of the school teaches children just as surely (if not more so) as the specified curriculum content. Grannis, in a recent article, pointed out that schools in general could be classified into a rough typology, namely, family schools, factory schools, and corporation schools. The latter two models are by far the predominant mode for schools in this country. The factory school model is usually found in working class (or blue collar) neighborhoods. The organization of the school generally includes: students working on identical material at a uniform pace, a standard grading procedure, carefully prescribed assignments, rote teaching, etc. As Grannis put it so well:

Thus, the students in the factory school learn to think in terms of a crude standardization of products, effort and reward and . . . to expect an arbitrariness of the standards and . . . the necessity of repetition.
(Grannis, 1967, p. 18)

By emphasizing the routine, the average, in an essentially paternalistic atmosphere, the messages that are transmitted to students in a factory school are clear and unambiguous. What they are really learning is the ability to eventually take their place on a production line, to follow orders, and to standardize output. Those are the attributes that will be rewarded later.

In the corporation model the atmosphere is quite different. The buildings themselves are usually more up-to-date, with one story sprawling construction and groomed shrubbery. . . . Inside, differences are noticeable too: modular scheduling, team teaching, multi-media instruction, and extensive evaluation procedures. In short, the atmosphere connotes specialization, efficiency, and elaborate equipment. "The whole attitude of the school is oriented toward planning and rationalization and toward the employment of specialized skills and technology." (Grannis, p. 20.) The school has a highly differentiated adult bureaucracy and collective planning. The result, Grannis suggests, is an atmosphere of de-personalization and a concomitant emphasis on individual achievement and competition. In this sense, the corporate school is a mirror image of the corporate life, suggesting that management training, and/or junior executive development programs may indeed start quite early.

If the framework for guidance is to have any significant meaning, we must see the growth and development problems in this broad perspective. Otherwise we would be attempting to create a theory and practice of limited importance. Guidance as a system of individual attention, for example, might be simply a partial antidote for students caught in a corporately organized school. Similarly, guidance as a special service or as a haven for pupils would be essentially beside the point. If, however, a guidance perspective included the ideas of human development noted in Chapter 2, and comprehended a value framework noted in Chapter 3, we could develop both the teaching and guidance functions from a framework that would be compatible with how children grow and develop, rather than how adults *think* that process occurs. This does not mean everyone in a school either is or should be a psychologist, or that a psychologist-human development expert should be given authority over the schools. But it must be recognized that adults who run schools do "psychologize" about children all the time. We constantly make assumptions about children, usually at the highly simplified level of conventional wisdom: "He's an underachiever because he's lazy." "He lacks sufficient attention span." "He's afraid to try something new because he's a perfectionist." "She's not adequately motivated at home." "Her peer rela-

tionships are inadequate because she's an only child." A perusal through almost any school's anecdotal records would reveal thousands of such authoritative and conclusive statements about children. This kind of psychologizing, of course, has the added purpose of focusing the difficulties either firmly inside each child or inside the child's home, but never as a result of interactions with teachers.

THE INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS ON HUMANS

Goffman (1961) has done a searching examination of caretaking institutions—asylums—which has more than indirect significance to the general problems of education. His analysis is towards institutions or organizations that, in general, can be considered total institutions. The clients do not choose to enter, but rather are enrolled by agents of society. Once given this degree of control, the institution can then use a series of strategies to force compliance by the person so involuntarily committed. The individual has no particular rights, but rather is given a series of duties that he is expected to perform. Goffman notes two general procedures that such total institutions use, namely, direct and indirect methods. Direct control is derived from the regulation of rewards, the "obedience" tests, the required verbal responses, etc. Indirect control comes from the informal privilege system; the control of dress, deportment, and manners; the requirements to perform regulated activities in unison; the need to be visibly engaged in activity, etc. When a person operates in the prescribed manner in such an institution, he becomes congruent with the official institutional view of him as relatively "normal" and well behaved. The number of adjustments the person must make, of course, ultimately drains away his own individuality and initiative. The high level of anxiety that can be created through direct and indirect influence by an institution virtually assures that the individual must accept the control and forfeit any direct influence over his own life. There are some secondary adjustments that people under such conditions can and do make—primarily, by developing a sub-society to function in the shadows. For example, patients in mental hospitals seek out "free" places in the buildings where they can control the activities themselves. In fact, the range of activities is quite astonishing.*

If we now turn to a study by Philip Jackson (1968) we will see some

* Goffman cites examples of patients developing an economic system by washing cars, tailor-making cigarettes, operating underground food services, etc.

parallels, even though they may only be metaphoric. Jackson has recently completed an observational study of elementary school classrooms. As he reviewed that experience, he developed a rough typology to classify the major elements of classroom life. He saw three main elements: Crowds, Praise, Power. The extent of crowds of people in a standardized environment (most of whom are there involuntarily), creates a condition of teacher management. Jackson found that teachers expended tremendous amounts of time and energy in management activities: controlling dialogue, supervising the time schedule, acting as supply agent and traffic manager, etc. The existence of crowds creates the need for traffic management. By using a series of strategies, teachers can control the group-living demands primarily through the use of praise and power. The teachers' command over the students' attention is the major source of power which is buttressed through a careful use of sanctions. By praising or withholding praise, the teacher can manipulate evaluation, competition among students, and comparisons between them. Behind the sanction of praise, as a back-up, resides the power inherent in an unequal situation of adult authority versus child dependence.

The Elementary Schools

When Goffman points to the control system of total institutions, some, if not many, of the same elements can be found in Jackson's classrooms. The requirement to perform regulated activities in unison, the need for visible engagement, the control of deportment, manners, dress . . . these are all familiar to the school as well as to the asylum. Duties are prescribed. Most classrooms in this country still are managed by the recitation method, despite all the theories to the contrary. Compliance, passivity, and reduced intimacy are what the children learn in classrooms, or as Jackson might say, all the extrinsic concomitants become the primary effect of education. In fact, it may seem from Jackson's analysis of elementary schools that, in spite of all the crowding and the crowds, each child may experience such an encounter only as in a lonely crowd.

The Secondary Schools

What of the secondary school? Does the metaphor from Goffman become weakened to such an extent that it is deceptive and no longer appropriate? Surely, by the time a student enters adolescence and secondary school, his control over his own life, the development of initiative

and competence should be more evident. If adolescence as a stage of development is viewed as a transition from childhood dependence to adult independence, then one would expect to find rather substantial differences in learning atmospheres in schools. However, a recent study of secondary schools calls this assumption into question and suggests instead that Goffman's concept of a controlling environment may still represent a major dimension of the secondary school. Also, the two main types of control may relate to Grannis' ideas in his suggestions of factory and corporate schools as organizations.

The study of adolescents was conducted in two public schools as general representations of large city high schools, on one hand, and large suburban high schools, on the other. In the city school, most of the students were from working class backgrounds; less than 20 percent of the graduates subsequently attend four year colleges. In the suburban school, most were from middle class backgrounds, and somewhere between 70 to 80 percent of the graduates attend four year colleges. The main purpose of the study was to focus on the students' perceptions toward school and learning, their reasons and motives for studying, and their values for education. Such variables as attitudes and perceptions can be conceptualized as representing not only how those students see and experience education, but also as elements that make up the atmospheres for learning. The students' personal understanding, their meaning systems, would stand as indices of their conceptions of themselves as learners, as well as their understanding of the meaning of knowledge. In this way, the study was focused on the subjective curriculum rather than on the objective, the latter being the more visible aspects, such as curriculum content, student-teacher ratio, books in the library, the condition of the bricks and mortar. It is an obvious bias perhaps, to consider these latter aspects of school as less important than the perceptions and attitudes of students. But if we are concerned, like Goffman, with what happens to individuality or self-concept under perhaps even benign conditions of socialization, then the focus may be more than just bias. One obvious reason for this view is the difference between our stated objectives and our actions.

Practically every educational institution that one could imagine suggests, either implicitly or explicitly, that its goals are to maximize the development of each student's potential to become a fully participating citizen in a democratic, egalitarian society. To what extent do our actions in school as teachers or counselors actually develop such sets and ideals within students? To understand such questions, we would need to examine their perceptions and attitudes, for those "things" will determine how

they will behave and respond to the demands of career and citizenship. John Seeley, in a classic study of adolescents in Crestwood Heights (the pseudonym of a fashionable suburb), observed rather bitterly that the difference between what the adults in that community say they value, and how they really act, was more than just an incidental incongruence. For example, the upper-middle class parent would say that his child's selection of a marriage partner should be based on what he is instead of what he has, "without regard to race, creed, or color, or above all—ugly word!—money." "Despite these deeply held and pervasive views, the marriages that do occur are not notably different from those that might have been arranged in a caste system based on race, creed, color, and—above all—money." (Seeley et al., 1956.)

The underlying attitudes, perceptions, and values are what such children have learned, and these form the basis for action rather than the oft-stated objectives of equality. So too in the Philip Jackson work, where the child learns of crowds, praise, and power, with probably more significant impact than is made by the multiplication table or the "Run Spot run—See Dick and Jane" epic. If we shift our viewpoint, then, away from the obvious things about school that we can see and count, to the apparently more invisible aspects, we may end up with clearer perceptions of the problems of education.

In the *Studies of Adolescents in the Secondary School* (Sprinthall and Mosher, 1969), the sets of attitudes and perceptions held by students became the major focus for examination. Using an array of assessment procedures (interviews, attitude scales, projective tests, Q-Sorts, etc.), the study pointed up basic between-school differences. In the urban school, the students, both boys and girls, tended to view learning as basically a passive process. Learning was obedience to teacher directives. The students' attitudes were those of unquestioning acceptance of adult authority. The teacher knows the correct answer, the student's job is to learn the teacher's interpretation. Regardless of the level of academic achievement, most students in the urban secondary school appeared to accept the conventional rhetoric about education. They felt that they would get a better job if they graduated from high school than if they dropped out, even though their interest in the subjects themselves was a passive interest and connoted going through the motions. The students had few questions about education. A student shouldn't disagree with a teacher's interpretation of a book; studying consisted of learning facts rather than opinions and following "tried and true" methods. Also, these students were most interested in pleasing their parents as a major goal of

their activity. In fact, when asked what might change their mind about attending college (since most had indicated they were not planning to attend) they mentioned their parents' views as the dominant influence.

In the area of decision-making by the urban students, the same general viewpoint emerges. Even though they were in the eleventh grade and many of them held part-time jobs after school, they still indicated that they relied on other people for decision-making, not on themselves. Thus, in a general way, the students in such a school setting have been prepared to live and work in the future based on a series of assumptions that seem very close to Grannis's concept of the factory school. To accept authority without serious question, to follow directives, to look to others for decision-making, and to conform—these are the essential preparations to take one's place on the production line in the world of work, a reality just around the corner for these students. But from another standpoint, namely, the oft-cited ideals of citizenship and the active participation in a democratically organized society by all members of that society, we have grounds for concern, and justified concern at that. Individuality or individual development has little importance in an institution seemingly committed to the development of a standardized product.

In the suburban public school, however, the students in the study manifested a set of perceptions and attitudes toward school that were significantly different from those held by the urban students. One might expect substantial distinctions simply by reason of the different school locations and student backgrounds. The suburban adolescents were relatively well-to-do, had higher educational aspirations, were more intelligent (as conventionally measured), and attended a modern school with multiple curriculum levels, many of the latest educational innovations, and a low teacher-student, counselor-student ratio. In these respects, then, the suburban students were certainly more "favored." More money was expended per pupil, and in its most visible aspects, the school was clearly superior to the urban school.

On the basis of these obvious differences, of course, it would follow almost naturally that the students would hold different sets of perceptions and attitudes toward learning. The surprising finding, however, was the actual content of those differences. The suburban students held much more negative attitudes toward education than did their urban counterparts. They saw school as boring, the subjects as uninteresting and tiresome, and would study only for examinations. They felt the press of gamesmanship for grades and the resultant oppression of institutional control. These perceptions and feelings came out strongly through an array of assess-

ment procedures. Cynicism seemed to be one of the concomitant attitudes that develops as a result of the experience of suburban education at the secondary level.

In addition to the dimension of negative motivation toward school, there was simultaneously a strong set of functional motives. Attitudes toward school can be conceptualized along a continuum from intrinsic interest to extrinsic. Intrinsic interest is fairly obvious as a concept. Learning is a self-enjoyable process, a value unto itself, without any necessary practical pay off.* Extrinsic motives would view learning almost exclusively in functional terms, as a means to an end. In the suburban school, the students viewed education almost exclusively in pragmatic and functional terms. School learning was seen as the means to job security and good incomes. College was almost synonymous with career preparation for positions as lawyers, business managers, accountants, engineers, dentists, etc. The value for upward mobility through education was unusually strong, which differed noticeably from the values in the urban school. There the students expressed an interest in getting a job that would not be as physically demanding as the jobs their fathers presently held, one where "you don't have to break your back," as they put it. While the urban students saw some connection between school work and their ability to get a job, the suburban students seemed to make that connection almost a way of life. Thus, their basic orientation to school was hard-nosed and pragmatic. It was also clear that grade consciousness was high, and the sanctions of academic grades exerted a strong influence on the students. In the urban school there was more talk of overt control by teachers and administration, through student passes, detentions, and corridor supervision, while in the suburban school, the threat of and the importance accorded to grades created an atmosphere of strong though covert institutional control, in the Goffman sense of indirect sanctions. As a result, direct and overt control was not nearly as necessary in suburbia. It was somewhat ironic that the students in the middle class school did not strongly value the idea of being a brilliant student. In fact, that value was far down on the list of things students wanted to be remembered for. Yet these same students did want what good grades and academic achievement would supply them with; namely, an index of successful competition and a position another rung up on the achievement ladder.

Returning to some of Grannis's comments about the corporation

* A recent work entitled *Education and Ecstasy* is a case in point. The process of learning is viewed as highly intrinsic and as satisfying as an orgasm, perhaps an overstatement even in a metaphoric sense.

school, one is struck by the similarity of some of his concepts and the perceptions and attitudes held by the suburban students. In large and complex organizations, membership and participation tend to be calculative. The "system" can become the object of manipulation. The gap between rhetoric and reality may be wide indeed between the stated values and their translation into practice. What the student seems to learn most significantly in the suburban school is to delay and postpone gratifications, to work for grades now to provide the means to enter college, which in turn is seen as a stepping stone to a profession.* In this way he may be less in control of his own life, less inner-directed in a Riesman sense than is the urban student.

The Colleges

The suburban student aims higher on the educational horizon, his values for the process are mostly extrinsic, and he may be more cynically aware of the compromise that ensues; for these reasons he may be less in control and more co-opted by the system. If that were the case, it would not be surprising that such students, once leaving the secondary school and the supervision implicit in living at home with one's parents, might, when they arrive on the college campus, exhibit a yearning for personal relationships, a sense of community, and a readiness to revolt once the previous sanctions and values become directly challenged. The heavy emphasis both in school, and, at least by implication, in the suburban community, on extrinsic rewards for academic performance, may set up those high school students for a violent reaction formation later on in their educational careers.

There is evidence in this regard largely based on some recent work by Heath (1968 A). Heath has been conducting longitudinal research on perceptions and attitudes held by college students and, as a result, has outlined some of the changes that have occurred on the college scene over the past two decades. This provides a good context to understand more fully some of the most significant changes and their implications for the problems of human growth in educational institutions. Rather than viewing the causes of student unrest and upset in conventional concepts, that is, as derivatives of the communication gap, adult hypocrisy, or the ubiquitous establishment, Heath suggests that the current problems are

* In fact at the time of the study, we were really struck by the extent to which the students viewed a liberal arts college as a trade school.

most significantly problems of human development and maturity. Students enter college both better educated, in the narrow sense, and at the same time less educable. Personal development has not kept pace with intellectual development. High school students today enter college, in many cases, having already covered the content of courses usually offered in the first two years of college some fifteen to twenty years ago. This means in one very important way that the academic curriculum in college no longer provides the intrinsic excitement involved in the discovery of new worlds of knowledge, nor the significant personal impact involved in revising one's conception of knowledge.

For example, a recent study by Perry (as we have noted) indicated that a student's conception of knowledge has shifted rather significantly over the past decade or so. Previously it was rather common for students to enter college perceiving knowledge as a fixed number of facts which a professor would transmit. In a manner similar to the attitudes toward learning demonstrated by the urban high school adolescents in a previously mentioned study, college students would view learning as memorizing facts and the teacher's interpretation of what those facts meant. In a delightful analogy, Perry describes that perception of learning as a process of decoding the "truth" from tablets in the sky which contain all the "right" answers. A significant personal learning experience occurred, often painful but nevertheless compelling, when a student gradually revised his own conception of learning. Perhaps the central aspect of this process was the personal experience of taking charge of one's own development, experiencing the initiative involved in a new conception of learning. This transforming experience during college is less likely to occur now, simply because many of the secondary schools that send large numbers to college have revised their curricula through changes such as advanced placement and now confront the students with the relativity of knowledge at an earlier point in their development.

One of the significant problems that this shift has created is the paradox of fostering, on one hand, a view of knowledge and learning as relative, while at the same time emphasizing the extrinsic importance of learning during the secondary school years. Thus the college may have lost a good part of its previous impact because of the increased intellectual sophistication of the students—a sophistication gained through the vehicle of extrinsic motives.

Another part of this problem, which Heath particularly notes, is that increased intellectual sophistication during high school may have taken

place at the expense of personal development; hence the phrase "better educated and less educable." In fact, his data indicate that, despite an exaggerated or precocious intellectualism, in personal terms the students are more inhibited, isolated, lonely, and self-centered. An increase toward privatism appears as an important concomitant of these forces.* He sees, almost as a tragic consequence, the possibility of entrapment between an intellectual narcissism and a private loneliness, or between a lack of intellectual humility and an over-concern with "not blowing one's cool." In fact, Heath interprets the current increasing demand for community as symptomatic. Of course the colleges themselves may unknowingly or unwittingly increase the students' demands for community, personal involvement, and experience-based maturation.

We substitute more advanced and specialized courses and more faculty—which all the evidence suggests have minimal maturing effects on students. . . . Students sense that and their cry has been these past years . . . "community . . . community."

(Heath, 1968 B)

However, it is one thing to realize what one may be missing, but quite another to know how to bring about the appropriate changes. If, for example, a student has missed a series of important and personally integrating experiences and instead developed a somewhat precocious intellectualized set of "lenses" through which he views the problems of the world, the solutions he may seek may be too singular. A desire for the "free university" may be understandable in that context but not necessarily the most appropriate solution to the problems of personal isolation, inhibition, and despair.

For the high school student, especially those in the so-called college prep public schools, the problem is obviously critical. He seemingly is caught in a cross fire between a demanding academic curriculum that produces an intellectual sophistication, and attitudes and values for education conceptualized in functional and economic terms. Grades become the oppressive sanctions, and cynicism and negative motivation become the personal learning experience. Institutional control through the manipulation of rewards, through the use of competition, through the promo-

* Heath's studies indicate that on a longitudinal basis an increasing number of entering college students now apply for "single" rooms. Another dimension of this privatism comes from a survey at Berkeley, where 36 percent of the graduates reported that they had no close friends during four years in college.

tion of achievement in learning rather than inquiry—all these prepare him for college, a preparation that is perhaps as subtle as it is destructive.

In college itself, as Heath has so well noted, important personal development may again be bypassed. Rather than make any serious attempt to directly alter the imbalance between the intellectual and personal, colleges too often choose to perpetuate the knowledge-acquisition model as their only purpose. Individual maturation is left to random forces and the vicissitudes of the moment. However, as is readily apparent from the headlines of any recent newspaper, the institutional controls (in the Goffman sense) are beginning to break wide open. The questioning that students may experience when they realize that knowledge is not a fixed entity or a truth written on a tablet in the sky, can be turned toward other objects as well as college textbooks. It is not surprising, then, that the "objects" in question may be the institutional structures themselves. Also, the lack of student involvement in how their own lives are being governed does indicate the need for significant alteration. And it is finally apparent to some students, after spending most of their lives in educational institutions, that their lack of personal development and involvement does not have to be passively accepted any longer.

One of the social inventions of an industrialized society has been the extension of adolescence as a stage of development to well nigh ridiculous proportions. For middle class children especially, there is high school, college, and increasingly, graduate school to complete before one finally steps out of adolescence and into adulthood. The time lag between the preparation for a career and the implementation of it has reached enormous proportions. Adolescence was, not too long ago, a brief period of exploration and high jinks between childhood dependency and adult independence. However, each decade sees a widening of the parameters that mark the end of one and the beginning of the other, to the point where one-third of the entire population of this country is neither fully one nor the other, but somewhere in between in the stage we now only euphemistically can call adolescence. Ruth Benedict, a social anthropologist, provides an excellent context to increase our understanding of the significance of such a shift through her concepts comparing the continuities versus the discontinuities provided by cultural sanctions. Many cultures deliberately use a series of societal instructions, rituals, and ceremonies to provide specific support to individuals as they move from one stage of development in the life cycle to the next. When she examines our own culture, she finds that we tend to maximize the discontinuity by teaching children the opposite of adult roles and simultaneously minimiz-

ing the support necessary to aid the individual in shifting from one set of expectations as a child to another as an adult.*

Perhaps the clearest example of the increased discontinuity of adolescence can be seen if we recall that increasing numbers of high school and junior high students are developing sophisticated intellectual/cognitive abilities. They learn to perceive knowledge not as a set of truths to be memorized or truisms to be repeated, but rather as a proximate and logically connected series of viewpoints which may represent our best understandings at the present time, subject to change. Their minds are being set free but not their lives. They learn the rhetoric of independence in thought but do not experience the reality of living in responsibility. This appears as the most critical fault of our educational institutions, indeed almost the Achilles heel. Alfred North Whitehead has commented, "The valuable intellectual development is self development." Perhaps one of the consistent ironies of all the movements for educational reform in this country is the general failure to genuinely change the impact of the educational program. If the school's role has been that of a socializing agent to homogenize the hitherto diverse products (i.e., the "melting pot," as early twentieth century America was denoted), there can be little question that it has failed. In fact, the concept of socialization itself results in a perpetuation of differences under the guise of local control. However, the needed reforms in schools and in curriculum will not come from just a revision of administrative arrangements concerning the control of schools, but rather from a revision in concepts and purposes of education itself.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GUIDANCE: EDUCATIONAL CONSULTATION

Certainly the hope and intent of this volume on school guidance and counseling is to provide a basis for a needed restructuring of education. We need to do more than simply increase the number of guidance personnel in schools. We need to provide a framework from which the practice of guidance can be derived, a framework that is broad enough to overcome the problems inherent in the current practices of guidance. This also means that we cannot restrict our views to a single dimension, since

* Benedict notes that we maximize differences and discontinuities by emphasizing the differences between child play and adult work. We stress child submission versus adult dominance, and teach that sexual expression is bad and dirty for one and appropriate for the other.

such changes would merely be tinkering adjustments. Education as an organization has been notable for its ability to resist change, to incorporate new ideas in ways that so compromise those new ideas as to render them ineffective, or to simply deny any real need for innovation. Too often guidance as theory and practice has been a passive handmaiden in this process, being ready to accept whatever role others were willing to ascribe. The problem, then, for guidance is especially complex. First, as we have indicated, we need to refocus aspects of practice, such as counseling and assessment, so that individual development can be promoted. Thus the traditional aspects of guidance must be reshaped. Second, and equally critical, is the role of guidance in changing the impact of the educational institution itself.

Guidance as educational consultation could bring with it certain unique advantages. Based on concepts of personal efficacy and the developmental stages and task framework we have noted, it could be possible to substantially revise our views on how to organize the school, how to help children learn, and how to better relate subject matter learning and personal development. Examples of this view will have to be somewhat mundane because of the primitive state of the practice. We are aware of the importance and indelible quality of initial learning experiences that occur in the first two grades in school. At the same time, pupils experience a major discontinuity in learning each time a teacher changes the task, say from addition to subtraction. First, then, it would be important to acknowledge the phenomenon and then to provide educational help, particularly, personal encouragement and sensitive support to the pupils at the onset of the discontinuity. An analysis of the errors children make during such periods would be particularly revealing of what they "heard" as opposed to what the teacher "thought" they heard. In fact on a subjective basis, it is truly amazing how many children learn to cover up their mistakes in elementary school, rather than using error as feedback to learn from mistakes. Such a simple principle of learning could be usefully practiced without any major reconstruction of the school except an attitudinal one.

In another situation, observation would show that in beginning to learn a new language in either elementary or secondary school, students are usually extremely inhibited and embarrassed over the problems of pronunciation. The result is perhaps too obvious to mention: tiny little voices meekly sounding out strange words, followed by collective mutism! One example of intervention provided by Truesdell (1968), demonstrated the effect of taking the children out of the classroom and using the stair-

well as an echo chamber. Feedback soon overcame inhibition, and pronunciation improved along with self-confidence.

At the secondary level, of course, the problems of adolescent development interfering with traditional learning abound. However, if we take a careful look at adolescence and see the raw amount of energy available, we will perhaps come up with some other model of curriculum instruction than the one currently used. We can continue to force the old system to work, through manipulation of obedience, conformity, and the threat of academic sanctions, or we can take a position made obvious by many theorists and create the conditions under which adolescents will experience genuine responsibility. One clear example would be for adolescents to teach and counsel in school. Educators and psychologists have long known that we learn the most when we try to teach someone else. (And the corollary has to be that authors of books learn more than readers!) There is no reason why adolescents have to be denied that experience. In fact successful small scale programs have already been tried (Cowen et al., 1966). The problem from an instructional standpoint concerns the possible ways of connecting a series of experiences under conditions of genuine responsibility so that the major questions of adolescence and identity formation can be addressed directly. Otherwise, such experience would remain outside the school and perhaps outside the person as simply interesting volunteer work.* Deliberate personal education during the secondary school years is an extremely promising area for investigation as a guidance function. However, this does not mean that we can rush in as guidance consultants, or as it is sometimes called, "agents of change," and begin to adopt all the current fads for schools. In fact there is a real danger that guidance practice may soon experience a new undirected "growth spurt" through the uncritical acceptance of techniques and methods currently popular: T Groups, Self-Analytic Groups, Improvisational Dance and Drama Groups, Marathon Groups, Outward Bound Groups, Achievement Training Groups et al. Hopefully, a more significant approach could emerge from a careful examination of the different dimensions of adolescence as a stage and the development of a systematic program for educational change. To adopt a few current frills will only insure that guidance, either as practice or consultation, will continue to remain separate and isolated from the main

* These educational problems are presently under study by the author and a group of colleagues including Professor Ralph Mosher at the School of Education at Harvard: "A Program for Deliberate Psychological Education for Adolescents in Secondary School." (Mosher, R. L. and Sprinthall, N. A., 1970.)

focus of school. If such continues to occur, then it would probably mean that once again the student is left out of the educational program of the school.


The need for substantial change at the college level is already obvious. The riots, occupations, demands for student power, and the deliberate destruction of the "old regime" are all symptoms of the underlying problems caused by the denial of significant personal responsibility. The universities are apparently caught flat in the middle of this dilemma. They seem very willing to turn over dormitory life completely to the students, while retaining exclusive control over instructional responsibilities. This will not work on either count. In the first place, during the past one hundred years, because of the way dormitories have been constructed, the authority of the college administrators has simply been replaced by the authority of the peer group in the dormitory. Under either system the individual has almost no voice in the moral or ethical atmosphere; the "establishment" has simply changed clothes. And in the second place, to deny college students an important voice in the direction of their own studies today is literally handing students a "cause celebre." In any case it is obviously critical that decisions concerning the personal development of students, whether at the elementary, secondary, or college level, not be left either to the exigencies of the moment or to the oppression of outmoded traditions.

SUMMARY

This chapter was originally intended to present a set of guidelines for consultation. We envisaged a three part role for guidance counselors in practice consisting of counseling, assessment, and consultation. However, as was noted, the present models for consultation do not provide an adequate framework. Where consultation has developed in schools, its focus is toward the "exceptional child"—in the form of diagnosis and referral. Instead of continuing to emphasize such a special role for consultation, we have taken a different position suggesting that guidance counselors develop a new focus to emphasize an educational rather than a remedial role.

As an educational consultant, we suggested that the counselor adopt a broad view of the school as a socializing institution. We particularly emphasized the impact of the so-called hidden agenda or the informal curriculum in schools and the extent to which schools, as systems, mold and shape attitudes toward self and perceptions of self as learner which are antithetical to the stated goals

of education. Guidance in practice that avoids or ignores the overall impact of the educational institution upon the students will also avoid or ignore the opportunity to achieve an important professional identity. A sense of professional identity will remain elusive if guidance counselors continue to accept the status quo and orient their counseling and vocational development activities around the edges, so to speak, of the school. The critical element now missing in schools is a focus on the personal efficacy of students. This chapter suggested that guidance consultation can provide a mechanism for this type of direct and deliberate impact.



EPILOGUE

There is an immediate and pressing need for guidance theory and practice to become relevant to the curriculum as a whole. This does not mean teaching the principles of guidance in groups, or adding a course in occupational information to the current school curriculum; such programs would merely perpetuate existing rationalizations for guidance as a pot-pourri of activities claimed by no one else. The overall problem faced by educators is the need to promote adequate personal maturation, or, as we have termed it, human growth.

If the studies mentioned early in Chapter 7 and the excerpts included at the outset mean anything, the problems we face concern curriculum revitalization (or perhaps just vitalization). The atmospheres for learning, the crowds, praise and power (Jackson); the institutional controls that de-humanize (Goffman); the factory or corporate atmospheres in schools (Grannis)—all point to the fundamental problems that education, including school guidance, must confront. The attitudes and perceptions that are currently fostered in schools are less than satisfactory, whether we look at the urban high school student who learns to memorize what the teacher wants to hear, or at the student in the suburbs who learns that the main reasons and motives for education are both economic and functional, or at the college students who are moving toward privatism and isolation.

We may at least hope that necessary changes will occur before any more generations of children experience the current mis-educational process. It is obvious that any civilization is dependent for its vitality and growth upon the quality of human beings it produces. In the past, through a series of fortunate historical accidents, our country has managed to unearth a small cadre of people in a series of fields (science, politics,

law, medicine, etc.) sufficient to provide technological advances. However, it is also becoming obvious that the major problems we now face as a country are not technological, but are problems of human interaction or social communication. We cannot allow solutions to such difficulties to be subject to random forces. It is the contention of this work that we take seriously the opportunities provided in educational settings, from nursery through graduate school, to affect the process of human growth. These are important years in the life cycle from birth to maturity. For this purpose we need a view of human growth and development that would comprehend personal mastery and self-esteem, that would promote our understanding of such natural growth trends in children, and that would acknowledge the importance of our perceptions and expectations toward children as well as *their* perceptions and expectations. Erik Erikson has noted: "We are now working toward and fighting for a world in which the harvest of democracy may be reaped. But if we want to make the world safe for democracy, we must first make democracy safe for the healthy child." (Erikson, 1959, p. 100.)

It is frightfully easy to pay lip service to a goal of human development and personal mastery for all. If such is the case and our acts lag far behind our lips, we shall have failed once again to respond to our most important natural resource—human potential.

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
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